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Chapter 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
    
 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
To perform their business activities effectively, organizations rely heavily on the use 
of information (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1996, p 1).  Owens (1998) reiterates this by 
claiming that all organizations depend on information for their everyday operation and 
without it business will fail to operate (Owens, 1998, p 1-2).  For an organization it 
means that if the right information is not available at the right time, it can make the 
difference between profit and loss or success and failure (Royds, 2000, p 2).   
 
Information is an asset and just like other important business assets within the 
organization, it has extreme value to an organization (BS 7799-1, 1999, p 1;  
Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 8).  For this reason it has become very important 
that business information is sufficiently protected. There are many different ways in 
which information can exist. Information can be printed or written on paper, stored 
electronically, transmitted electronically or by post, even spoken in conversation or 
any other way in which knowledge and ideas can be conveyed (URN 99/703, 1999, p 
2; Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 8; URN 96/702, 1996, p 3). 
 
It is, therefore, critical to protect information, and to ensure that the security of IT 
(Information Technology) systems within organizations is properly managed. This 
requirement to protect information is even more important today, since many 
organizations are internally and externally connected by networks of IT systems 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1996, p 1).   
 
Information security is therefore required to assist in the process of controlling and 
securing of information from accidental or malicious changes, deletions or 
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unauthorized disclosure (Royds, 2000, p 2;  URN 96/702, 1996, p 3). By preventing 
and minimizing the impact of security incidents, information security can ensure 
business continuity and reduce business damage (Owens, 1998, p 7).  
 
Information security in an organization can be regarded as a management opportunity 
and should become an integral part of the whole management activity of the 
organization.  Obtaining commitment from management is therefore extremely 
important for effective information security.  One way in which management can 
show their commitment to ensuring information security, is to adopt and enforce a 
security policy.  A security policy ensures that people understand exactly what 
important role they play in securing information assets.  The responsibility for 
ensuring information security therefore lies not only with technical staff, end-user staff 
and other members of staff, but a great deal of responsibility lies with management 
(Owens, 1998, p 7). It must, however, be understood that the information security 
process is not a once off exercise, but an ongoing activity, because if security is well 
managed, it should be a business enabler. 
 
Therefore, besides management commitment, it is essential that a structured approach, 
based upon an organization’s specific security need, is used to provide the most 
effective way of information security (Royds, 2000, p 2).  Such a structured approach 
can take the form of an Information Security Management System (ISMS), because as 
for the proper management of anything, it is important that a management system is 
established (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 6). Since information security is regarded as 
all the aspects related to defining, achieving and maintaining of security (ISO/IEC TR 
13335-1, 1996, p 1), the process of information security management intends to 
achieve and maintain appropriate levels of confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
accountability, authenticity and reliability of information (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1996, 
p 1). 
 
The Information Security Management System of an organization includes a number 
of documents, such as the organization’s risk management approach, the control 
objectives and the controls, together with the policy and procedure documents and all 
other relevant records (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 6; Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 
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1998, p 7).  It proves that even though information is shared, the Information Security 
Management System ensures the protection of information and computing assets 
(Owens, 1998, p 7).  The primary goal of an Information Security Management 
System is to be effective and efficient, since it should only undertake necessary tasks 
for the protection of information assets, while it avoids excessive control and waste of 
valuable resources.  
 
To achieve an acceptable level of information security, a suitable set of security 
controls should be identified and implemented to protect information assets (BS 7799-
1, 1999, p 1).  To make a positive contribution to the overall success of an 
organization, information security controls must be well chosen and properly 
implemented (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 6).   
 
Information security controls are used to provide the necessary protection to 
information assets against risks (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 9-20).  The 
amount of protection required to adequately protect all information assets against 
identified and unidentified risks is referred to as the information security 
requirements.  An organization should, therefore, first establish its information 
security requirements in order to identify and select which information security 
controls are required to provide an adequate level of protection (Humphreys, Moses & 
Plate, 1998, p 9). It is, therefore, necessary to have a good understanding of the 
security needs of the organization in order to select the most suitable information 
security controls, to ensure that risks are reduced to an acceptable level (BS 7799-1, 
1999, p 2; ISO/IEC TR 13335-4, 1997, p 22).  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Risk analysis was traditionally used in the computing environment to assist in the 
process of identifying and assessing risks to help in the process of identifying the most 
suitable controls.  Risk analysis was the main driving force behind the process of 
securing computer assets.  
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The basic risk analysis methodology involves the identification and valuation of 
assets, the identification of threats and their likelihood of occurrence, the assessment 
of the vulnerability or weakness and the severity thereof (Moses, 1992, p 229-230).  
Having done this, risks are identified and assessed, and based on the magnitude of the 
various risks, a set of controls is proposed to minimize the risks to an acceptable level 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1996, p 9; Moses, 1992, p 236). Risk analysis originates from 
the era where assets were mostly physical of nature, such as hardware (Cowcher, 
1992, p 311).  
 
But today we live in a society which is mainly driven by information.  In short it can 
be called the information society (URN 99/704, 1999, p 2).  Since the emphasis has 
moved over the last few years from security computer assets to security information 
assets, an alternative approach might be required to secure the information resources 
of an organization (Moses, 1992, p 229). 
 
The protection of information today has changed substantially from the protection of 
hardware in the early days, because nowadays it is more about protecting the 
information than merely protecting the infrastructure (Wills, 1999, p 1).  A risk 
analysis was, and still is, adequate to protect physical assets of which the threats and 
vulnerabilities can be estimated by means of qualitative and/or quantitative measures 
(Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 49). Information security, however, is evaluated 
in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity and 
reliability, as indicated earlier, and the risk analysis approach might not be the most 
effective to determine the amount of information security required.  Especially since 
the loss of confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity and 
reliability of information and services can have an adverse impact on an organization 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1996, p 1). Risk analysis and risk management are concerned 
with the assessment of risks, which is considered to be effective and fairly easy when 
taking into account, for example, the risks to physical assets.  Information security 
requirements, however, are concerned with the amount of security required for the 
effective protection of information assets. Thus, to ensure that the correct amount of 
information security is obtained to protect information assets, information security 
requirements need to be determined. 
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Having conducted a very thorough literature study, an effective methodology or 
technique to assist in the process of defining and determining the information security 
requirements of an organization, could not be identified. 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 
The primary objective of this project is to define and motivate a technique to identify 
the best suitable set of security controls to provide the required level of security 
protection.  This set of security controls will be identified through determining the 
information security requirements of the organization, based on business needs. 
 
The secondary objectives are firstly, to prove that an approach, like an information 
security requirements exercise, can be used as an alternative to risk analysis to identify 
the most appropriate security controls.  The objectives also include secondly, to define 
information security requirements and thirdly, to indicate how information security 
requirements can be determined. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
Firstly, a thorough literature study will be undertaken to study relevant areas in 
information security management, concentrating on risk analysis and management.  
Based on the findings of the literature study the differences between the purpose of a 
risk analysis exercise and an information security requirements exercise will be 
identified.   It will be argued why information security requirements might be an 
alternative in determining the amount of security necessary to adequately protect an 
organization’s information assets, instead of using the traditional risk analysis 
approach.  
 
A technique will be developed to effectively determine the information security 
requirements of an organization.  The information security requirements will provide 
an indication of how much information security the organization requires, taking into 
account the business needs of the organization.  Based on the business needs, the 
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information security requirements should indicate all applicable information security 
controls, which are necessary to ensure that the information assets are adequately 
protected within the organization. 
 
1.5 Structure of Dissertation 
 
As mentioned in the Background (section 1.1), information is regarded as a very 
valuable asset in any organization and needs to be properly protected.  Information 
security is useful for controlling and securing information from changes, deletions or 
unauthorized disclosure (Royds, 2000, p 2, URN 96/702, 1996, p 3) and can, 
therefore, ensure business continuity, while reducing business damage (Owens, 1998, 
p 7).  To achieve an acceptable level of information security, the proper management 
of information security is essential.  By establishing an Information Security 
Management System  (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 6), the proper management of 
information security can be ensured.  
 
In the second chapter a detailed discussion will be given on the management of 
information security, focusing on the establishment of an Information Security 
Management System.  To do so, the relationships between all the security elements, 
related to information security will be revealed.  Following the discussion of security 
elements, the processes of Information Security Management will be discussed, after 
which the different models for managing information security will be presented.  From 
chapter two it should become clear that an Information Security Management System 
consists of different components.  These components can be represented graphically, 
and is referred to as a framework. 
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will examine three existing Information Security Management 
frameworks.  The three frameworks to be discussed are COBIT (ISACF, 1995), 
GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 13335, 1996) and ISO 17799 (2001).  These frameworks will be 
critically evaluated and using the strong characteristics of every framework, a new 
framework will be defined.  This new framework will be called the Information 
Security Management Toolbox Framework.  
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The Information Security Management Toolbox is a very extensive software package 
that covers a variety of relevant business questions in order to determine an 
organization’s requirements for security, as well as the security controls which will 
satisfy these requirements.  Relevant information security policy documents will also 
be produced by the Information Security Management Toolbox.  This means that the 
Information Security Management Toolbox serves as a guide to provide a structured 
approach for the development of an Information Security Management System (ISMS) 
for an organization.   The proposed Information Security Management System will be 
customized according to the unique business and security needs, requirements or 
objectives within the particular organization. The complete framework and 
methodology for the Information Security Management Toolbox will be described in 
chapter 6.  Each phase of the methodology will be related to an appropriate component 
in the Information Security Management Toolbox Framework.  
 
Chapter 7 will provide a detailed discussion on risk management and risk analysis.  A 
detailed discussion will first be given on the risk management process, followed by 
the risk analysis process.  Different approaches to risk analysis will be identified and 
tools and methods for performing a risk analysis will be presented. The benefits and 
limitations of using a risk analysis will also be addressed.  After considering the 
numerous limitations of conducting a traditional risk analysis in an attempt to ensure 
information security, it should become apparent that an alternative approach to risk 
analysis is called for.  This approach will be based on the information security 
requirements of an organization. 
 
The evolution in computing is explained in chapter 8, indicating how different 
protection mechanisms became necessary as the emphasis moved from protecting the 
infrastructure to protecting information.  This chapter also motivates why information 
security requirements, which are based on specific organizational goals and objectives 
and seen in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, 
authentication and reliability, can be considered as an alternative approach to 
traditional risk analysis.  
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The approach, based on information security requirements will be called the Security 
Requirements Analysis (SRA).  A detailed explanation on what a Security 
Requirements Analysis consists of and how it can be utilized to determine the 
information security requirements of an organization is given in chapter 9.  Not only 
does a Security Requirements Analysis determine the information security 
requirements of an organization, but it can further identify all relevant ISO 17799 
security controls to satisfy the previously determined information security 
requirements.  Determining the information security requirements, and from it the 
security controls, is made possible by using a technique based on information security 
related questions.  Chapter 9 will refer to Appendices A and B. Appendix A will 
explain how the Security Requirements Analysis questionnaire will determine the 
information security requirements of an organization.  Appendix B, on the other hand, 
will elaborate on how the ISO/IEC 17799 control categorization table will indicate all 
relevant security controls, based on the pre-determined information security 
requirements. 
 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Appendix A lists all the questions which will 
typically be included in the Security Requirements Analysis questionnaire.  The 
questionnaire is divided into two main categories.  The first category of questions is  
business related, whereas the second is impact related.  The business related questions 
cover issues concerning confidentiality, integrity, availability, auditability and 
authenticity.  The impact related questions, on the other hand, cover consequential and 
motivational issues.   These different types of questions, which form part of the 
questionnaire, will be discussed in more detail at a later stage in this dissertation.  All 
these questions must be answered by the key role players responsible for security in 
the organization, e.g. the Security Forum.  By making use of weighted calculations the 
answers can be analyzed in order to produce the information security requirements of 
an organization. 
 
Appendix B contains the ISO 17799 Control Categorization Table, which links each 
security control from the ISO 17799 standard to one or more security concern 
(Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Auditability and Authentication), while also 
indicating its importance by classifying it as being of either ‘Low’, ‘Medium’ or 
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‘High’ intensity. The ISO 17799 control categorization table will, therefore, be used to 
indicate all relevant security controls based on the pre-determined information 
security requirements as determined by the results of the questionnaire. 
 
Three papers that resulted from this research project are included in Appendices C, D 
and E respectively.   The first paper which is included as Appendix C, entitled; 
Formalizing information security requirements, was published in the international 
journal Information Management & Computer Security, Vol 9, nr 1, 2001. Appendix 
D contains a second paper entitled; Security requirements for an information society, 
which was presented at the BITWorld 2001 Conference in Cairo, Egypt that took 
place from 4-6 June 2001. The third paper, found as Appendix E, entitled; From Risk 
Analysis to Security Requirements has also been published in an international journal 
Computers & Security, Vol 20, nr 7, 2001. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter spells out the importance of protecting information assets.  To ensure the 
proper protection of information, information security controls should be identified 
and implemented. Traditionally risk analysis was used as an approach to help identify 
the necessary security controls.  Today, however, the focus of asset protection has 
changed.  Previously the focus was more on the protection of the infrastructure and 
traditional risk analysis was adequate of this purpose.  But since the focus today is 
more on the protection of information, a different approach for identifying information 
security controls is called for.  
 
This dissertation aims to develop and explain an approach which will simplify the 
process of identifying the necessary information security controls.  This approach will 
be referred to as the Security Requirements Analysis.  As its name indicates, the 
Security Requirements Analysis starts out by identifying information security 
requirements, which in turn will indicate the most effective set of information security 
controls.  How the information security requirements are determined and the 
information security controls identified, will be explained in detail in this dissertation.  
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Chapter 2 
 
INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT  
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, besides the people you employ, information is 
probably your business’s most valuable asset and resource (URN 99/704, 1999, p 1).  
These information assets need to be protected against possible threats which might 
result in a lack of confidentiality, integrity and availability (Humphreys, Moses & 
Plate, 1998, p 8), which can have an adverse impact on an organization (ISO/IEC TR 
13335-1, 1996, p 3).  Although there are, in total, six components related to 
information security (confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity 
and reliability), three of these, namely confidentiality, integrity and availability are 
referred to as the essence of information security (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 5).  
Managing the effective protection of these components can be seen as the essence of 
information security.   
 
Seeing that this chapter is about the management of information security, it is 
important that its objectives are made known. The objectives of information security 
are firstly, to ensure that business continuity is maintained, and secondly, to reduce 
business damage, by preventing and minimizing the impact of security incidents 
(Owens, 1998, p 7).   To achieve this objective, information security controls need to 
be introduced to ensure the protection of information. 
 
The protection of information is no longer merely a technical issue, as it used to be, 
but now also a management issue (Owens, 1998, p 7). Therefore, it has become 
important that information security should form an integral part of an organization’s 
overall management plan  (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996, p 3).  Effective management 
of information security ensures that the right information is viewed and processed by 
the right people at the right time.  Anything that might threaten this, is a risk to the 
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business environment (URN 99/704, 1999, p 2).  Information security management 
provides a way in which to achieve and maintain the appropriate levels of protection 
for confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity and reliability 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996, pp 3 - 5). 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, it is important that an Information Security 
Management System (ISMS) is developed to ensure the proper management of 
information security. More detail on what an Information Security Management 
System is, and what it should typically include, will be given in this chapter.   
 
This chapter will also introduce and put into perspective all the elements related to 
information security.  An explanation of what security elements are, is necessary in 
order to obtain an even better understanding of information security and what it 
entails. Once the security elements have been introduced, the processes involved in 
information security management will be discussed.  Different models for managing 
information security will then be presented and briefly discussed.  These models will 
illustrate the relationships between the previously discussed security elements. 
 
2.2 Information Security Management System  
 
In the previous section the importance of information security management has been 
discussed.  To ensure effective information security within an organization, it will be 
essential that a documented Information Security Management System be established 
and maintained by the organization. This Information Security Management System 
should include all the assets to be protected, the approach that will be followed for 
risk management, as well as the control objectives and the information security 
controls required (Owens, 1998, p 7).  It should, in addition, include all necessary 
policy documents, procedure documents and a security awareness programme 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, pp 2 – 14;  Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 7).  
 
The Information Security Management System should provide evidence to prove that 
the above mentioned actions have been taken. Further, it should have a summary of 
the management framework and documented procedures for implementing the 
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information security controls and to manage and operate the Information Security 
Management System.  The scope and the administration of the Information Security 
Management System will solely depend on the size of the organization and the 
information resources involved.  The most important goal of an Information Security 
Management System is that it should be effective and efficient.  It means that it should 
only undertake necessary tasks for ensuring information security, but it should avoid 
the implementation of too many information security controls, which can result in 
wasting of valuable resources (Owens, 1998, p 7).  It is essential that the right level of 
security be applied, according to the level of risk (URN 99/699, 1999, p 3).  The 
following sub section will cover the aspects involved in the management of 
information security. 
 
2.2.1 Aspects in the Management of Information Security 
 
The aspects involved in the management of information security will mostly 
depend on the culture and the environment in which an organization operates. This 
in turn will have an effect on the approach to be taken for managing information 
security issues.  In this sub section the plan for managing information security will 
be covered and thereafter the objectives, policies and strategies for information 
security management will be discussed briefly.  
 
♦ Information Security Management Plan 
 
A systematic plan is necessary to identify the requirements for information 
security.  The implementation of information security, as well as the ongoing 
administration thereof, is a process which is referred to as the management of 
information security, and a plan for completing these tasks should be in place.  
The process of information security management should include activities such 
as information security policy development, identification of roles and 
responsibilities within the organization, risk management, configuration 
management, change management, contingency planning and disaster recovery 
planning, control selection and implementation, security awareness and a 
follow-up, for maintenance, security audit, monitoring, review and incident 
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handling. 
 
♦ Objectives, Strategies and Policies 
 
Combined, the corporate security objectives, strategies and policies support the 
business of the organization and they ensure consistency between all 
information security controls.  The objectives need to identify what should be 
achieved, the strategies need to identify how these objectives are to be met and 
the policies need to identify what must be done. 
 
Periodic security reviews are required.  Based on the result of these reviews, 
the objectives, strategies and policies should be maintained and updated 
regularly.  
 
The objectives, strategies and policies will firstly, determine the level of 
security required for the organization.  In other words, it plays an important 
role in determining the ‘amount’ of information security required and is thus 
an important factor in determining the information security requirements of an 
organization.  Secondly, the objectives, strategies and policies will determine 
the threshold for risk acceptance and thirdly, they will determine the 
organization’s contingency requirements (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996, pp 3-4).   
 
This section highlighted the necessity for an information security management plan 
which lists all the information security management tasks and ensures that each 
task is completed. Besides having an information security management plan in 
place, the corporate security objectives, strategies and policies of the organization 
should also be clearly stated. The aim of the objectives, strategies and policies is to 
determine the amount of information security required.  In order to understand the 
terminology involved when dealing with information security, it will be necessary 
to discuss each element involved in the security management process.   
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2.2.2 Security Elements 
 
The major elements involved in the security management process will now be 
discussed, by firstly introducing each element in terms of a definition, followed by 
a brief description thereof. The security elements discussed in this section will 
frequently be referred to throughout this dissertation and for this reason it is 
necessary to explain the meaning of each, as well as their relationship to one 
another.   
 
♦ Assets:   Anything that has value to the organization 
 
It is vital to the success of any organization, that assets are managed properly, 
which is a responsibility for all the levels of management. 
 
The assets of an organization includes; physical assets (i.e., computer 
hardware), information / data (i.e., documents and databases), software, ability 
of producing a product, the ability of providing a service, people and 
intangibles (i.e., goodwill and image).  Some, or even all, of these assets can be 
considered to be valuable enough, so that at least some level of protection can 
be justified (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996, pp 5-10). 
 
♦ Threats:   A threat has the potential to cause an unwanted incident, which may 
result in harm to a system or organization and its assets 
 
There are many kinds of threats, which can cause harm to assets. This harm 
can be the consequence of direct or indirect attacks on information, which may 
result in unauthorized destruction, disclosure, modification, corruption and 
unavailability or loss.  A threat can be of human or natural origin and can be 
caused accidentally or deliberately (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996, pp 5-10). 
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♦ Vulnerabilities:   Includes a weakness of an asset or group of assets, which 
can be exploited by a threat 
 
Weaknesses in the organization, procedures, personnel, management, 
administration, hardware, software or information can all be referred to as asset 
vulnerabilities.  A vulnerability itself does not cause harm, but is merely a 
condition that can allow a threat to affect an asset.   In other words, a 
vulnerability can be seen as a weakness that can be exploited by a threat, to 
cause harm.  
 
♦ Impact:   The result of the occurrence of an unwanted incident 
 
The impact is the result of the occurrence of an unwanted incident, which 
causes damage to an asset.  When an impact is measured, a balance should be 
obtained between the result of the unwanted incident, and the cost of the 
information security controls, which should protect against this unwanted 
incident. 
 
♦ Risk:   The potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset 
or group of assets to cause loss or damage to the asset. 
 
A risk can be characterized by a combination of two factors, the probability of 
the occurrence of an unwanted incident and its impact.  If any changes are 
made to assets, threats, vulnerabilities and information security controls it can 
have a significant effect on the risks.  If changes in the environment or system 
can be detected immediately, then appropriate actions can be taken to reduce 
the risk. 
 
♦ Controls:   A practice, procedure or mechanism that reduces the risk 
 
Controls, which can take the form of practices, procedures or mechanisms can 
be implemented to protect against a threat, reduce a vulnerability or limit an 
unwanted incident.  Often a combination of different controls are necessary, to 
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provide layers of security for assets, which in turn will ensure effective security 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996, pp 5-10). 
 
Controls can perform any of the following functions: detection, prevention, 
limitation, correction, recovery, monitoring and awareness.  It is of utmost 
importance to select the appropriate controls in order to have a properly 
implemented security programme.  Since this dissertation concentrates on the 
protection of information, information security controls need to be identified 
and implemented.  For the rest of this dissertation the term security controls 
will be used when referring to information security controls. 
 
♦ Residual Risk:   The risk that remains after controls have been implemented 
 
Usually controls can only partially prevent risks from occurring. Sometimes this 
partial prevention of a risk is all that is possible at the time, since more 
protection entails higher cost.  This in essence means being satisfied with 
having residual risks.   
 
If the residual risk is acceptable to the organization, then it proves that the 
security is appropriate to the needs of the organization.  This process is referred 
to as risk acceptance.  Only those who are in a position to take responsibility for 
the impact of the occurrence of an occurring unwanted incident, should be 
allowed to decide whether a residual risk is acceptable or not. 
 
♦ Constraints: The property that restricts security control implementation  
 
Management normally sets constraints. These constraints can be influenced by 
the environment in which the organization operates. Whether financial, 
organizational, environmental, personnel, time, legal, technical or cultural, 
these factors can all introduce constraints. 
 
When selecting and implementing controls, all these factors must be 
considered.  New and existing constraints must regularly be reviewed and 
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changes identified.  It should be kept in mind that time, geography and social 
evolution can bring about changes to constraints (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996, 
pp 5-10). 
 
At this stage the terminology for all the elements related to information security 
management have been clarified and put into context.  These security elements will 
be referred to frequently throughout the remaining chapters. Besides being aware of 
the different security elements involved when managing information security, the 
processes of information security management must also be discussed. 
 
2.2.3 Processes of Information Security Management 
 
Information security management is an extremely important activity, which 
consists of several  processes.  All these processes are important to ensure that 
information security is properly managed. Each process will be described briefly in 
this sub section.  Figure 2.1 illustrates some of the processes which will be 
discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1:  Information Security Management Processes 
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♦ Configuration Management 
 
Configuration management involves the monitoring of changes to the system.  
The main purpose of using configuration management for security is to ensure 
that changes made to the system will not affect the functionality or 
effectiveness of controls (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996, pp 10-14). 
 
♦ Change Management 
 
This process helps to identify new requirements for security which may result 
from any changes being made to the systems.  It is important to always 
determine what influence a change can have on the security of the information, 
whether planned or otherwise.   For any changes, major or minor, a risk analysis 
should be done to consider the benefits and cost. Normally, for minor changes, 
this is done informally at meetings, although the management decision should 
be documented. 
 
♦ Risk Management 
 
Risk management in itself is a huge cycle of activities and should always be 
considered when any vital changes to the system are planned.  A good balance 
between minimizing the time and resources spent in identifying and 
implementing security controls which ensure appropriately protected systems, 
must be maintained.   
 
During the risk management process, risks are compared with the benefits or 
cost of controls, and an implementation strategy and information security policy 
consistent with the corporate IT policy and business objectives, must be 
developed.  When considering different types of controls, a cost and benefit 
analysis must be performed on each.   
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♦ Risk Analysis 
 
Risk analysis is used to identify risks, regardless of whether the risks need to be 
controlled or accepted.  Risk analysis involves the analysis of asset values, 
threats and vulnerabilities.  The outcome of the risk analysis review should 
identify all possible risks to assets.  
 
Risk analysis forms part of the risk management process, and by conducting a 
brief high-level analysis on all systems, it will ensure that no time and resources 
are wasted.  The purpose of a high-level analysis is to identify all systems in 
critical need of security.  The result of this analysis will determine which of the 
systems can be sufficiently protected by applying only minimal security 
controls, and which of the systems will benefit from a detailed risk analysis 
exercise.  These minimal controls can be used as a common basis of agreement 
and best practice to meet the requirements of baseline protection (ISO/IEC TR 
13335-1, 1996, p 12).  
 
♦ Accountability 
 
Accountability ensures that the actions of a person may be traced uniquely to 
that person. Responsibilities and accountabilities, therefore, need to be assigned 
to individuals in order to ensure effective security.    
 
♦ Security Awareness 
 
The effectiveness of controls can greatly be reduced, if a lack of security 
awareness and poor security practices exist in an organization.  People within 
the organization are the organization's weakest link in security.   
 
By establishing and maintaining an effective security awareness programme it 
can be ensured that the right level of security awareness is in place in the 
organization.  The aim of the security awareness programme is to highlight and 
explain the information security objectives, strategies and policies and to also 
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explain the need for information security, and what the roles and 
responsibilities of the employees, partners and suppliers will be.   
 
♦ Monitoring 
 
All implemented controls should be monitored regularly to ensure that they are 
functioning as desired, and should any changes be made to the environment, in 
which these controls operate, it must be ensured that these changes do not alter 
the functionality of these controls in any way.  Regular reviews and system log 
analysis can be used to assist in this monitoring process. 
 
♦ Contingency Plans and Disaster Recovery 
 
Every organization should have contingency and disaster recovery plans in 
place. The contingency plans should include information to indicate how 
business is to be conducted in severe cases, when IT facilities have become 
unstable or unavailable.  Disaster recovery plans, on the other hand, should 
describe how the operation of the IT systems and IT facilities can be restored, 
with as little disruption as possible and as quickly as possible (ISO/IEC TR 
13335-1, 1996,  p 14). 
 
This subsection highlights the importance of the Information Security Management 
processes and what each entails.  The following section, however, will concentrate 
on presenting various Information Security Management models. Each Information 
Security Management model will illustrate and explain the relationship between the 
previously defined security elements, in order to gain a better understanding of how 
these relate to one another.   
 
2.2.4 Information Security Management Models 
 
Various models exist to illustrate the management of information security. 
Information management models describe how the information security elements 
and business objectives are combined to provide plans, strategies and policies to 
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successfully manage information security. The models, represented in figure 2.2, 
figure 2.3 and figure 2.4 respectively, illustrate the relationship between security 
elements, the relationships involved in risk management and the process of 
managing information security (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996,  p 15-18).    
 
Figure 2.2:  Security Element Relationship 
 
♦ Security Element Relationship Model 
 
Figure 2.2 shows that assets can be vulnerable to a number of threats.  Since the 
IT environment and technology change frequently, threats will consequently 
also change (ISACF, 1998, pp 7-8). Assets therefore need to be protected 
against threats to reduce the impact that an occurring threat might impose on 
the business environment.  Security controls are introduced to protect assets 
against threats.  Security controls can adequately reduce risks which are 
associated with multiple threats or vulnerabilities, as indicated by (a), (b) and 
(c) of figure 2.2. 
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Due to time, financial, technical, environmental, personnel, legal and cultural 
constraints (ISO/IEC TR13335-1, 1996, p 10) (not indicated in Figure 2.2) and 
based on the stipulation of the pre-set organizational policy, the selection of  
security controls might be influenced to such an extent that a residual risk is left 
after the selected security controls are implemented (Moses, 1992, pp 240-241).  
The residual risk must be acceptable to the organization. Decisions on 
accepting residual risk or authorizing additional security controls, must only be 
taken by those with the appropriate authority in the organization (ISO/IEC TR 
13335-1, 1996, p 9).  As a guideline in determining whether a risk is acceptable 
or unacceptable, a balance must exist between the expenses involved in 
implementing additional security controls and the financial loss which will 
result from the occurrence of an unwanted security incident. It would be 
inappropriate if the implementation and maintenance cost of recommended 
security controls were to exceed that of the asset it intends to protect 
(Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 26).  
 
It is often necessary for several security controls to be implemented to reduce 
the remaining risk to an acceptable level (Figure 2.2 (b)). At other times no 
security controls are required, even if threats are present, because the risk was 
found to be acceptable (figure 2.2 (d)).  Figure 2.2 (e) shows that there might be 
an existing vulnerability, without any known threats to exploit it (ISO/IEC TR 
13335-1, 1996,  p 15).  
 
Security elements associated with risk management and the major relationships 
between them are illustrated in Figure 2.3, which represents the second 
information security management model of this sub-section.   
 
♦ Model depicting Relationships in Risk Management 
 
Figure 2.3 indicates that assets can have threats and that threats can exploit the 
vulnerability of an asset.  The presence of a threat and / or a vulnerability of an 
asset increases risk.   When a vulnerability exposes an asset, it can have a 
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severe impact on business in terms of the impact on the asset.  The intensity of 
the impact that a potential security incident can have on an asset indicates that 
the asset is considerably valuable, which increases the risk involved. 
 
Figure 2.3: Relationships in Risk Management 
 
Risks indicate protection requirements, which are met by security controls.  To 
reduce the risk, security controls are introduced to protect against threats.  This 
explanation of the relationships in risk management shows that a significant 
relationship exists amongst security elements in the business environment 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996, p 16).  The third information security 
management model of this section, which represents the management of the 
information security process, will be discussed next. 
 
♦ Model representing the management of the information security process 
 
The security life cycle must be kept in mind when managing information 
security.  Each aspect involved in the security life cycle is examined to address 
techniques for the management of information security.  Figure 2.4 illustrates a 
basic model which indicates the main activities involved in the management of 
information security. 
 
24  
 
Figure 2.4: The Management of IT Security Process 
  
The first two models which were discussed, both explained how threats can exploit 
a vulnerability to cause harm to an asset, and how security controls can be 
introduced to protect the asset, whether completely or partially.  If an asset is only 
partially protected, it could be due to certain constraints which force the acceptance 
of the residual (remaining) risk.  The third model, illustrates the repetitive steps 
involved in the information security management process, starting with risk 
management through to the implementation of security controls. 
  
The main idea behind these various information security management models, is 
therefore to introduce security controls, that can reduce risks to an acceptable level, 
which will ensure that the organization can continue to do business as usual 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996,  pp 16-18).   
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the importance of protecting information has been discussed 
(Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 8). Information can be protected by introducing 
and implementing an appropriate set of information security controls.  The objective is 
to select and implement the most effective set of security controls to protect the 
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information assets against all possible threats, whether known or unknown. To enable 
an organization to adequately protected itself, against security risks, means that 
information assets should not be over or under protected (Owens, 1998, p 7). Security 
controls could take the form of policies, practices, procedures, organizational 
structures or even software functions (BS 7799-1, 1999, p 1).  To ensure the proper 
management of information security, a documented Information Security Management 
System should be established.  The Information Security Management System should 
consider all the assets to be protected, it should take into account the approach that 
will be followed for risk management, as well as the control objectives and the 
required security controls.  An Information Security Management System should, 
therefore, be “all-inclusive”, which means that it should include an information 
security plan, control objectives, security controls which are recorded in a Statement 
of Applicability, policy documents, procedure documents and a security awareness 
programme (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, pp 2 – 14;  Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 
1998, p 7; Owens, 1998, p 7).  It can thus be seen that an Information Security 
Management System consists of various components, which can be graphically 
represented and is referred to as a framework.   
 
Three independent, well-known frameworks, namely the frameworks of COBIT, 
GMITS and ISO 17799, will be analyzed and compared in the next three chapters.  
Each framework will be represented in the form of a diagram which illustrates all 
components of the particular framework.  Each framework produces a visualization of 
the security components that it consists of and provides a way in which various 
mechanisms and approaches of other similar frameworks can be compared (Bruce & 
Dempsey, 1997, p 46).  The frameworks will be analyzed in order to point out the 
strengths and weaknesses of each.  The aim with this analysis is to gain enough 
knowledge from existing frameworks to develop a new framework, which would 
possibly combine the strengths, and address the weaknesses, of the analyzed 
frameworks. 
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Chapter 3  
 
THE INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORK OF COBIT 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Information is regarded by many organizations as their most valuable asset or 
resource (URN 99/704, 1999, p. 1). It is said that information exists to help 
organizations succeed (ISACF, 1998, p. 3), but no organization in today’s world can 
operate and continue to do so without information security (Boddington & Hill, 
1998, p 6).  To ensure the success and survival of an organization and to reduce 
business damage by preventing and minimizing the impact of security incidents 
(Owens, 1998, p 7), information and related IT (Information Technology) must be 
managed effectively.  The effective management of information is especially critical 
in today’s competitive and fast changing business environment.   
 
One of the goals of management is to increase quality and functionality, and decrease 
delivery time.  Besides this, management continuously searches for ways in which to 
improve service levels at a reduced cost.  To obtain these management goals, most 
organizations realize that there are numerous potential benefits that can be obtained by 
incorporating new technology.  When implementing new technologies, many 
successful organizations are aware of the associated risks and manage these risks in an 
appropriate manner.  While considering risks and constraints of IT, it should be noted 
that effective management of information security is achieved by providing adequate 
security controls (ISACF, 1998, p 3). 
 
In order to make reasonable and discreet judgments in the evaluation of control 
practices of typical business or governmental organizations, it is necessary that the 
technology of controls and its changing nature is also understood (ISACF, 1995, p vi).  
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The decision of what is reasonable to invest for security and control in IT, and how to 
balance risk and control investment in a changing IT environment, lies solely with 
management (ISACF, 1998, p 7).  To ensure the successful management of 
information, an Information Security Management System (ISMS) should be 
established.  The Information Security Management System will indicate the risk 
management approach to be used, the control objectives and controls as well as the 
degree of assurance (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 6).  The components that make up an 
Information Security Management System can easily be depicted in a framework.  
 
A framework is generally presented in the form of a diagram, table or list illustrating 
all parts of a subject.  Such a reference framework into which components have 
logically been combined, can also be referred to as an architecture.  An architecture 
provides the conceptual definition and structure of an undefined environment.  It 
allows for the design of individual components within this environment and specifies 
how all these individual components can be integrated in this environment.  The goal 
of a security architecture or framework is to produce a visualization of security 
components and provides scope for comparing it to various mechanisms and 
approaches of other similar frameworks (Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 46). 
 
Three independent frameworks related to the management of information security will 
be analyzed and compared.  The first framework to be discussed, called the COBIT 
(Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology) framework, 
incorporates a combination of both business control models and IT control models 
(ISACF, 1995, p 2 & 5).  It is therefore regarded as being quite comprehensive for 
management, since it operates at a higher level than technology standards for 
information systems management.  The second and third frameworks to be discussed, 
are called the GMITS (Guidelines for the Management of IT Security) and ISO 17799 
frameworks, respectively and concentrate mainly on the management of information 
and information technology security. 
 
As the discussion on each framework progresses, an overlap of components within the 
different frameworks will be observed and will be pointed out.  The overlap of 
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components occurs because all the frameworks, which will be analyzed, are in some 
way related to the management of information technology security. 
 
3.2 The COBIT framework:  Control Objectives for Information and Related 
Technology  
 
COBIT was released by the COBIT Steering Committee in combination with the 
Information Systems Audit and Control Foundation Research Board and the 
Information Systems Audit and Control Foundation Standards Board resource. COBIT 
was designed to be the breakthrough IT governance tool that assists in the 
management and understanding of the risks associated with information and related IT 
(ISACF, 1998, p 3).   It incorporates a combination of both business control models 
and IT control models (ISACF, 1995, p 5).  
 
The main objective of COBIT is to make the development of a clear policy and good 
practice for IT control possible.  Not only does the good practice for IT control mean 
good control throughout industry, but also worldwide (ISACF, 1995, p vi).  This 
objective is important, because of the need that organizations have for a framework of 
generally applicable and accepted IT security and control practices, which ensures 
internal control (ISACF, 1995, p 1).   Such a framework, which ensures internal 
control, should support business processes and should indicate how each individual 
control activity impacts the IT resources and how it satisfies the business 
requirements.  These controls include policies, organizational structures, practices and 
procedures which should produce control objectives.  The statement of the intended 
result or purpose to be achieved by implementing specific control procedures are 
referred to as control objectives. 
 
COBIT presents a framework which has been developed to serve as a generally 
applicable and accepted standard for good IT security and control practices.  These IT 
security and control practices should however also consider the existing and planned 
IT environment.  The principle that the COBIT framework is based on is that IT 
resources must be managed by a set of naturally grouped IT processes, which in turn 
will provide the information to achieve organizational objectives (ISACF, 1995, p vi).  
29  
 
The COBIT framework includes the classification of domains by specifying which 
high level control objectives apply to which domain.  It furthermore indicates the 
business requirements for information that pertains to each of the classified domains 
and indicates the IT resources which are impacted primarily by the control objective 
(ISACF, 1995, p 3). 
 
The underlying concepts of the COBIT framework are represented in Figure 3.1.  
Control in IT is approached by considering the information which is necessary in 
order to support the business requirements or business objectives. The COBIT 
framework concepts illustrated in Figure 3.1 regard information as being the result of 
the joint application of IT related resources that need to be managed by IT processes 
(ISACF, 1995, p 5; ISACF, 1998, p 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1  The underlying concepts of the COBIT Framework  
 
Derived from the underlying concepts, the COBIT framework can be represented by a 
cube (in a three-dimensional way), as illustrated in Figure 3.2. The three-dimensional 
representation is necessary because the framework can be approached from three 
vantage points, namely: Information Criteria, IT resources and IT processes (ISACF, 
1998, p 12). 
BUSINESS 
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IT 
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Figure 3.2  The COBIT Framework (ISACF, 1995, p 11; ISACF, 1998, p 12) 
 
All three vantage points will be introduced and addressed individually, before their 
relevance to the framework and to one another is revealed.  The interrelationship of 
the three vantage points of the framework will become clear once the functioning of 
the framework in its totality is discussed. The vantage point, Information Criteria, will 
be discussed next (ISACF, 1995, p 11). 
 
3.2.1 Information Criteria 
 
Information needs to conform to specific criteria in order to satisfy business 
objectives.  COBIT refers to these specific criteria as business requirements for 
information.    
 
As for all assets, an organization should satisfy the requirement of quality, 
fiduciary reporting and security for their information. The requirement of quality, 
fiduciary reporting and security forms the basis of defining information criteria in 
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the COBIT framework (ISACF, 1995, p vi).  Each of the three requirements will 
now be discussed briefly (ISACF, 1995, p 6).  
 
♦ Quality 
The quality requirement refers to quality, cost and delivery. 
 
♦ Fiduciary 
The fiduciary requirements relates to the effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations, the reliability of information and compliance with laws & 
regulations. 
 
♦ Security  
The security requirements implicate confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
 
An inquiry into the quality requirement of information revealed that the aspects 
related to the quality requirement were somehow either embedded in the fiduciary 
or the security requirement of information (ISACF, 1998, p 10).  Each considered 
aspect of the quality requirement will be shown in Table 3.1, indicating whether 
the fiduciary or the security requirement address the particular quality requirement. 
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QUALITY 
REQUIREMENT 
ASPECTS 
EXAMPLES OF 
QUALITY 
REQUIREMENT 
ASPECT 
QUALITY 
REQUIREMENT 
ASPECT ADDRESSED 
BY …  
The ‘negative’ 
aspect  
no faults,  
reliability 
 integrity of Security 
Requirement 
The ‘positive’ aspect  style, attractiveness, 
‘look and feel’, 
performing beyond 
expectation 
 not considered 
The ‘usability’ 
aspect  
-  effectiveness of Fiduciary 
Requirement 
The ‘delivery’ aspect  -  availability of Security 
Requirement and 
 effectiveness and 
efficiency of Fiduciary 
Requirement 
The ‘cost’ aspect  -  efficiency of Fiduciary 
Requirement 
Table 3.1  Quality Requirement Aspects 
 
Each aspect of the quality requirements overlaps either with the fiduciary or the 
security requirement on either efficiency, effectiveness, availability or integrity.  
Because of this, seven specific, but sometimes overlapping, categories were 
identified.  The seven categories include effectiveness, efficiency, confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, compliance and reliability.  The seven categories with their 
associated definitions are listed below (ISACF, 1995, p 6; ISACF, 1998, p 11). 
 
◊ Effectiveness refers to ensuring that information is relevant and appropriate to 
the business process, while ensuring that this information is delivered in a 
timely, correct, consistent and usable way. 
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◊ Efficiency deals with providing information by using resources in the most 
productive and economical manner. 
 
◊ Confidentiality addresses the issue of ensuring that sensitive information is 
protected from unauthorized disclosure. 
 
◊ Integrity pertains to the accuracy and completeness of information, including its 
validity in relation to business values and expectations. 
 
◊ Availability applies to the availability of information, whether it is required at 
present by the business process or in future. 
 
◊ Compliance addresses issues, such as complying with those laws, regulations 
and contractual arrangements of externally dictated business criteria on 
business processes. 
 
◊ Reliability of Information deals with providing appropriate information for 
management to handle an organization’s financial and compliance reporting 
responsibilities. 
 
Information needs to be considered in order to support business requirements or 
business objectives.  According to the COBIT documentation, information results 
from applying a combination of IT resources.  IT resources form the second 
vantage point (second-dimension) of the COBIT framework, and will be introduced 
next. 
 
3.2.2  IT Resources 
 
As mentioned earlier, the underlying concept of the COBIT framework indicates 
that looking at information is an approach that can provide control in IT.  
Information is necessary for supporting business processes and results from 
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applying a combination of IT related resources for the management of IT processes 
(ISACF, 1995, p 5). 
 
IT resources include data, application systems, technology, facilities and people.  
Money or capital can be referred to as an investment into any of the identified IT 
resources, and has therefore not been included as an IT resource for the 
classification of control objectives.  The relationships that exist amongst the IT 
resources are illustrated and explained by figure 3.3. 
 
 
Figure 3.3  Principles of the COBIT Framework (ISACF, 1995, p 5; ISACF, 
1998, p 11) 
A brief description of each IT resource will follow (ISACF, 1998, p 11).  
 
♦ People 
The people resource includes staff skills, awareness and productivity to plan, 
organize, acquire, deliver, support and monitor information systems and 
services. 
 
♦ Application Systems 
Application Systems include all manual or programmed procedures. 
 
35  
♦ Technology  
The technology resource relates to hardware, operating systems, database 
management systems, networking and multimedia, to name but a few. 
 
♦ Facilities 
Any resource that can be used to house and support information systems is 
referred to as a facility. 
 
♦ Data 
All internal and external data objects, in the widest sense possible, refer to data.  
Data can also include structured and non-structured graphics and sound. 
 
Figure 3.4 illustrates that the information, needed by business processes, is 
provided by the IT resources.  Adequate control measures need to be defined, 
implemented and monitored by these resources, to ensure that the business 
requirements of information are satisfied. 
 
Figure 3.4 Relationships between the business processes, information and IT 
resources (ISACF, 1995, p 7; ISACF, 1998, p 12) 
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As mentioned earlier, IT resources must be managed by IT processes, which also 
represents the third vantage point of the COBIT framework. 
 
3.2.3  IT Processes 
 
Figure 3.5 represents the third vantage point of the COBIT framework, namely IT 
Processes.  IT Processes consist of activities or tasks, processes and domains, each 
of which will be discussed in more detail (ISACF, 1995, p 8; ISACF, 1998, p 12). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5  The IT Processes (ISACF, 1995, p 8; ISACF, 1998, p 12) 
 
♦ Activities / Tasks 
Activities or tasks can be defined as all the necessary actions that must be 
taken to achieve measurable results.  Examples of activities are systems 
development, configuration management and change management, whereas 
examples of tasks include those performed for the support of strategic IT 
planning, risk assessment, quality planning, capacity and performance 
management. 
 
♦ Processes 
A series of joined activities or tasks with natural (control) breaks defines 
processes. 
 
Domains 
Processes 
Activities 
/ Tasks 
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♦ Domains 
Domains are defined as naturally grouped processes.  The natural grouping of 
processes into domains is sometimes referred to as responsibility domains in 
the organizational structure.  Responsibility domains are in line with the 
management cycle, as well as the life cycle which applies to IT processes. 
 
Four domains have been identified, namely Planning and Organization, 
Acquisition and Implementation, Delivery and Support and Monitoring 
(ISACF, 1995, p 9; ISACF, 1998, p 13). 
 
◊ The Planning and Organization domain is concerned with strategies and 
tactics to identify ways in which Information Technology can contribute to 
achieving business objectives.  For this strategic vision to materialize, it 
must be properly planned, communicated and managed from different 
perspectives.  Once this is done, a proper organizational and technological 
infrastructure must be implemented. 
 
◊ The Acquisition and Implementation domain addresses the identification, 
development and acquisition or implementation as well as integration of 
business processes for the realization of the IT strategy.  Changes in and 
maintenance of existing systems are also covered in this domain, to ensure 
the continuation of the life-cycle of these systems.  
 
◊ The Delivery and Support domain is responsible for the actual delivery of 
required services.  These services range from traditional operations such as 
security, continuity and training aspects.  All necessary support processes 
must be in place for the successful service delivery.  The actual processing 
of data by application systems is also included as part of this domain. 
 
◊ The Monitoring domain deals with the regular assessment of processes 
over a period of time, for quality and control requirement compliance. 
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Figure 3.6 portrays the four domains, each with a set of naturally grouped processes 
to manage the IT resources (ISACF, 1995, p 10).  
 
 
Figure 3.6  The four IT Resource domains with related processes (ISACF, 
1995, p 10) 
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The main issue is that IT resources must be managed by the set of naturally 
grouped processes of each domain.  By doing so, the information needed by the 
organization to meet its objectives can be provided  (ISACF, 1998, p 4).  
 
Now that each vantage point of the COBIT framework, namely information 
criteria, IT processes and IT resources have been discussed individually, the 
relationship between them needs to be addressed.  This will be done by viewing the 
relationships between the three vantage points of the COBIT framework in 
perspective.   
 
3.2.4  The COBIT framework: In perspective 
 
The COBIT framework, which is represented as a cube consisting of 3 dimensions 
or vantage points, is illustrated in figure 3.2.  An explanation will be given to 
indicate how the pieces of the COBIT framework fit together and how the COBIT 
framework can be used to produce high level control objectives for the 
organization.  
 
♦ Target personnel using the COBIT framework 
 
There are many different people within an organization who can benefit from 
using the COBIT framework.  However, different groups of people might be 
interested in different parts of the COBIT framework.  As an example, an 
enterprise manager may be interested in the quality, fiduciary or security issues 
which are translated by the framework into seven specific information criteria.  
IT managers might want to consider the IT resources for which they are 
responsible, whereas an IT specialist or user might be interested in specific 
processes.  Auditors, on the other hand, may wish to consider the framework 
from a control coverage point of view.   Since the target users of the COBIT 
framework have been identified and their unique interest in the framework 
addressed, an explanation of how the COBIT framework can be put to use will 
follow. 
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♦ Using the COBIT framework 
 
The framework can be approached from three perspectives.  Whether the 
framework is approached from an IT resource perspective, a business criteria 
for information perspective or IT process perspective, depends on the unique 
requirements of the person using the COBIT framework.  The COBIT 
framework produces high level IT control objectives which are closely linked 
to business objectives.  These high level IT control objectives are statements 
which specify the desired result or purpose to be achieved after specific control 
procedures have been implemented within an IT activity.  Each IT control 
objective has been arranged by process/activity.  
 
High level IT control objectives in the COBIT framework relate to controlling 
the business need within a specific IT process.  The achievement of the 
business need or requirement is enabled by a control statement.  The control 
statements should give consideration to the potentially applicable controls to 
be implemented.  The relationships between the IT processes, Business 
requirements, Control statements and Control practices are illustrated in figure 
3.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7  The relationships between IT Processes, Business 
Requirements, Control Statements and Control Practices (ISACF, 1995, p 
11) 
Business 
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IT  
Processes 
Control 
Statements
Control 
Practices
The 
is enabled by 
which satisfy 
considering 
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To facilitate the use of the COBIT framework from any of the three 
perspectives, navigational aids are provided. 
 
♦ Navigational Aids 
 
Navigational aids facilitate the efficient use of the control objectives through 
using the different perspectives of the COBIT framework.  A navigational aid 
is provided for each of the three dimensions of the framework namely IT 
processes, IT resources and Information criteria, as shown in figure 3.8.  The 
explanation to follow will firstly indicate where each of the navigational aids 
can be located on a high level control objective page, as illustrated by fig 3.10.  
Secondly, it will indicate how each navigational aid can be utilized.  
 
 
Figure 3.8  Using the navigational aids (ISACF, 1995, p 12) 
 
All four IT domains are shown in the top right hand corner of each page of the 
high level IT control objectives (Figure 3.10 (a) ).  The domain under review 
is, however, enlarged and highlighted. 
  IT Resources
Information Criteria
IT Domains
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Information criteria will be displayed in the upper left hand corner of each 
page making up the high level IT control objectives (Figure 3.10 (b) ).  
Information criteria will be presented as a mini matrix which identifies 
information criteria applicable to each high level IT control objective.  Its 
applicability is shown in terms of the degree to which the information criteria 
apply to each high level IT control objective.  Three degrees, namely primary, 
secondary and blank have been established. 
 
Different business requirements will not be satisfied to the same degree by 
control measures.  Therefore, a classification was necessary within the COBIT 
framework to distinguish between three levels of IT effort to which business 
requirements can be satisfied by control measures.  The classification was 
based on the input from researchers, experts and reviewers (ISACF, 1995, p 7).   
 
The three levels of IT effort are classified as primary, secondary and blank.  
The primary level indicates the degree to which the information requirement or 
business requirement concerned is satisfied by the control objective.  The 
secondary level specifies to a lesser extent or indirectly the degree to which the 
control objective satisfies the concerned business requirement.  Blank means 
that the control objective could be applicable, but the requirement can be better 
satisfied by other criteria in the process. 
 
The classification of IT effort levels was necessary to allow either one of three 
levels of IT effort to be applied, where the management of IT resources is 
concerned (ISACF, 1998, p 14).  
 
 In the lower right hand corner a second mini matrix is found (Figure 3.10 (c) ).  
It identifies the IT resources which are specifically managed by the process 
under consideration. 
 
All navigational aids are used in the quest to understand the high level IT 
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control objectives.  In addition to the high level IT control objectives a 
summary table is also provided. 
 
♦ The Summary Table 
 
The Summary Table indicates by IT process  which IT resources are applicable 
and which  information criteria are impacted by the control objective as shown 
in figure 3.9.  
 
 
Figure 3.9  COBIT’s Summary Table (ISACF, 1995, p 13; ISACF, 1998, p 
15) 
 
Since the Summary Table is only an additional guide to the high level IT 
control objectives, an example of a high level IT control objective will be 
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shown. 
 
♦ High level IT control objectives: example 
 
From the illustration given in figure 3.10, which shows an example of one of 
the high level IT control objectives, all the previously discussed navigational 
aids can be observed. 
 
Figure 3.10  Example:  High-level IT Control objective (ISACF, 1995, p 
19) 
 
 
a
b
c
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The high level IT control objective chosen as example, is concerned with the 
IT process related to communicating management aims and direction.  The 
navigational aids indicate the Information Criteria, IT Domain and IT Resource 
related to this IT process.  In addition to the IT process each high level IT 
control objective specifies the business requirement to be satisfied, the control 
statement as well as one or more control practices to consider. 
 
♦ Selected High-level IT Control objectives 
 
The high level control objectives presented by the COBIT framework aims to 
control the business need (e.g. see high level control objective P01 (b)) within 
a specific IT process (e.g. see high level control objective P01 (a)).  This 
business need / requirement is enabled by a control statement (e.g. see high 
level control objective P01 (c)).  The control statement considers all potentially 
applicable and implementable controls (e.g. see high level control objective 
P01 (d)).  Each high level control objective specifies the IT process to which 
control is provided, the business requirements which are satisfied by applying 
the control, how this IT process is enabled and any consideration regarding the 
IT process.   
 
COBIT lists a number of IT processes, but only those relating to the purpose of 
this chapter will be mentioned, namely the high level control objectives 
number PO1, PO4, PO6, PO7, PO9, PO11, DS1, DS5, DS7, DS10, DS11 and 
M1.  Each of these chosen high level control objectives will be presented by 
specifying the objective number, the IT process, the business requirement to be 
satisfied, the control statement and the relevant control practices. 
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High Level Control Objective: PO1 
Control over the IT Process of 
defining a strategic IT plan 
 that satisfies the business requirement 
to strike an optimum balance of information technology opportunities 
and IT business requirements as well as ensuring its further 
accomplishment.  
Is enabled by (Control Statements) 
a strategic planning process undertaken at regular intervals 
giving rise to long term plans.  The long term plans should 
periodically be translated into operational plans setting clear and 
concrete short-term goals.  
 And takes into account (Control Practices) 
• definition of the business objectives and needs for IT 
• inventory of technological solutions and current 
infrastructure 
• “technology watch” services 
• timely feasibility studies 
 
High Level Control Objective: PO4 
Control over the IT Process of 
defining the organization and relationships 
 that satisfies the business requirement 
to deliver IT services    
Is enabled by  (Control Statements) 
an organization suitable in numbers and skills with roles and 
responsibilities defined and communicated.  
 And takes into account (Control Practices) 
• in and outsourcing 
• steering committee 
• board level responsibility 
• personnel planning and recruitment 
d
b
c
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• segregation of duties 
• job descriptions 
• staffing levels 
• supervision 
• ownership, custodianship 
• defined and measureable KPIs (key performance 
indicators) 
 
High Level Control Objective: PO6 
Control over the IT Process of 
communicating management aims and direction 
 that satisfies the business requirement 
to ensure user awareness and understanding of those aims  
 Is enabled by (Control Statements) 
policies established and communicated to the user community.  
Furthermore, standards need to be established so as to translate 
the strategic options into user practical and usable rules  
 And takes into account (Control Practices) 
• security policies 
• quality commitment 
• technology directives 
• code of conduct/ethics 
• compliance 
• internal control policy 
• commitment to continuous improvement 
 
High Level Control Objective: PO7 
Control over the IT Process of 
managing human resources 
 that satisfies the business requirement 
to maximize personnel contributions to the IT processes 
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Is enabled by  (Control Statements) 
sound personnel management techniques  
 And takes into account (Control Practices) 
• counseling 
• objective and measurable performance evaluation 
• training 
• awareness building 
• discipline 
• cross training 
• reliance on key personnel. 
 
High Level Control Objective: PO9 
Control over the IT Process of 
assessing risk 
 that satisfies the business requirement 
of ensuring the achievement of IT objectives and responding to threats 
to the provision of IT services    
Is enabled by (Control Statements) 
the organization engaging itself in IT risk-identification, impact 
analysis and the taking of cost-effective measures to mitigate 
the risks.  
 And takes into account (Control Practices) 
• different kinds of IT risks (e.g. technology, security, 
continuity, regulatory, etc.) 
• timing of analysis: either periodic or during the 
implementation of new systems 
• scope: global or system specific 
• reporting of incidents 
• keeping of a risk model 
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High Level Control Objective: PO11 
Control over the IT Process of 
managing quality 
 that satisfies the business requirement 
to meet the IT customer requirements    
Is enabled by  (Control Statements) 
the planning, implementing and maintaining of quality 
management standards and systems by the organization  
 And takes into account (Control Practices) 
• structure of quality plan 
• quality assurance responsibilities 
• review of critical domains (e.g. development) 
 
High Level Control Objective: DS1 
Control over the IT Process of 
defining service levels 
 that satisfies the business requirement 
to establish a common understanding of the level of service required 
Is enabled by (Control Statements) 
the establishment of service-level agreements which formalize 
the performance criteria against which the quantity and quality 
of service will be measured 
 And takes into account (Control Practices) 
• definition of responsibilities 
• response times and volumes 
• dependencies 
• charging 
• integrity guarantees 
• non-disclosure 
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High Level Control Objective: DS5 
Control over the IT Process of 
ensuring system security  
 that satisfies the business requirement 
to safeguard information against unauthorized use, disclosure or 
modification, damage or loss 
Is enabled by  (Control Statements) 
logical access controls which ensure that access to systems, data 
and programs is restricted to authorized users  
 And takes into account (Control Practices) 
• authorization 
• authentication 
• user profiles and identification 
• key management 
• incident reporting and follow-up 
 
High Level Control Objective: DS7 
Control over the IT Process of 
educating and training users 
 that satisfies the business requirement 
to ensure that users are making effective user of technology and are 
aware of risks and responsibilities involved    
Is enabled by (Control Statements) 
a comprehensive training and development plan  
 And takes into account (Control Practices) 
• awareness campaigns 
• awareness techniques 
• training modules 
• procedure guides. 
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High Level Control Objective: DS10 
Control over the IT Process of 
managing problems and incidents 
 that satisfies the business requirement 
to ensure that problems and incidents are resolved, and the cause 
investigated to prevent any recurrence    
Is enabled by  (Control Statements) 
a problem management system which records and progresses all 
incidents  
 And takes into account (Control Practices) 
• sufficient audit trails of problems and solutions 
• timely resolution of reported problems 
• escalation procedures 
• incident reports 
 
High Level Control Objective: DS11 
Control over the IT Process of 
managing data 
 that satisfies the business requirement 
to ensure that data remain complete, accurate and valid during its input, 
update and storage 
Is enabled by (Control Statements) 
an effective combination of application and general controls 
over the IT operations 
 And takes into account (Control Practices) 
• media identification, movement and library 
management 
• forum design 
• source document retention 
• data storage and backup management 
• input controls 
• processing controls 
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• output controls 
• interface controls 
 
High Level Control Objective: M1 
Control over the IT Process of 
monitoring the processes  
 that satisfies the business requirement 
to ensure the achievement of the objectives set for the IT processes 
Is enabled by  (Control Statements) 
management’s definition of relevant management reporting an 
performance indicators, implementation of the supporting 
systems as well as clearing of the reporting on a regular basis  
 And takes into account (Control Practices) 
• self-assessment 
• benchmarks 
• measurable key performance indicators 
• management reporting 
 
This subsection explained how the COBIT framework can be used, with the help of 
navigational aids.  It further showed and discussed the navigational aids by means 
of displaying an example of a high level control objective.   Only the high level 
control objectives relevant to this chapter have been presented, showing how a 
business requirement can be satisfied by an IT process and enabled by a control 
statement which in turn considers control practices.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, all parts of the COBIT framework have been explained in detail and 
put into perspective using a number of relevant illustrations and examples. The two 
most predominant advantages of using COBIT that came to light in this explanation 
are firstly, that the COBIT framework relieves managers and business process owners 
from the responsibility involved in all aspects of the business process.  Secondly, the 
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COBIT framework produces control objectives for the management and protection of 
information and related technology. 
 
Regardless of its advantages, the fact remains that the functioning of COBIT is quite a 
complicated concept to grasp.  Information security personnel will, therefore, have to 
spend a lot of time to familiarize themselves with COBIT before the organization can 
benefit from its advantages.  The COBIT framework is limited to high level control 
objectives which only indicates the business need within a particular IT process as 
well as the control statements which could enable the achievement of the business 
need by considering certain potentially applicable security controls (ISACF, 1995, p 
11).  The problem with this is that, although the high level control objectives are 
given, no guidance is given to indicate which of the so-called potentially applicable 
security controls should be selected and how these should be implemented.  For 
example, COBIT provides security controls, such as awareness campaigns to achieve 
the high level control objective (DS7) of educating and training users (ISACF, 1995, 
p37), but it does not give the specifics in guiding how exactly the awareness campaign 
should be established, what it should include and to whom it should be directed.   
 
Another difficulty that can be experienced with the use of COBIT is that it does not 
indicate how an organization can determine/ascertain the degree to which a control 
measure will satisfy the business requirements for information.  As mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, there are three degrees to which control objectives satisfy the 
information requirement concerned, namely primary, secondary or blank (figure 3.10 
(b)). 
 
The chapter that follows will discuss the second framework to be examined, namely 
the information security management standard GMITS (Guidelines for the 
Management of IT Security).  Although GMITS does not provide control objectives 
for the management and protection of information like COBIT, it does, however, 
provide guidelines, which are useful for the identification and management of all 
aspects related to IT security. 
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Chapter 4  
 
THE INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORK OF GMITS 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
ISO (the International Standards Organization) and IEC (the International 
Electrotechnical Commission) have established a Joint Technical Committee called 
ISO/IEC JTC 1, in the field of Information Technology.  To prepare international 
standards is the main task of such a Technical Committee.  ISO/IEC TR 13335 is a 
Technical Report which was prepared by the Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 
1.  The general title of ISO/IEC TR 13335 is Information Technology: Guidelines for 
the Management of IT Security, better known as GMITS. 
 
4.2   The Information Security Management Framework of GMITS 
 
All components which are necessary for the development and management of 
information security, according to GMITS, are represented in a framework as seen in 
figure 4.1.  The main activities involved in the successful management of IT security 
include the Planning and Management activity, the Risk Management activity, the 
Implementation activity and the Follow-up activity.  Each of these will be discussed in 
detail. 
 
4.2.1 Management of IT Security 
 
The Planning and Management activity, Risk Management activity, 
Implementation activity and the Follow-up activity play important roles in the 
management of IT security. 
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Proper planning and management help with the process of establishing and 
maintaining an overall IT security program for an organization, which is 
represented by figure 4.1 in its totality (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 2-3). The 
processes involved in creating an IT security program will depend on the 
management style, the size of the particular organization and the structure within 
the organization.  The way in which business is conducted should also be 
considered as part of the process. Conducting management reviews, therefore, 
plays an enormous role in all activities involved in the process of developing an IT 
security program.  
  
A good understanding of the organization’s IT security objectives can be regarded 
as a good starting point.  IT security objectives are derived from higher level 
objectives, such as business objectives, and should indicate the IT security strategy 
for the organization as well as the IT security policy.   The corporate IT security 
policy should therefore ensure that an appropriate organizational structure is 
developed, which will allow the IT security objectives to be achieved.  Once clarity 
on the organization’s objectives is obtained, risk management can take place. 
 
The risk management process firstly includes the determination of the risk analysis 
strategy option to use, which is in line with the IT security policy. Secondly, it 
includes the selection of the security controls as recommended by the results of the 
risk analysis or by making use of baseline controls.  Thirdly, IT system security 
policies must be formulated from the recommendation of the risk analysis, and the 
corporate IT security policy must be updated accordingly.  The fourth task in the 
risk management process is to devise the necessary IT security plans for the 
implementation of the security controls, in line with the accepted IT system 
security policies.  
 
As part of the implementation process, security controls should be implemented 
according to the specifications of the IT security plan, which was decided on during 
the Risk Management process.  The effectiveness of the implemented security 
controls relies heavily on the general IT security awareness amongst staff of the 
organization.  From the implementation section of figure 4.1 it can be seen that the 
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control selection process and security awareness should happen concurrently.  This 
will ensure that security awareness is systematically accepted by staff members, 
since human behavior cannot be changed instantaneously.   
 
At this stage the IT security management process of the GMITS framework is not 
yet complete.  It should be understood that the information security process is not 
an once-off exercise, but an ongoing activity (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 6).  To 
ensure information security, the security management process must be reviewed on 
a regular basis.  
 
This review or “follow-up” process includes all of the following considerations. 
The security controls should be maintained to ensure that the security controls 
continue to operate as intended.  Security controls should adhere to the adopted 
security policies and plans.  Assets, threats, vulnerabilities and security controls 
should be monitored regularly to identify any changes which may consequently 
also change the risks.  Incident handling also plays an important role in the ‘follow-
up’ process, to ensure that appropriate action can be guaranteed in the case of the 
occurrence of unwanted events.  The ‘follow-up’ process is an essential task, which 
continuously re-evaluates any decisions taken earlier in other activities of the 
security management process of GMITS. 
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Figure 4.1   The GMITS framework:  Planning & Management of IT Security 
 
The overview of the entire framework, for the planning and management of IT, as 
proposed by GMITS is a brief high-level explanation of the GMITS framework.  It 
puts into perspective all activities related to the management of information 
security by indicating the relevance and importance of each activity within the 
framework.  Since the overview merely touched upon each activity, an in-depth 
discussion on each will follow. The in-depth discussion of activities will ensure 
that each part of the GMITS framework is fully understood and that no ambiguity 
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exists regarding its relevance to, and purpose in, the framework.  It has been said 
earlier that a framework can form the basis for easy comparison of frameworks, 
especially if the frameworks are intended for similar environments (eg. IT) and 
similar purposes (eg. management of information security). 
 
As the in-depth discussion on the activities within the GMITS framework takes 
place, it will be related to other frameworks of similar intent.  Parallels will be 
drawn amongst activities discussed in this framework and those already discussed 
in the COBIT framework.  The activities of the management process of the GMITS 
framework will now be discussed individually. 
 
4.2.2 Corporate IT Security Policy 
 
In an organization it might be necessary that IT security objectives, strategies and 
policies be defined for each level of an organization, as indicated by figure 4.2. The 
IT security objectives indicate what is to be achieved, whereas IT security strategies 
indicate how these IT security objectives can be met.  IT policies on the other hand 
specify the rules to be followed to achieve the defined IT security objectives.  
COBIT also supports the definition of IT business objectives and needs in its high-
level control objective number PO1 (ISACF, 1995, p 14).  
 
It is imperative that top management shows its commitment towards IT security 
(Owens, 1998, p 7).  The communication of management aims and direction is 
specified in COBIT’s high-level control objective number PO6, and can also be 
interpreted as management commitment (ISACF, 1995, p 19).  To show 
management commitment, a formally agreed upon and documented IT security 
policy must be developed, supported and enforced by management.  Security 
policies are also supported by COBIT’s high-level control objective number PO6, 
which concludes that even in COBIT management commitment and the security 
policy go hand-in-hand. 
  
The relationships that can exist between the different policies are illustrated in 
figure 4.2.   The corporate IT security policy should be in line with the corporate 
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security policy and can form part of a range of corporate, technical and 
management policies as indicated by figure 4.2(a).  The described policies should 
address the issues for which they are intended and consistency must be maintained 
amongst policies, although various documentation styles and organizational 
structures may differ.  Together this range of corporate, technical and management 
policies builds the basis for a corporate IT strategy statement which indicates how 
the defined IT security objectives can be achieved.  If security is an important issue 
within an organization, to ensure compliance with the IT strategy, then some 
persuasive words regarding the importance of security should be included in the IT 
strategy statement.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2:   Policy Relationships 
 
There is a number of topics that should feature in the corporate IT security policy 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 3-5).  IT security requirements, in terms of 
(a)
(b) 
(c) 
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confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, accountability and reliability, 
especially from the asset owners’ viewpoints, are an important issues that must be 
specified in the corporate IT security policy.   The infrastructure of the organization 
must be included and the assignment of the responsibilities should be specified.  
The corporate IT security policy should also include rules for integrating security in 
system development and procurement.  It should cover the directives and 
procedures for security and should define classes for the classification of 
information.  Strategies for risk management and contingency planning is vital for 
the continued existence of an organization and should not be omitted from the 
corporate IT security policy.  Issues regarding personnel (personnel in positions 
requiring trust, such as maintenance personnel and system administrators) should 
be given special attention.  All personnel should be included in the training and 
awareness programs as indicated by the corporate IT security policy.  Other issues 
to be addressed in the corporate IT security policy are legal and regulatory 
obligations, outsourcing management and the handling of incidents. 
 
There are three organizational aspects related to IT security which will be 
addressed.  The first organizational aspect being the roles and responsibilities 
which govern employee conduct and behavior towards IT security.   The duties of 
the IT Security Forum, the corporate IT Security Officer and the IT Project/System 
Security Officer are all part of the first organizational aspect which refers to 
employee roles and responsibilities.  The second organizational aspect which will 
be considered is that of commitment.  Management commitment at all levels is 
important to ensure effective IT Security.  The third organizational aspect of 
importance is a consistent approach to IT security.  The Corporate IT Security 
Officer should ensure that a consistent approach to IT security is followed for all 
development, maintenance and operational activities.   
 
4.2.3 Organizational Aspects of IT Security:  Roles and Responsibilities 
 
Every IT project or system and all the IT users within an organization can relate to 
IT security which can, therefore, be branded as an interdisciplinary topic, relevant 
to most areas in an organization.  If personnel roles and responsibilities are 
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adequately assigned and differentiated, the efficient performance and 
accomplishment of tasks can be ensured.  COBIT, in its high level control 
objectives number PO4 and DS1, advises that roles and responsibilities be defined 
and communicated by means of segregating duties, etc.  The specification of roles 
and responsibilities will establish a common understanding amongst staff of the 
level of service required (ISACF, 1995, p 17 & 31). 
 
Besides the assignment of responsibilities, the size and structure of an organization 
should also be considered.   According to GMITS, every organization should have 
an IT Security Forum and a corporate IT Security Officer.  The IT Security Forum 
normally handles and resolves interdisciplinary issues and approves directives and 
standards, where as the corporate IT Security Officer on the other hand acts as the 
focus for all IT security aspects within an organization. 
 
The duties of the IT security forum and the IT security officer should be clear and 
well defined.  Both the IT security forum and the IT security officer should indicate 
commitment to the corporate IT security policy.  Clear lines for communication, 
responsibility and authority for the corporate IT security officer should be provided 
by the organization and all duties should be approved by the IT security forum.  
Outside consultants may be approached to help with the performance of any of 
these duties, as stipulated by the IT security forum. 
 
The relationships between the corporate IT security officer, the IT security forum 
and the representatives from various departments within the organization are 
shown in figure 4.3 (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 5-6).  The example depicted in 
this figure indicates three organizational levels (Corporate, Department and 
System/Project level) for IT security.  According to organizational needs, levels can 
be added or taken away. 
 
If the organization is not of a sufficient capacity and size the Department level can 
be disregarded completely.  Similarly, Department or other levels can be added if it 
is permitted by the size and the structure of the organization.  Figure 4.3 also shows 
that the corporate IT Security Officer, together with representatives from other 
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areas in the organization should serve on the IT Security Forum.  In the case where 
there is an IT representative and an User representative, both should be included as 
members of the IT Security Forum.  All IT Security Officers should make visible 
their commitment towards the development and establishment of a comprehensive 
and all-inclusive corporate IT security policy, regardless whether this is at 
Corporate, Department or Project/System level. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3   Example IT Security Organization  
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The typical responsibilities of an IT Security Forum, a Corporate IT Security Officer 
as well as an IT Project Security Officer and IT Systems Security Officer are as 
follows. 
 
♦ IT Security Forum 
 
People with skills to identify requirements, formulate policies, draw up the 
security programme, review achievements and direct the corporate IT security 
officer, should preferably form part of the IT security forum or committee.  
The duties that should be performed by such a forum or committee are listed 
below.  These duties include (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 6):  
 
◊ advising the IT steering committee regarding strategic security planning, 
◊ the formulation of a corporate IT security policy to support the IT strategy 
and obtain approval from the IT steering committee, 
◊ translating the corporate IT security policy into an IT security programme, 
◊ monitoring the implementation of the IT security programme, 
◊ reviewing the effectiveness of the corporate IT security policy, 
◊ promoting awareness of IT security issues, and 
◊ advising on resources (people, money, knowledge, etc.) needed to support 
the planning and implementation process of the IT security programme. 
 
Members of the forum, representatives of the providers and the users of IT 
systems should have a background in security and technical aspects of IT 
systems.  Knowledge and skills from all these areas are essential for the 
development of a practical corporate IT security policy. 
 
The IT Security Forum alone cannot ensure and enforce IT security within the 
organization.  IT Security Officers from different organizational levels, in 
addition to the IT Security Forum, will therefore have to be relied on. IT 
Security Officers from different organizational levels include the corporate IT 
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Security Officer and IT Project/System Security Officers.  The explicit duties 
of each of these types of IT Security Officers will be discussed next. 
 
♦ Corporate IT Security Officer 
 
Since the responsibility for IT security is shared, there is a probability that 
nobody will take responsibility if a security incident occurs.  To overcome this 
problem, an individual person, called the corporate IT security officer, should 
be assigned to take on the responsibility.  The person who fulfills the post of 
corporate IT security officer, should not be burdened with other 
responsibilities.  Therefore, a dedicated post must be established for the 
corporate IT security officer.  The person selected as the corporate IT security 
officer should have background in security and should take on the following 
responsibilities (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 7):  
 
◊ oversee the implementation of the IT security programme, 
◊ liaise with and report to the IT security forum and corporate security 
officer, 
◊ maintain corporate IT security policy and directives, 
◊ co-ordinate incident investigations, 
◊ manage the corporate-wide security awareness programme, and 
◊ determine the terms of reference for IT project and system security officers 
 
♦ IT Project Security Officer and IT System Security Officer 
 
Besides having someone responsible for the corporate IT security, individual 
projects or systems should also have someone responsible for security.  This 
person is called an IT security officer.  Being an IT security officer might not 
be a full time role.  The activities of both the IT project security officer and the 
IT system security officer are the responsibility of the corporate IT security 
officer (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 6 & 7).  The security officer is 
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responsible for all the security aspects of a project, system or group of systems.  
Other responsibilities include: 
 
◊ liaising with and reporting to the corporate IT security officer 
◊ issuing and maintaining the IT project or system security policy 
◊ developing and implementing of the security plan 
◊ day-to-day monitoring of implementation and use of the IT security 
controls, and 
◊ initiating and assisting in incident investigations. 
 
The specification of employee roles and responsibilities is not the only important 
organizational aspect that should be in place for the security of IT.  Without 
management commitment, the specification of employee roles and responsibilities 
is worthless. 
 
4.2.4  Organizational Aspects of IT Security:  Commitment 
 
To ensure effective IT security, management at all levels should support any efforts 
made by individuals (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 7).  COBIT refers to 
commitment in its high-level control objective number PO6, which ensures 
continuous improvement of commitment towards security and related issues within 
the organization (ISACF, 1995, p 19).  Commitment for ensuring IT security 
includes: 
 
◊ an understanding of the organizations global needs, 
◊ an understanding of the needs for IT security within the organization, 
◊ a demonstration of the commitment to IT security, 
◊ a willingness to address the IT security needs,  
◊ a willingness to allocate resources to IT security, and 
◊ an awareness of what IT security means, or consists of, even at the highest 
level. 
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Two organizational aspects of IT security have already been mentioned.  They are 
employee roles and responsibilities and commitment to enforce these roles and 
responsibilities.  The third organizational aspect is ensuring that a consistent 
approach for the management of IT security follows. 
 
4.2.5 Organizational Aspects of IT Security:  Consistent Approach 
 
All development, maintenance and operational activities should follow a consistent 
approach to IT security.  Even throughout the life cycle of information and IT 
systems, from the planning phase to the disposal phase, adequate protection should 
be ensured.  For a consistent approach to IT security, there is a need to commit to 
standards.  These may include standards or rules of international, national, regional, 
industrial and corporate origin, provided that it be selected and applied according to 
the IT security needs of the organization (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 7).  
COBIT specifies that quality within the organization can be managed by 
incorporating and maintaining standards (PO11) (ISACF, 1995, p 24).  Whenever 
technical standards are used, some rules or guidelines should be followed to ensure 
the proper implementation, use and management thereof. 
 
Using standards can be quite beneficial to the organization.  A couple of benefits 
when using and complying to standards are listed below (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 
1997, p 7): 
 
◊ security integration, 
◊ interoperability, 
◊ consistency, 
◊ portability, 
◊ economies of scale, and  
◊ standardization amongst organizations. 
 
With the discussion of all three organizational aspects and the corporate IT security 
policy, the first part of the GMITS framework is concluded.  Risk Management is 
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the next major activity to be performed, according to the overview of major 
activities within the GMITS framework, as discussed previously. 
 
4.2.6 Corporate Risk Analysis Strategy Options 
 
A suitable strategy for risk management in a particular organizational environment 
must be put in place, to ensure that risks are addressed in an effective manner.  
According to COBIT the IT process for the assessment of risks (PO9) ensures that 
IT objectives are met and that threats are properly responded to (ISACF, 1995, p 
22).  The strategy to be chosen must focus on the security need, although it should 
also consider cost and time.  Conducting detailed reviews for all systems is not a 
viable option, since it does not use resources and time effectively.  Not addressing 
serious risks is also not advisable for effective security.  A strategy, which 
maintains a balance between the fore-mentioned extremes, makes use of a high 
level review to determine the IT security need of systems.  The depth of the 
analysis should however be in line with the IT security needs.  IT security needs 
depend on the size of the organization, the type of business activities performed 
and its environment and culture (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 8).  All these issues 
should be considered by the corporate risk analysis strategy option to be selected. 
 
Organizations often decide to neglect or postpone control implementation. If such a 
decision is made after the high-level reviews have been completed, management 
must be aware of the risks involved in doing so.  Management should also consider 
the disastrous impact for which it will be liable in the event of a security incident 
occurring. Such a decision should only be taken if serious consideration is given to 
these and other effects first.   Based on the results of the high-level reviews, a 
suitable risk analysis strategy option can be chosen in order to select security 
controls which will lessen the risks.  There are four risk analysis strategy options to 
choose from, namely the Baseline approach, the Informal approach, the Detailed 
Risk Analysis approach and the Combined approach.  Each of these will be 
discussed briefly.  
 
68  
The first risk analysis strategy option to choose from is the Baseline approach. 
With the Baseline approach a set of security controls is simply selected, which 
should achieve a minimum baseline level of protection across all systems.  In 
baseline manuals a number of standard security controls are recommended as 
guidance to achieve the baseline protection level. These security controls are 
classified as core security controls, around which other security controls can be 
built (Fitzgerald, 1995, pp. 10 - 11).  Often the basic needs of an organization can 
be examined, and based on the outcome of the examination, some security controls 
can be adapted from other organizations with appropriate similarities.  
 
The second risk analysis strategy option which can be used is the Informal 
approach.  This approach involves an informal risk analysis to be done for all 
systems.  This informal method of risk analysis is completely based on the 
knowledge and experience of individuals (internal or external to the organization), 
rather than structured risk analysis methods (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 8). 
 
Thirdly, Detailed Risk Analysis can be chosen as the desired risk analysis strategy 
option. With this approach a detailed risk analysis for all systems is justified.  
Detailed risk analysis requires that assets need to be identified and valued, threats, 
to these assets, need to be assessed and the vulnerabilities of those assets need to be 
considered. 
 
All this information can be used as input to determine and assess the risks.  This 
entire process can be very resource intensive, therefore boundaries need to be set to 
indicate the depth of the analysis, and management must monitor the analysis 
process closely. 
 
Lastly, the Combined Approach can be used.  This approach is a combination 
between the Detailed Risk Analysis Approach and the Baseline Approach.  Firstly a 
high-level risk analysis is done to identify systems which are at high risk or critical 
to business operations.  These results can then be used to determine which of the 
identified systems require a Detailed Risk Analysis to be done and for which  
systems the baseline protection is appropriate (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 9).  
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This approach minimizes the time and effort spent in identifying security controls, 
but it ensures that all systems are adequately protected.  We can almost say that the 
best of both approaches are combined into one. 
 
Normally risks would have been identified at this stage, by using any one of the 
four available risk analysis strategy options.  It should be kept in mind, however, 
that risks are not always identified. What remains to be done is to implement 
security controls which will lessen the identified risks.  Based on the identified 
risks some suggestions for reducing these risks will be provided by the chosen risk 
analysis strategy option.  These suggestions are referred to as IT Security 
Recommendations. 
 
4.2.7 IT Security Recommendations 
 
Any of the four risk analysis strategy options, mentioned in the previous section 
should result in a number of recommendations which could reduce the security 
risks to an acceptable level.   It is up to management to make the final decision on 
these recommendations for risk reduction.  Recommendations should include 
criteria for determining the acceptable levels of risks for the IT system.  Another 
recommendation, for reducing risk to an acceptable level, is control selection.  It is 
necessary that the recommendation includes the benefits of implementing the 
selected information security controls and the risk reduction that will be achieved 
when these security controls are implemented.  The recommendation should also 
include the acceptability of a residual risk that remains after all the suggested 
information security controls have been implemented (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, 
p 9). 
 
♦ Security Control Selection 
 
Various different types of security controls exist.  COBIT suggests that input, 
processing, output and interface security controls be selected to effectively 
manage data (DS11) and to protect information against unauthorized use, 
disclosure or modification, damage or loss (DS5) (ISACF, 1995, p 35 & 41).  
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Security controls can prevent, monitor, detect or correct unwanted incidents 
and some security controls can even recover from unwanted incidents. 
Preventative security controls can obstruct unwanted events and activities, 
which increase security awareness (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 9). 
 
Control applicability applies to the following major areas such as hardware 
(backup, keys), software (electronic signatures, logging, anti-virus tools), 
communications (firewalls, data encryption), physical environment (fences, 
badges), personnel (staff awareness, procedures for employee termination), and 
administration (authorization, disposal of hardware, license control).  Some 
security controls work in combination with other security controls, increasing 
the benefits that can be obtained from it.  It is therefore important to consider 
control interdependencies when selecting security controls. 
 
When significant changes are made to either new or existing systems, the risks 
to the systems will also change.  The new risks resulting from changes made to 
the system must be identified and controlled in an appropriate manner, by 
either deciding to adjust existing security controls or selecting additional 
security controls to counter the risks. 
 
As part of the control selection process, management should ensure that 
security controls operate effectively, although some security controls might 
need administrative support for maintenance in order to constantly operate 
effectively.  The effective operation of security controls should, however, not 
cause unnecessary overhead for users and management.  Control 
implementation should form part of change management, configuration 
management and it should be included in the security awareness programme, if 
the security controls cause significant changes in the organization. 
 
♦ Risk Acceptance 
 
No system can ever be made absolutely secure, therefore, even after security 
controls have been implemented, there will always be a residual risk. A 
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residual risk is the risk that remains after selected security controls have been 
implemented.  It could be that certain assets are intentionally left unprotected, 
since a balance must exist between the cost of the suggested control to be 
implemented relative to the estimated value of the asset it intends to protect 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 9 & 10).  
  
There are two steps involved in the risk acceptance process.  Firstly the 
selected security controls must be reviewed in order to identify and assess all 
possible residual risks.  The second step involves the classification of residual 
risk.  Residual risks can be classified according to those which are considered 
as being “acceptable” and those which are considered as being “unacceptable” 
for the organization.  Once the classification of residual risks is complete, then 
both the “acceptable” and the “unacceptable” residual risk must be handled in 
an appropriate manner. 
 
Since unacceptable risks cannot be tolerated, additional security controls need 
to be considered and introduced to limit the impact or consequence which can 
be caused by the manifestation of such risks.   The decision ultimately lies with 
management, to judge whether a risk is to be considered “acceptable” and if 
not, to approve the necessary expenses for additional security controls to 
reduce the risk to an acceptable level. 
 
Selecting  security controls, which will reduce risks to an acceptable level, does not 
mean that these security controls will ensure effective and continuous protection 
against the identified risks of a system.  Efforts should be made to ensure that 
security controls are implemented correctly and that they continue to function as 
intended.  This is made possible by the formulation of an IT System Security 
Policy, which contains, amongst others, rules and guidelines for the correct 
implementation and maintenance of the selected security controls. 
 
Following the rules and guidelines contained in the IT System Security Policy will 
result in the effective and continuous functioning of security controls against 
identified risks. 
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4.2.8 IT System Security Policy 
 
The IT system security policy should be based on the corporate and departmental 
security policy as illustrated by figure 4.2(c).  A set of principles and rules for 
protecting systems and services should be included in the system security policy.  
The policies must be implemented by introducing and applying appropriate security 
controls to ensure an adequate level of protection for a specific IT system.  The 
principles and rules included in the system security policies should also be backed 
by management. These principles and rules should be regarded as compulsory to 
guarantee that financial and manpower resources are committed to applying and 
enforcing the system security policy.  In COBIT’s high-level control objective 
number PO6, security policies are mentioned and play an important role to 
communicate management aims and direction, to commit to continuous 
improvement of security (ISACF, 1995, p 19). 
 
The planning and preparation of each IT system security policy should consider the 
following key issues (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 10): 
 
◊ defining the IT system in question and its boundaries 
◊ defining the business objectives of the system, since they might have an 
influence on the security policy and the information security controls to be 
selected and implemented.  
◊ potential harmful business impacts from the following:  
• unavailability, denial or destruction of services or assets including 
information, 
• unauthorized modification of information or software, and  
• unauthorized disclosure of information. 
  
The consequences from the above mentioned business impacts could be 
quantitative or qualitative.  Quantitative consequences include direct or indirect 
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money losses, whereas qualitative consequences include loss of goodwill, loss of or 
danger to life and breaches of personal privacy. 
 
◊ level on investment in IT, 
◊ serious threats to the IT system and the information it possesses 
◊ vulnerabilities, including the weaknesses that leave the IT system exposed to 
the danger of identified threats 
◊ required security controls, to adequately deal with the identified risks 
◊ costs of IT security, such as the expenses of protecting IT assets, and 
◊ relationship to an selection ethics for outsourcing providers, such as computing 
centers and PC support. 
 
A planned approach is needed for IT security and it need not be done in isolation.  
The IT Security Plan could and should form part of the strategic planning process.  
Doing so will ensure that security is planned for and designed into the system from 
the beginning.  Adding security controls at a later stage can be extremely expensive 
or even impractical, if security was not considered as part of the overall strategic 
planning process (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 10).  
  
4.2.9 IT Security Plan 
 
The coordinated actions to be undertaken for implementing an IT system security 
policy must be defined and documented in an IT security plan.  The IT security 
plan should include the primary short, medium and long term actions, that must be 
undertaken, its associated costs (e.g. investments and operational costs), and a time 
schedule for the implementation thereof.  An IT security plan should include the 
following (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 11): 
 
◊ an overall security architecture and design, 
◊ a short review of the IT system, in terms of maximum financial losses, 
embarrassment, company image, etc. to check whether it is consistent with the 
organization’s security objectives, 
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◊ an identification of the security controls that correspond to the assessed risks, 
validated and approved by management, 
◊ an assessment of the effectiveness of security controls, reflecting the actual 
level of confidence in them 
◊ an overview of the assessment of residual risks in the system or application, 
◊ identifying and defining the priority of actions to be taken in order to 
implement security controls, 
◊ preparing a detailed work plan for implementing security controls, which 
considers priorities, budget and time-schedules 
◊ project control activities, that include: 
• committing of resources and assignment of responsibilities 
• defining progress-reporting procedures. 
◊ the security awareness and training programmes required for IT staff and end-
users 
◊ requirements for the development of procedures such as security operation and 
administration. 
 
The IT security plan should also have procedures in place to define the conditions 
and actions for validating each of the above points, while also including procedures 
for modifying the plan itself (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 11). Once the IT 
security plan has been devised and established, it needs to be implemented. 
 
4.2.10 Implementation of Security Controls 
 
COBIT recommends that security controls should be implemented to protect 
against unauthorized use, disclosure or modification, damage or loss (DS5).  The 
implementation of security controls according to COBIT will ensure that data 
remains complete, accurate and valid during its input, update and storage (DS11) 
(ISACF, 1995, p 35 & 41).   
 
In GMITS it is said (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 11) that the IT system security 
officer is responsible for handling and managing the implementation of the plan. 
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The following objective should be kept in mind throughout implementation of 
security controls as regulated by the IT Security Plan (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, 
p 11): 
 
◊ The cost of the security controls should remain within the approved range, 
◊ security controls should be correctly implemented as stated by the IT security 
plan, and 
◊ security controls should be operated and administered as indicated by the IT 
security plan. 
 
It is often necessary to supplement technical security controls by means of 
operational and administrative procedures, since some technical security controls 
cannot be enforced by technical means alone. 
 
After the implementation of the IT security plan, the implementation of the security 
controls should be approved, as stipulated in the IT system security plan. Once 
approved, the operability of the IT system or service can be authorized.  In some 
communities this approval process is referred to as accreditation (ISO/IEC TR 
13335-2, 1997, p 11). 
 
Changes made to a system could cause the risks to these systems also to change 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 10).  Whenever major changes are made to the IT 
system or service, or noticed, the entire IT system or service should then be re-
checked, re-tested and re-approved. 
 
Security awareness and training are also considered to be security controls.  
Although security awareness relates to all personnel, specific training might be 
necessary for certain personnel only.  Training is required for personnel such as the 
IT project and system security officers, as well as for personnel responsible for 
security administration (e.g. access control) and for personnel responsible for the 
development and operation of the IT systems. 
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4.2.11 Security Awareness 
 
As mentioned before, security awareness applies to all personnel.  Since this is the 
case, the security awareness programme should be implemented at all 
organizational levels, starting at top-management through to all the users.  The 
security awareness programme cannot be successful, unless the users are involved 
in its development and accepting it.  It is important that users understand their 
significance to the success of this programme. 
 
The purpose of an awareness programme is to convey the knowledge of the 
corporate IT security policy, whilst ensuring that the security guidelines and 
appropriate actions for security are clearly understood.  Security awareness is 
promoted by COBIT’s high-level control objectives number PO6, PO7 and DS7, 
which ensures that users are aware of the security risks and their responsibilities 
towards risks (ISACF, 1995, p 19, 20 & 37).  The objectives of the system security 
plan should also be addressed in the security awareness programme.  The following 
topics should at least be covered in the security awareness programme (ISO/IEC 
TR 13335-2, 1997, p 11): 
 
◊ the basic information protection needs, 
◊ the implications of security incidents for the user and the organizations, 
◊ the objectives as well as an explanation of the corporate IT security policy, and 
the risk management strategy, which will lead to the understanding of risks and 
security controls, 
◊ the IT security plans to implement and check security controls, 
◊ classification of information 
◊ the specific responsibilities of data owners 
◊ personnel responsibilities,  job descriptions and procedures, 
◊ the importance of reporting and investigating security breaches or attempts, 
◊ the consequences, should personnel not adhere to policy, by not acting in an 
authorized manner, which include disciplinary actions, 
◊ checking of security compliance, and 
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◊ change and configuration management. 
 
A wide variety of media, such as newsletters, brochures, handbooks, posters, 
videos, hands-on practical exercises, workshops, seminars and lectures, are 
available, of which as many as possible should be used in order to create an 
effective security awareness programme.  It is of utmost importance that 
management are made aware of the critical need for security.  Each manager is 
responsible for the security awareness of their staff.  Hence it should be planned for 
in the budget.  In large organizations the corporate IT security officer should get the 
responsibility for ensuring security awareness in the organization.  Convincing 
people that significant risks do exist and that the loss of information, unauthorized 
modifications or disclosure, can have disastrous effects on the organization and its 
employees, is the overall aim of the security awareness programme.  It is preferred 
that awareness sessions, which are arranged for educating personnel are related to 
the organizations environment.  Relevant examples should be given during the 
awareness session, such as easily understandable cases which can occur in the 
organization.  All examples should have a greater impact than the cases reported in 
the news media.  These awareness sessions will give the opportunity for employees 
to interact with the instructor.  Once personnel have completed the awareness 
session their compliance with security controls must be monitored.  If it is found 
that the awareness session had little effect on how these staff members comply to 
security controls, then the awareness session’s content should be evaluated and 
altered accordingly   (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 11 & 12). 
 
It is important that awareness sessions be repeated occasionally, not only to inform 
new staff but also to refresh the awareness knowledge of existing staff.  All new, 
transferred or promoted personnel should be informed of their new responsibilities.  
It would be a viable option to integrate IT security aspects into other courses. 
Security awareness is an ongoing process, which can never be regarded as 
complete. 
 
At this point the IT management process is still not complete and should not be 
regarded as such, since the management of IT security is an ongoing process 
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(Boddington & Hill, 1998,  p 6).  Even if all the previously mentioned tasks of the 
GMITS framework have been performed, tasks such as formulating a corporate IT 
security policy, considering organizational aspects of IT security, performing a risk 
analysis, following IT security recommendations, documenting an IT system 
security policy and defining an IT security plan (which dictates steps for 
implementing security controls and establishing a security awareness program) 
must be considered.  Developing and incorporating the follow-up procedure is 
therefore essential. 
 
4.2.12 Follow-up 
 
Maintenance on each and every control is a requirement that will ensure that 
security controls function, and continue to function, in an appropriate and 
predictable manner, as intended.  Although maintenance is such an important 
aspect of security, it is often neglected or forgotten.  In most cases security is added 
to existing systems or services as an afterthought, after which it is often completely 
forgotten.  People tend to ignore already implemented security controls and the 
minimum time is spent, and attention given, to maintain and improve security.  If 
security controls have become obsolete, they should be discovered by planned 
actions and not accidentally stumbled upon.   
 
Besides maintenance, other follow-up actions such as security compliance 
checking, monitoring of the operational environment, log record reviews and 
incident handling are all important issues to ensure the on-going protection of IT 
systems and services. Each of these follow-up actions will be discussed briefly 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 12 - 14) 
 
♦ Maintenance 
 
An important part of an organization’s security program is to maintain and 
administer security controls.  The following list of activities or tasks is the 
responsibility of all managers, regardless at which level.  The managers should 
ensure that: 
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◊ the necessary organizational resources are allocated to maintain the 
security controls, 
◊ re-evaluation of security controls occurs on a regular basis, to ensure its 
ongoing performance, 
◊ when new requirements are discovered, the security controls should be 
adjusted or upgraded, 
◊ the control maintenance responsibilities are clearly understood, 
◊ any modifications to either hardware or software, and any upgrades to an 
IT system must not change the satisfactory performance of existing 
security controls, 
◊ new threats or vulnerabilities are checked for and dealt with following any 
advancements in technology. 
  
Only if the maintenance activities or tasks listed above are accomplished and 
complied with, then and only then can existing security controls continue to 
perform as intended, while avoiding any unfavorable and costly impacts 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 12). 
  
♦ Security Compliance 
 
To comply with the IT system security plan, security compliance checking, 
also known as security audit or security reviewing, must be done.  The goal to 
be achieved is to ensure that the correct level of IT security is in tact.  To 
achieve this goal, all implemented security controls continually conform to the 
security controls listed in the IT project or system security policy.  Whether 
during design and development, or during the operational lifetime, or during 
replacement or disposal, all security controls must always comply with those 
specified in the IT project or system security plan. 
 
External or internal personnel, such as auditors, can be used to conduct the 
security compliance checks.  Checklists related to the IT project or system 
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security policy are used by the appointed auditors to assist in the process of 
security compliance checking.  To determine whether operational support staff 
and users are conforming to specific security controls and procedures, spot 
checks can be used.   
 
Security compliance checking is necessary to ensure that the correct security 
controls are implemented, as well as checking whether they are implemented 
correctly.  Security compliance is also mentioned and regarded as important in 
COBIT (PO6) (ISACF, 1995, p 19).  Furthermore, the compliance checking 
can determine whether the security controls are correctly used and tested.  A 
corrective action plan should be produced and activated, when it is found that 
some security controls do not conform to the specifications of the IT project 
and system security plan.  After the corrective action plan is activated, the 
results should once again be reviewed. Security compliance checking should 
not be an independent activity and should preferably form part of other 
planned activities.   
  
♦ Monitoring 
 
Monitoring forms an important part of the IT security cycle and if done 
correctly it can give management an indication of what has been achieved, 
compared to the targets and deadlines defined earlier.   Monitoring can also 
give management an idea of how satisfactory the achievements are and where 
certain initiatives failed or succeeded.  Monitoring also features in COBIT’s 
high-level control objective number M1 (ISACF, 1995, p 44). 
   
Since all changes to assets, threats, vulnerabilities and security controls can 
have an effect on risks, preventative action should be taken to ensure early 
detection of changes.  Sometimes output logs are produced by security 
controls.  These output logs contain an entry of every security relevant event.  
To ensure the early detection of trends and the detection of events that 
repeatedly occur, it is necessary that the output logs are reviewed regularly and 
if possible, by means of statistical analysis.  As part of the monitoring process, 
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there should be procedures in place for regular reporting of output log results 
to the IT security officer and to management. 
    
♦ Incident Handling 
 
What is unavoidable and certain is that security incidents will occur.  
According to COBIT, problems and incidents should be resolved and the cause 
thereof should be investigated to prevent any recurrence.   The high-level 
control objective number DS10 in COBIT mentions incident handling and 
recommends that incident reporting is done and escalation procedures are in 
place (ISACF, 1995, p 40).  The depth to which any security incident is to be 
investigated should be justified by the potential damage that the occurrence of 
the particular incident can cause.  Incident handling can provide guidelines to 
react to security incidents or any disruptions to the operation of the IT systems, 
whether it be accidental or deliberate.  
 
These guidelines provided by incident handling will necessitate the 
development of an incident reporting and investigation scheme.  The reporting 
and investigating scheme should be suitable for all the IT systems and services 
of the organization.  It is always beneficial to join inter-organizational 
reporting schemes.  By doing so, a wider view of IT security incident 
occurrences can be gained.  Furthermore it will indicate an organization-wide 
view of threats, related to security incidents and the effect they could have on 
IT assets and business operations. 
 
The two primary objectives to be achieved by conducting an IT security 
investigation are firstly, to sensibly and effectively react to an incident.  
Secondly, to learn from past incidents, and to lessen or eliminate similar future 
events.  A plan should be in place which consists of a list of actions to be 
taken, based on predefined decisions, should a security incident occur.  The 
plan will allow an organization to limit further damage by reacting in 
reasonable time.  The sequence of all events and actions should be documented 
in the plan.  In doing so the source of the incident could be identified which 
82  
can lead to the improvement of security controls to reduce future risk.  Besides 
the negative effects that a security incident can have on an organization, one 
thing is certain;  an incident will increase the willingness to invest in security 
controls (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 13). 
 
The following questions must be addressed when an incident analysis is 
executed and documented. 
 
◊ What has happened, and at what time? 
◊ Did the staff follow the plan? 
◊ Was the required information available to the staff on time? 
◊ What would the staff propose to do differently the next time? 
 
The answers to these questions will provide a better understanding of the 
incident and by upgrading the relevant IT security policies and plans, can 
reduce risks.  Risk reduction can be achieved by either improving security 
controls, reducing vulnerabilities or adapting the security awareness 
programme. 
 
The follow-up actions discussed in this sub-section, namely maintenance, 
security compliance, monitoring and incident handling, all contribute 
to the successful and ongoing protection of IT systems and services. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter all activities of the GMITS framework, namely Planning and 
Management, Risk Management, Implementation and Follow-up have been addressed.  
GMITS proposes a framework, which makes available guidelines for managing IT 
security.   It intends to familiarize managers with the major activities that are 
necessary for effective IT security management (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 14). 
 
There are, however, a few problems which arise when using GMITS. Firstly, the 
purpose of GMITS (Guidelines for the Management of IT Security), as its name 
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indicates, is to provide guidance, not solutions, on the management aspects of IT 
security (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1997, p iv).  Secondly, it should be noted that GMITS 
does not concentrate on the management of information security, but rather on the 
management aspects of IT security. Thirdly, individuals within an organization who 
are responsible for IT security are expected to adapt the guidelines given in GMITS to 
suit their specific needs.   Doing so can prove to be a difficult and time-consuming 
task since GMITS does not contain explicit examples to illustrate how effective IT 
security management can be accomplished.  Another drawback of GMITS is that, 
although it provides guidance on the selection of security controls, it does, however, 
not provide a list of security controls from which to choose (ISO/IEC TR 13335-4, 
1997).  Not listing security controls is therefore one of the major limitations when 
using GMITS, especially since the aim of this dissertation is to identify and implement 
the most effective set of security controls to satisfy the information security need of an 
organization, in order to ensure the effective management of information security. 
 
As an alternative to using the GMITS framework, the ISO 17799 standard provides a 
framework, which can be used, for the management of information security. The ISO 
17799 framework will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5  
 
THE INFORMATION SECURITY 
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK OF  
ISO 17799 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the history of the ‘Code of Practice (CoP) for Information Security 
Management’ will be discussed, starting with when it was first published, to becoming 
an international standard called ISO 17799.  The ‘Code of Practice for Information 
Security Management’ can be used as a common reference standard for inter-company 
trading and for sub-contracting or procurement of information technology (IT) 
services or products.  Following the history of the ‘Code of Practice for Information 
Security Management’ a detailed discussion of the Information Security Management 
Framework of ISO 17799 will be given.    
 
5.2 The History of the ‘Code of Practice for Information Security 
Management’  
 
The ‘Code of Practice’ (CoP) has been developed by the Department of Trade and 
Industry, with the assistance of a group of leading companies and organizations in the 
United Kingdom and was first published in September 1993.  It is based on a 
compilation of the best information security practices in general use in many leading 
international companies.  It also provides ‘best practice’ guidance to help companies 
to successfully implement their own information security system (Owens, 1998, p 2).   
 
In 1995 the ‘British Standard Code of Practice (CoP) for Information Security 
Management’ was published under supervision of the British Standards Institution 
(BSI) and became known as a British Standard, called BS 7799 (URN 96/702, 1996, p 
5).  The objectives of BS 7799 are to provide a common basis for companies to 
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develop, implement and measure their security management practice, and to provide 
confidence when information is shared between organizations (Owens, 1998, p 3 & 
URN 96/702, 1996, p 5). 
 
A comprehensive set of security controls is provided by BS 7799. This set of security 
controls is regarded as the best information security practices in current use (URN 
96/702, 1996, p 5). These generally accepted security controls are referred to as 
baseline security controls, because they collectively define an industry baseline of 
good security practice. Some of these security controls are, however, not applicable to 
every IT environment and should be used selectively, according to specific business 
circumstances. If every relevant security control were implemented to the minimum 
extent in an organization, then the minimum baseline level of security would have 
been achieved. To do this would not require a detailed risk analysis, but it is necessary 
to determine if this baseline level of security is sufficient for the specific security 
needs of an organization (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 10).  
 
The consideration of other security controls not listed in BS 7799 is, therefore, 
nevertheless a necessary part of your planning, which may be required to provide 
more protection for especially valuable assets, or to counter exceptionally high levels 
of security threats (British Standards Institution: CoP, 1995, pp 7-37). 
 
In 1999 the BS 7799 was issued in two parts (BS 7799, 1999). Part 1 (BS 7799-1) is 
called the ‘Code of Practice for Information Security Management’ and still contains 
most of the security controls listed in the BS 7799 1995 version.  A few revisions to 
the original security control list have, however, been made.  These 1999 revisions take 
into account recent developments in the application of information processing 
technology, particularly in the area of networks and communications. Part 2 (BS 
7799-2) is called the ‘Specifications for Information Security Management Systems’.  
This part forms the basis for assessing the Information Security Management System 
(ISMS) of the organization and may therefore be used as the basis for a formal 
certification scheme. 
 
86  
Organizations seeking certification are expected to adopt the elements of best practice, 
given in Part 1, and which are most appropriate to their information security needs as 
demonstrated by a risk analysis.  In order to be certifiable against the British Standard, 
the Information Security Management System will have to be implemented and 
maintained in a satisfactory manner as expected by the third party certification body.    
 
In 2000 Part 1 of the British Standard BS 7799 was adopted by ISO (the International 
Standards Organization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical Commission) as 
an International Standard, called ISO/IEC 17799.  For the rest of this dissertation this 
standard will be referred to as ISO 17799. 
 
The International Standard on Information Security Management, ISO 17799, includes 
a well-established framework.  This framework can assist in the initiation, 
implementation, maintenance and documentation of information security in an 
organization.  Since the standard is business-led, it provides a best practice on 
information security management (URN 99/703, 1999, p 6 & 7).  
 
5.3 The Information Security Management Framework of ISO 17799 
 
ISO 17799 enables the development of an Information Security Management System 
(ISMS) which involves three steps.  It involves the creation of a management 
framework for information, the assessment of security risks and the selection and 
implementation of controls.  The management framework of information security 
gives direction, specifies aims and objectives of information security and defines a 
policy which has the consent and commitment of management (URN 99/703, 1999, p 
6) 
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Figure 5.1   The Information Management Framework of ISO 17799  
 
The information management framework illustrated in figure 5.1 starts out with 
determining the company’s approach to security.  It also considers the scope of the 
ISMS.  Both the company’s approach to security and the scope of the ISMS are 
documented in the security policy.  The risks to which the company is exposed are 
then assessed.  After the assessment of risks, management can determine which risks 
must be managed and how the risks should be managed.  The management of risks 
depends on the policy and the degree of the risk.  Management can then decide and 
select appropriate controls from those listed in the BS 7799 standard and also other 
necessary controls not listed in the BS 7799 standard.  Security controls which are 
selected as applicable to the organization, must be documented in a Statement of 
Applicability.   The entire process of understanding, controlling and managing risk 
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should be reviewed regularly (Owens, 1998, p 8).  It is necessary that all the following 
steps are undertaken in order to identify and document the control objectives and 
controls (BS 7799-2, 1999, 1).  Control objectives are, coincidentally, also the 
deliverables which will result from using the COBIT framework (ISACF, 1995, p vi) 
 
5.3.1 Security Policy and ISMS Scope 
 
It is important that everyone in the organization understands the need for 
information security.  The commitment of management will ultimately also 
determine the attitude of staff members towards security matters.  It is therefore 
extremely important that staff members are educated to take the necessary care 
when dealing with and handling sensitive documents, passwords and any other 
activity regarding information security in the organization.  Management 
commitment is regarded by both GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 4 & 7) 
and COBIT’s high-level control objective number PO6 (ISACF, 1995, p 19) as an 
important issue related to information security management.   
 
The BS 7799 advises that “A written policy document should be available to all 
employees responsible for information security”.  A security policy helps 
management in giving them direction and support for information security.  Both 
GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 3-5 & 10) and COBIT (PO6) (ISACF, 
1995, p 19) necessitate the development of a security policy.  According to BS 
7799 the security policy should also include, amongst others, a definition of 
responsibilities for all aspects of information security and a security awareness 
program to educate staff on security needs.  Both the specification of employee 
roles and responsibilities and the formulation of a security awareness program are 
supported by GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 5 & 11) and COBIT (PO4, 
DS1, PO7 & DS7) (ISACF, 1995, p 17, 20, 31 & 37).  Incident handling is also 
specified in the BS 7799 guidelines to define a security policy (Owens, 1998, p 9). 
Incident handling was previously discussed in GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 
1997, p 13) as part of its follow-up procedure.  COBIT also referred to incident 
handling in its high-level control objectives (DS10) (ISACF, 1995, p 40).   The 
company’s security policy should be maintained and regularly reviewed based on 
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its consequent importance to the organization.  Figure 5.2 gives guidance on the 
contents of a security policy, identifying what it should at least contain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2   Security Policy guidance (Owens, 1998, p 9) 
 
The scope of the ISMS must be defined.  To do this the boundaries of the ISMS 
must be identified and defined by taking into account the characteristics of the 
organization, its location, assets and technology (BS 7799-2, 1999, p 1).  After 
identifying the boundaries of the ISMS, a risk analysis can be performed to identify 
all risks within the identified boundary. 
 
 
 
Security Policy 
Rationale 
• emphasis on its importance as an enabling mechanism for information sharing 
• compliance with legal and contractual requirements 
• protection of the company’s assets 
Definitions 
• the overall objectives 
• a definition of information security 
• a statement of management intention supporting the goals and principles  
• a definition of responsibilities for all aspects of information security 
How information security operates 
• the scope and procedures of the ISMS 
• an explanation of specific security policies and requirements 
• how staff will be educated about security needs 
• how virus prevention and detection works 
• the policy on busines continuity planning 
• an explanation of the process for reporting suspected security incidents 
Authority 
• approval and support from Board and management 
 
90  
5.3.2 Risk Analysis 
 
The staff members responsible for ensuring business continuity need to consider 
the business harm that is likely to result from an information security breach.  They 
should also consider the likelihood of the occurrence of such a security breach, 
taking into account the widespread  threats and controls. 
 
To ensure business continuity by avoiding a breach in security, it is necessary to 
select a risk analysis and management approach which can adequately satisfy the 
organizational and security needs.  The selected risk analysis approach should be 
undertaken to identify the possible risks.  In order to identify the possible risks, the 
information assets must first be identified.  An asset is anything related to the 
information system that has value to the organization.  The assets need to be 
adequately protected due to its worthiness for the organization.  Assets can be 
paper documents such as plans, records and products, they can be software assets, 
such as copies of documents held on computer or they can be physical assets such 
as computers, files and safes.  Furthermore assets can be systems which run on 
computers and processes that capture and verify data, or assets can be intangibles, 
such as intellectual property and industrial secrets. 
 
Risk analysis can be defined as a tool which can identify those areas of the 
organization that are vulnerable to risk.  The risk analysis can then assist in 
identifying areas where appropriate action needs to be taken to prevent or minimize 
the impact, should an asset be exploited by the risk (Owens, 1998, p 10).  The risk 
analysis will, therefore, be responsible for the identification of the threats to assets, 
vulnerabilities and impacts on the organization.  Besides the before-mentioned 
responsibility of a risk analysis, it should also determine the degree of risk that 
exists in the organizational environment (BS 7799-2, 1999, p 1).  The management 
of risk involves the selection and implementation of appropriate controls which 
will reduce the associated risks to a level which is acceptable to the organization 
(Owens, 1998, pp. 8 - 10).   
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5.3.3 Management of Risk 
 
The overall risk management process specified in GMITS includes a risk analysis, 
the selection of security controls, the acceptance of risks and defining an IT 
systems security policy and IT security plan (refer to figure 4.1). 
 
Whether the risk analysis process is considered to occur before the risk 
management process, as described by ISO 17799 in figure 5.3 (Owens, 1998, p 11), 
or whether the risk analysis process is considered part of the overall risk 
management process, as indicated in GMITS in figure 4.1 (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 
1997, p 2), it is none-the-less still essential in the successful management of 
information security.  Risk analysis is even supported by COBIT’s high-level 
control objectives DS5 and DS11 (ISACF, 1995, p 35 & 41), although no 
disclosure is made as to whether risk analysis is considered to occur before or 
during the risk management process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3   Managing the risks 
 
According to the ISO 17799 standard, risk management can be referred to as the 
process where security controls are identified and applied to an information system.  
The identified security controls should correspond to, and be justified by, the 
assessed risks.  
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To provide protection against the identified risks, suitable security controls should 
be selected, based on the outcome of the previously performed risk analysis.  
Sometimes it will be necessary to include security controls which do not form part 
of the ISO 17799 standard, since the assessed risks could require other security 
controls not listed in ISO 17799 (Owens, 1999, p 11).  The term risk management 
ultimately means that the areas of risk must be identified and managed according to 
the organization’s information security policy and based on the degree of assurance 
required (BS 7799-2, 1999, 1). 
 
5.3.4 Information Security Controls 
 
It is stated in ISO 17799 that “Appropriate security control objectives and security 
controls shall be selected and the selection shall be justified”.  After the risk 
management process, all areas containing critical or less critical risks will have 
been identified.  Security controls are able to reduce the risk that has been 
identified for a particular asset.  It is therefore very important that appropriate 
security controls and appropriate objectives be selected from the ISO 17799 list of 
security controls, to ensure that the correct level of protection is applied.   The 
security control categories listed in figure 5.4 contain the security controls which 
are generally accepted and are referred to as baseline security controls.  These 
generally accepted security controls or baseline security controls, as they are 
known, define an industry baseline of good security practice. Not all security 
controls are always applicable to each and every business environment and should, 
therefore, be used selectively according to organizational circumstances and 
business need.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4   Baseline security control categories 
 
The baseline security control categories 
Computer and network management 
 System access control 
 Systems development and maintenance 
 Business continuity planning 
 Compliance 
 Information security policy 
 Security organization 
 Assets classification and control 
 Personnel security 
 Physical and environmental security 
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After applicable security controls have been selected and implemented according to 
the results produced for the risk analysis, the next step in the ISO 17799 framework 
is to prepare a Statement of Applicability. 
 
5.3.5 Statement of Applicability 
 
The Statement of Applicability lists all the objectives and security controls which 
were chosen by an organization as most suitable to their business needs, 
accompanied by the reason for their selection. Besides listing those security 
controls that have been selected, the Statement of Applicability also includes those 
security controls excluded from the list as well as the reason why these security 
controls have been omitted (BS 7799-2, 1999, p 1 & Owens, 1998, p 12).   The 
Statement of Applicability document describes how risks are controlled within the 
organization.  Although the document contains the reasoning behind selection or 
non-selection of security controls, it should, however, not be too comprehensive.  If 
the Statement of Applicability is too extensive it can become a vulnerability to the 
information security situation of the organization.  This document will be made 
publicly available, since it might serve as an informative document for a potential 
trading partner.  This document can either be provided to a potential trading partner 
as a document on its own or in combination with a certificate issued by a 
certification body (Owens, 1998, pp. 11 - 12).  An example of a Statement of 
Applicability document is shown in table 5.1. 
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Control Selected
(Yes/No
) 
Justification 
6.3.1   Virus controls yes Highlighted by risk assessment.  High 
risk of damage to PC systems and 
network servers.  Baseline control for 
organization-wide implementation. 
7.4.3    User 
authentication 
yes High risk of unauthorized access 
through dial-up lines.  Security policy 
specifies authentication to be 
mandatory.  Baseline control for 
organization-wide implementation. 
4.3.4 Disciplinary 
             process 
no Strong personnel policies and practice 
already well established. 
10.3.2 Protection of 
system audit tools 
no Not relevant to this domain (application 
system). 
7.5.5 Duress alarm no Not relevant in this organization.  No 
identifiable threat.  Specifically 
excluded from baseline. 
 
Table 5.1:  Example:  Statement of Applicability 
 
5.3.6 Reviews 
 
The requirement in ISO 17799 regarding reviews states: “The previous steps 
should be reviewed at appropriate intervals”.  Information security control 
expenditure must be balanced and be in-line with the business value of the 
information and other business assets at risk.  Expenditure must also be justified 
and appropriate to the business harm likely to result from security failure.  The 
changing nature of IT and consequently also the changing business needs and 
priorities, require that a periodic review of business risks and security risks must be 
done.  Regular security reviews are after all an important feature of information 
security management (Owens, 1998, p 12).  The reviews which are described in 
ISO 17799 tie in well with the follow-up procedure of GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 
13335-2, 1997, p 12 & 13) and COBIT (PO6, M1 and DS10) (ISACF, 1995, p 19, 
40, 44). 
 
This section explained all components of the ISO 17799 framework.  Firstly an 
information security polity should be defined that specifies the aims and objectives of 
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information security within the organization.  A risk analysis should then be 
conducted to identify risks within the defined boundary.  To define the boundaries of 
the Information Security Management System certain characteristics of the 
organization should be taken into account, such as its location, its assets and 
technology (BS 7799-2, 1999, p 1).  The identified risks should then be managed by 
selecting and implementing appropriate security controls.  Doing so should reduce the 
risks to an acceptable level.  Once this process of risk management is completed, a 
Statement of Applicability should be prepared to give the reasoning behind the 
selection or non-selection of security controls.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter gave the history of the ‘Code of Practice for Information Security 
Management’, from when it was first published to becoming a British Standard (BS 
7799) and finally an international standard (ISO 17799). Each component that the ISO 
17799 framework consists of was also discussed in detail. 
 
As mentioned earlier, BS  7799 consists of two parts.  Part 1 lists a comprehensive set 
of security controls which is regarded as the best information security practices in 
current use (URN 96/702, 1996, p 5). Since Part 2 gives the specifications for 
Information Security Management Systems which form the basis for assessing the 
Information Security Management System (ISMS) of the organization, it may be used 
as the basis for a formal certification scheme.  Only Part 1 of BS 7799 has been 
accepted as ISO 17799 in 2000. 
 
The advantages of ISO 17799 is that it is business-led, it captures best practice on 
information, it can be used by businesses in all sectors and of all sizes, it provides 
ready-made guidance and shortens the learning curve (URN 99/703, 1999, p 3).  It 
also provides a common basis for companies to develop, implement and measure 
effective security management practice and it provides inter-company trading 
confidence (Owens, 1998, p 3 & URN 96/702, 1996, p 5). 
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A limitation of using ISO 17799 is that when the guidance given in ISO 17799 is 
considered, it becomes apparent that there is no best approach to achieve the security 
objective of your organization (URN 99/704, 1999, p 2).  This problem arises because 
not much detail or guidance is given on how risks should be analyzed. When security 
controls should then be selected, from those listed in ISO 17799 to manage the risks, 
difficulty can be experienced, especially if it is unknown which security controls are 
appropriate. 
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, each discussed a framework which is closely related to 
information security management.  These are the frameworks of COBIT, GMITS and 
ISO 17799, respectively. Certain components within these three frameworks can be 
regarded as common components, since they appear in more than one of the three 
discussed frameworks and can, therefore, certainly be considered as important for the 
management of information security. Besides having noticed common components 
within the three frameworks, the purpose, strengths and weaknesses of each were also 
given. 
 
Based on all the facts gathered from analyzing COBIT, GMITS and ISO 17799, a new 
framework for information security management will be proposed.  This new 
framework will be called the Information Security Management Toolbox framework, 
and the reasons for developing this new framework will be motivated in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6  
 
THE FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
OF THE INFORMATION SECURITY 
MANAGEMENT TOOLBOX  
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Three frameworks have been discussed in the previous three chapters.  They are the 
frameworks of COBIT, GMITS and ISO 17799. The COBIT framework provides 
control objectives for information and related technology. By using the COBIT 
framework, managers and business process owners can be relieved from the 
responsibility involved in all parts of the business process.  Although both GMITS 
and ISO 17799 present frameworks for the management of IT security and 
information security, it is also concerned with producing justified control objectives 
(Owens, 1998, p 11). 
 
After studying the three frameworks, various weaknesses of each framework, as 
discussed in the previous chapters, came to light.  Consequently none of the 
previously discussed frameworks, on their own, makes it ideal for the management of 
information security. Taking into account the advantages of each framework, some 
parts of these frameworks are, however, essential in the management of information 
security. Besides their respective advantages, it could also be noticed that certain 
components appear in more than one of the discussed frameworks.  In other words an 
overlap can be observed, regarding certain components of the various frameworks.  
Since these overlapping components appear in more than one framework, they can 
certainly be regarded as important and relevant in the process of managing 
information security.  
 
These overlapping components, along with the strengths of each framework, were 
found to be significantly important to be included into a new framework which were 
developed for information security management.  This framework is called the 
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framework for the Information Security Management (ISM) Toolbox.  The ISM 
Toolbox framework has been created based on the knowledge gained from evaluating 
the COBIT, GMITS and ISO 17799 frameworks. The ISM Toolbox framework does 
not merely consist of only the overlapping components derived from the previously 
discussed frameworks, but it also includes other equally important components found 
in the discussed frameworks.  These components, together with the strengths of the 
respective frameworks, are all necessary to produce a comprehensive Information 
Security Management System.   
 
The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to develop and define a new framework for the 
management of information security, which incorporates the strengths, and addresses 
the weaknesses, of each analyzed framework.  All components that constitute the ISM 
Toolbox framework will the discussed in detail.   
 
The methodology for the ISM Toolbox framework will then be discussed, associating 
each phase of the ISM Toolbox methodology with a component of the ISM Toolbox 
framework. 
 
6.2 The ISM Toolbox:  Addressing the weaknesses of COBIT,  GMITS and  
ISO 17799 
 
This section explains how a few of the previously mentioned weaknesses experienced 
with using COBIT, GMITS and ISO 17799, can be addressed by the ISM Toolbox.  
The ISM Toolbox is an integrated software tool which has been developed due to the 
combined efforts of various information security researchers at the Port Elizabeth 
Technikon.  The ISM Toolbox serves as a guide to provide a structured approach for 
the development of an Information Security Management System (ISMS) for an 
organization.   The proposed ISMS will be customized according to the unique 
business and security needs, requirements or objectives within the particular 
organization. 
 
The aim of the ISM Toolbox is to provide a quick and easy way in which 
organizations can determine which security controls will be most effective to protect 
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their information assets against possible disclosure, loss or destruction. The ISM 
Toolbox, therefore, concentrates on information security, rather than IT security, as is 
the case with GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 13335, 1997).   Another weakness of GMITS 
which has been mentioned in chapter 4 is that it only provides guidelines, not 
solutions, on the management aspects of IT security (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1997, p 
iv).  The ISM Toolbox, however, differs from GMITS in that it provides solutions to 
the management of information, by making use of a hands-on technique to determine 
the organization’s requirements for security by considering business needs and 
objectives.  With the help of the ISM Toolbox, these security requirements will then 
identify relevant security controls.   
 
The security controls which will be chosen by the ISM Toolbox, are listed in ISO 
17799 (ISO 17799, 2000).  This standard merely provides a list of security controls 
and no guidelines on the approach that should be followed to aid in the selection of 
security controls.   The ISM Toolbox addresses this weakness of ISO 17799, by 
providing an easy way in which to identify which of the security controls, listed in 
ISO 17799, should be implemented and which not.  
 
In addition to the identification of security controls, the ISM Toolbox also provides a 
set of supporting security procedures, to support and ensure the effective operation of 
each security control.  Security procedures are, however, not provided when the 
frameworks of COBIT (ISACF, 1998) and GMITS (ISO / IEC TR 13335, 1997) are 
used.   
 
All components of the ISM framework will be discussed in the following section.  
While being discussed the components of the ISM Toolbox framework will also, 
where relevant, be related to the frameworks of COBIT, GMITS and/or ISO 17799.  
 
6.3 A framework for the Information Security Management (ISM) Toolbox  
 
A framework that properly integrates all the key components required to develop a 
suitable Information Security Management System forms the basis of the ISM 
Toolbox. All required aspects or components making up the Information Security 
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Management System are logically combined into a reference framework which can 
also be referred to as the Information Security Management framework. Prior to the 
development of a framework a few very important issues should be taken into 
account, such as what should be protected within the organization, what standards 
should be followed, who bears the responsibility for security and whether employees 
have access to all information or whether their access is limited. The aim of any 
framework is to provide a conceptual definition and structure for an undefined 
environment.  Within this environment the framework allows room for designing 
individual components.  It specifies the integration procedure of individual 
components into the overall environment, while it ensures that the end result meets the 
originally intended vision of the framework (Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 46).  
 
If a security framework does not exist, it does not mean that the system, business unit 
or organization will be prevented from operating, however, it could cause serious 
mistakes related to, and oversight of, security which can lead to unexpected and 
harmful vulnerabilities (Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 47).  A benefit of using a 
framework for Information Security Management is that a diagram or representation 
of all the required security components are provided. Such a diagram or representation 
can be useful when various mechanisms and approaches of similar frameworks must 
be compared (Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 46).  The frameworks of COBIT, BS 7799 
and GMITS have been compared and based on the conclusions derived from their 
evaluation, the components of the ISM Toolbox framework can be motivated. 
 
The ISM Toolbox framework comprises of a number of components which together 
defines a framework for a comprehensive security solution in the form of an 
Information Security Management System. Figure 6.1 illustrates all the major 
components of the ISM Toolbox framework.  The major components of the ISM 
Toolbox framework are all regarded as generally important in the quest to develop a 
comprehensive Information Security Management System.  The major components of 
the ISM Toolbox framework is derived from the comparison of three previously 
discussed frameworks, namely COBIT, GMITS and ISO 17799. 
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Figure 6.1   The Information Security Management (ISM) Toolbox framework 
 
The ISM Toolbox’s framework determines the appearance, characteristics and 
components necessary in developing a typical Information Security Management 
System.  The ISM Toolbox framework is represented as a building, which consists of 
a foundation, pillars, a roof and other important components, as shown in figure 6.1.   
The ISM standards on which the ISM Toolbox is based, form the framework’s 
foundation.  The security vision and strategy, as well as the organizational aspects, 
which are both necessary for ensuring the proper management of security, are 
represented by the two pillars of the ISM Toolbox framework.  The pillars are 
necessary to uphold the construction of the building, which can be interpreted as 
ensuring continued security within the organization, which ultimately ensures business 
continuity.  The roof of the building depicts the responsibility of management, which 
is to oversee and convey the message of support and commitment for all security 
activities within the organization as dictated by the Information Security Management 
System.  Other important core components which form part of this framework are 
issues regarding security requirements, security policy, risk management and the 
follow-up procedure.  Each component of the ISM Toolbox framework will be 
discussed and related to the previously discussed ISM frameworks, namely COBIT, 
GMITS and ISO 17799, starting with the issue regarding management commitment.  
Management commitment plays an important role in the reference frameworks of 
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COBIT (PO6) (ISACF, 1995, p 19), GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 4 & 7) 
and ISO 17799 (Owens, 1998, p 8) and therefore it has been included in the ISM 
Toolbox framework. 
 
6.3.1 Top Management Commitment 
 
To ensure that any Information Security Management System is effective, it is 
crucial that top/senior management commitment is evident, through their support 
for the Information Security Management System.  Senior management should not 
only in principle support information security in the organization, but management 
should also show their commitment in practice (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 4; 
Owens, 1998, p 7).  Management’s support for information security can be 
demonstrated by means of an information security policy document, security 
directives and through the allocation of resources (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p  
7; URN 96/702, 1996, p 9). 
 
Besides management commitment, there are many other issues to consider for 
developing an appropriate Information Security Management System.  Since the 
aim of the ISM Toolbox framework is to illustrate all the necessary aspects in 
developing a complete Information Security Management System, it had to 
consider all issues relevant to dealing with the management of security in a 
business environment.  For this reason existing information security management 
standards were examined.  
 
6.3.2 Information Security Management Standards 
 
The ISM Toolbox is based on two information security management standards.  
These standards are ISO/IEC TR 13335 - Guidelines for the Management of IT 
Security (GMITS) and ISO 17799 - Code of Practice for Information Security 
Management.  Although gaining knowledge from information security 
management standards, the ISM Toolbox should also have its own security vision 
and strategy for information security management.  
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 All three discussed frameworks specified a need for security vision and strategies.  
GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 3) specifies that objectives must be 
defined, whereas ISO 17799 (Owens, 1998, p 9) specifies a rationale for security 
and the high-level control objective, PO1 of COBIT (ISACF, 1995, p 14) suggests 
that a strategic IT plan must be formulated which will clarify all business 
objectives for IT to accomplish IT business requirements.  Although the three 
frameworks use different terminology, the need is still the same to specify the 
organization’s security vision and strategies for achieving the security vision. 
 
6.3.3 Security Vision & Strategies  
 
 A clear vision of what is to be achieved regarding information security should be 
set by the organization, after which a strategy for achieving this security vision 
must be defined.  The security vision and strategies include the development of a 
mission statement, guiding principles and philosophy, which provide a strategy for 
addressing the information protection need of the organization.   
 
 To succeed in achieving the security vision of the organization, and based on the 
findings of analyzing the COBIT, GMITS and BS 7799 frameworks, a definite 
organizational structure should be in place. 
 
6.3.4 Organizational aspects 
 
 The organizational aspects pillar of the ISM Toolbox framework (figure 3.18) 
recommends that a definite organizational structure must be introduced.  To 
configure an organizational structure an Information Security (IS) Officer must be 
appointed and an Information Security (IS) Forum must be established.  The 
responsibilities or duties of an IS Officer is to develop, implement and review the 
Information Security Management System.  The IS Officer should also be a 
member of the IS Forum.  An IS Forum is a cross-functional forum which consists 
of management representatives who are selected from relevant areas within the 
organization.  The duties of the IS Forum, on the other hand, include tasks such as 
advising the IT steering committee, formulating a corporate IT security policy, 
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devising, implementing and monitoring an IT security programme, promoting IT 
security awareness and advising on resources for the implementation of the IT 
security programme (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 6 & 7). 
  
6.3.5 Security requirements 
 
 The most effective way of providing information security is to use a structured 
approach, based upon the specific security requirements of the organization.  By 
concentrating on specific security requirements it can be ensured that all important 
areas in the organization are considered (URN 96/702, 1996, p 5). 
 
Security requirements can be defined as the unique business and/or security needs 
that exist within an organization and which are necessary to determine the 
appropriate protection for ensuring information security. 
 
The security requirements of the organization are determined by means of an 
extensive business security analysis.  Depending on the value and importance of 
particular information systems to the organization, security requirements may vary 
(Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 60).  For this reason different levels are defined for 
security requirements. The security requirements will be defined in terms of the 
level of confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and auditability 
required by the organization. 
 
6.3.6 Security policy 
 
The security policy gives top management the opportunity to demonstrate their 
support as well as commitment for information security.  The organization’s 
security vision must be complemented by the information security policy and the 
information security policy should reflect the desire for controlled and secure 
business operations (URN 96/702, 1996, p 9). 
 
The information security policy should consider the business requirements or 
business needs of the organization, taking into account the importance of 
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information security to each business process (URN 96/702, 1996, p 9).   The 
purpose of a policy document is to convey the direction and expectation of senior 
management to people related to the organization.  The direction and the 
expectation of management can be conveyed through a statement which supports 
the goals and principles of information security (URN 96/702, 1996, p 9). The 
importance of information assets related to business objectives should be 
addressed, together with the employee roles and responsibilities.  Employees 
should be given details on how suspect security incidents can be reported (URN 
96/702, 1996, p 9).  Employee policy awareness and training as well as employee 
security awareness and training is a very important aspect to ensure that security is 
maintained in the organization and should therefore also be specified in the policy 
document.  The policy document should be relevant, understandable and 
accessible to the target reader (BS 7799-2, 1999, p. 3).  
 
The information security policy which will be developed and produced by the ISM 
Toolbox aims to convey the importance of information by giving a definition of 
information security, manage threats to information resources and to create a 
culture that ensures the protection of information resources.  It further aims to 
dictate discipline and uniformity when using information. The ISM Toolbox 
attempts to set a clear direction for business and outside partners, while it meets 
external demands and requirements from, for example, clients and suppliers.  
Besides having an informtion security policy  at hand, risks have to be controlled 
and managed in order to obtain optimum security of information.  Consensus 
amongst the frameworks of COBIT (DS11 and DS5) (ISACF, 1995, p 35 & 41), 
GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 3, 9-11) and BS 7799 (Owens, 1998, p 11) 
warrants the necessity and inclusion of risk management in the ISM Toolbox 
framework. 
 
6.3.7 Risk management 
 
Risk management is the process whereby information security controls are 
identified and applied to an information system, in order to provide adequate and 
justified protection (Owens, 1998, p 11).  The risk management aspect of the ISM 
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Toolbox Framework is based on the ISO/IEC TR 13335 and BS 7799 standards, in 
which case a set of BS 7799 controls will be dictated by the identified security 
requirements and the information security policy.  The identified security controls 
need to be implemented and any residual risks should first be handled before the 
risk management process is complete.  Even if the tasks within the risk 
management process have been done, the process of managing information 
security is not yet complete.  A follow-up procedure needs to be in place. 
 
6.3.8 “Follow-up” 
 
The COBIT (PO6, M1 and DS10) (ISACF, 1995, p 19, 40 & 44), GMITS 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 12 & 13) and BS 7799 (Owens, 1998, p 12) 
frameworks all support the definition and implementation of a follow-up 
procedure.  BS 7799 refers to security reviews, which includes monitoring, while 
COBIT refers to compliance, monitoring and incident handling and GMITS refers 
to all these activities, namely maintenance, monitoring, incident handling and 
compliance checking.  
 
Controls should be maintained, periodically re-evaluated and upgraded to ensure 
that they continue to perform as intended.  Monitoring keeps management 
informed and it identifies the satisfactory and unsatisfactory functioning of 
controls.  Monitoring is especially useful for the early detection of new risks, 
which result from changes to assets, threats, vulnerabilities and controls.  Output 
logs could be useful to report on security relevant events or incidents.  Incident 
handling is another activity of the follow-up procedure.  Amongst others, it 
specifies procedures for how occurring incidents should be investigated and 
reported to management.  The purpose of incident handling is to reduce future risk 
by improving controls, related to he source of the incident.  Security compliance 
checks, audits or reviews are done to ensure that security controls are correctly 
implemented, used and tested.  If not, corrective action should be taken (ISO/IEC 
TR 13335-2, 1997, p 12 & 13).  By performing the follow-up procedure, the 
continuous, effective operation and functioning of the implemented security 
controls can be guaranteed. 
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 It was found that many individual components appeared in more than one of the 
analyzed frameworks, namely COBIT, GMITS and ISO 17799.  These overlapping 
components were regarded as being rather important and relevant in the process of 
managing information security and were, therefore, found to be significantly important 
to form the basis of a new framework which was developed for information security 
management.  This framework, called the framework for the Information Security 
Management (ISM) Toolbox, has been created based on the knowledge gained from 
evaluating the COBIT, GMITS and ISO 7799 frameworks, incorporating the strengths 
and addressing the weaknesses of each discussed framework.  The ISM Toolbox 
framework comprises of a number of components which together define a framework 
for a comprehensive security solution in the form of an Information Security 
Management System.   
 
The Information Security Management Toolbox can be defined as an integrated 
software tool which provides guidance by following a structured approach to develop 
a number fit Information Security Management System for the organization.  In the 
next section the methodology for the Information Security Management Toolbox will 
be discussed. 
 
6.4 The Information Security Management Toolbox Methodology 
 
The Information Security Management Toolbox methodology consists of several 
phases.  These include the Introduction Phase, the Initial Phase, the Analysis Phase, 
the Development Phase, the Implementation Phase and the Continuation Phase.  Each 
phase of the Information Security Management Toolbox methodology is associated 
with a certain component of the Information Security Management Toolbox 
framework, as indicated by Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: The Information Security Management Toolbox framework 
indicated with related phases of the Information Security 
Management Toolbox methodology. 
 
While each phase of the Information Security Management Toolbox methodology is 
being discussed, it will be related to certain components of the Information Security 
Management Toolbox framework, revealing its relevance to the particular component. 
 
6.4.1 Introduction Phase 
 
The Introduction Phase covers issues such as gaining top management support and 
commitment for information security in the organization. The degree of 
management commitment will reflect the attitude of the staff towards information 
security (Owens, 1998, p 8). It is essential that top management demonstrate 
amongst others, their support for information security by making available the 
necessary resources to achieve information security.   
 
Besides requiring top management commitment, the Introduction Phase also 
requires that relevant information security management standards be adhered to.   
The information security management standards, which are used by the 
Information Security Management Toolbox are ISO/IEC TR 13335 – Guidelines 
 
Initial Phase 
Introduction Phase 
Development Phase 
Implementation Phase
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Initial Phase 
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Development Phase 
Continuation Phase 
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for the Management of IT Security (GMITS) and ISO 17799 – Code of Practice 
for Information Security Management (CoP). 
 
Once top management commitment is obtained and the relevant information 
security management standards adopted, the security vision for information 
security must be set by the organization.   
 
6.4.2 Initial Phase 
 
The Initial Phase is related to the organizational aspects and security vision and 
strategy pillars of the Information Security Management Toolbox framework.  
This phase is concerned with issues such as achieving the security vision, 
appointing an Information Security Officer, establishing an Information Security 
Forum and defining the scope of the Information Security Management System.  
 
To achieve the security vision a strategy must be defined and formulated.  
Strategies for achieving the security vision include the development of a mission 
statement, guiding principles and philosophy.  All of the before mentioned 
strategies will address the need for information protection in the organization. 
Once the security vision and strategy has been defined, the appointment of an 
Information Security Officer can be done. 
 
An Information Security Officer should be a member of the Information Security 
Forum and is responsible for the development and implementation of the 
Information Security Management System.  The Information Security Forum 
should ideally comprise of management representatives, who are selected from 
various relevant disciplines within the organization.  The Information Security 
Forum’s responsibilities include performing tasks such as advising the IT steering 
committee, formulating a corporate IT security policy, devising, implementing and 
monitoring an IT security programme, promoting IT security awareness and 
advising on resources for the implementation of the IT security programme 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 6 & 7).   
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6.4.3 Analysis Phase 
 
The Analysis Phase is related to the ‘Security Requirements’ component of the 
Information Security Management Toolbox framework.  During the Analysis 
Phase it is required that a business analysis is conducted, and the Information 
Security Officer oversees this process.  A business analysis involves identifying 
and interviewing the key role players responsible for information security in the 
organization. The purpose of the business analysis is to determine how much 
information security is required in the organization.  The amount of security 
needed in an organization is called the security requirements.   Security 
requirements are related to and are based on the organization’s unique business 
needs in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity 
and reliability, and are driven by business objectives and business goals.  The 
business analysis of the Information Security Management Toolbox will, 
therefore, be referred to as a security requirements analysis rather than a business 
analysis.  The security requirements of the organization will be used to identify all 
relevant information security controls. 
 
Once the security requirements of an organization have been determined, a draft 
policy structure must be drawn up by the Information Security Officer.  A security 
policy gives top management the opportunity to set a clear direction, whilst 
demonstrating top management’s support for and commitment to information 
security (URN 96/702, 1996, p 9).  
 
It is the task of the Information Security Officer to propose this draft policy 
structure to the Information Security Forum. The Information Security Forum is 
responsible for the review and approval of the policy structure. Once approved, the 
security policy should be signed by the most senior person in the organization to 
demonstrate commitment at the highest level (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 9).  It is 
important that the security policy document is maintained by regularly reviewing 
the security policy (Owens, 1998, p 8).  
 
 
111  
6.4.4 Development Phase 
 
The Development Phase spans the ‘Security Policy’ and the ‘Risk Management’ 
components of the Information Security Management Toolbox framework, as 
depicted in figure 6.1.  
 
A good description of what a security policy is, is that it is a series of statements, 
decided on by top management, which express the goals and procedures for 
achieving information security in the organization (Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 
49).  Its objectives are to ensure that risks are managed effectively, to ensure 
compliance with laws and regulations, to define employee accountability for 
information asset protection and to preserve management’s authority in case of 
asset misuse, loss or unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information (Bruce & 
Dempsey, 1997, p 49).  Included in a security policy should be a statement from 
top management, which supports the goals and principle importance of 
information security.  Specific statements indicating the requirements to comply 
with, such as legal, regulatory and contractual obligations, security awareness and 
educational requirements, virus prevention and detection, as well as business 
continuity planning, should also form part of the security policy.  A definition of 
responsibilities and accountabilities for information security, as well as details on 
the procedure for reporting suspect security incidents should be covered in the 
security policy (URN 96/702, 1996, p 9).  In short, a security policy should thus 
include a policy statement, the purpose of the security policy, the scope of the 
policy, the requirements for complying with the policy and the penalties or 
consequences should the policies be violated (Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 74).  
The policy document should be published and should be made available to all 
employees  responsible for information security (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 8), in 
a form which is relevant, accessible and understandable to the intended employees 
(BS 7799-1, 1999, p 3).  When a security policy document exists, every staff 
member can be held accountable under the policy (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 9).  
The security policy will promote consistent user action and acceptable behavior 
(Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 49). 
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For a security policy to be successful, it must have top management support, it 
must have user community awareness, it must be kept independent of technology, 
it should be clear and readable, and it must be in line with the security architecture 
(Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 63).  An information security policy can thus give 
guidelines to ensure that the correct level of information security is maintained in 
the organization.  To achieve and maintain this acceptable level of security, the 
appropriate information security controls should be identified, introduced and 
applied (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 10). 
 
These information security controls, which are based on the organization’s 
security requirements, and which were identified during the Analysis Phase, must 
be put forward and must be agreed upon by the Information Security Forum.   
 
Once the proposed information security controls have been agreed upon, a project 
plan must be devised and documented.  The project plan includes the short, 
medium and long-term actions to be taken, its associated cost and a time schedule 
for the implementation of the identified security controls. 
 
In addition to the implementation of security controls, a set of supporting security 
procedures should be identified, to support the effective operation of each control.  
These procedures also need to be proposed to the Information Security Forum for 
acceptance.  
 
Furthermore an Information Security Awareness Programme needs to be 
established.  The main purpose of an Information Security Awareness Programme 
is to educate the users about the information security policy.  It also ensures that 
the security guidelines and the appropriate actions for security are clearly 
understood by everybody responsible for security in the organization.  People 
should be convinced that significant risks do exist and that the loss of information, 
unauthorized modifications or disclosure, can have disastrous effects on the 
organization and its employees. A variety of media, such as newsletters, 
brochures, handbooks, posters, videos, workshops, seminars and lectures are 
available and should be used to develop an effective Information Security 
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Programme.  A Security Awareness Programme should address the basic 
information protection needs and should also mention the implications that 
security incidents can have for the employee and the organization (ISO/IEC TR 
13335-2, 1997, p 11 & 12).  
 
6.4.5 Implementation Phase 
 
The Implementation Phase is not related to a particular component of the 
Information Security Management Toolbox framework.  This phase takes place 
between the components that represent ‘Risk Management’ and ‘Follow-up’ in the 
Information Security Management Toolbox framework and is concerned with the 
actual implementation of the security controls according to the pre-accepted 
project plan.  For implementation, the necessary people must be empowered and 
assigned certain responsibilities.  Nominating and empowering employees to 
perform certain tasks and take on certain responsibilities is referred to as defining 
a responsibility framework.  It is important that people become aware of the 
necessity of security in their organization.  To raise the employee awareness and 
even loyalty, the information security awareness program must be used to educate 
employees regarding information security issues within the organization. 
 
6.4.6 Continuation Phase  
 
The Continuation Phase of the ISM Toolbox methodology is associated with the 
‘Follow-up’ component of the ISM Toolbox framework.  As mentioned 
previously, it should be understood that the information security process is an 
ongoing activity and not an once-off exercise (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 6).  The 
continuation phase of the ISM Toolbox Methodology involves four activities. 
 
◊ Firstly the Information Security Management System should be maintained.  
This is especially important, since it is a known fact that when there are 
advancements in technology, the associated threats and vulnerabilities can also 
change (ISACF, 1995, p vi; ISACF, 1998, p 3).  Deviations in the operation of 
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security controls should, therefore, be maintained to cater for situations like 
these. 
 
◊ Secondly, it should be ensured that security incidents are handled in an 
appropriate manner.  Any occurring incident should be resolved and the cause 
thereof should be investigated to prevent any recurrence (ISACF, 1995, p 40).  
The two main objectives of incident handling, are to effectively react to an 
incident, and to learn from past incidents in order to lessen or eliminate similar 
future events (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 13). 
 
◊ Thirdly, the security situation should be monitored. Monitoring is the activity 
that checks whether the correct level of security is maintained by the system, 
its users and the environment.  It is said that monitoring is important in the 
detection of security relevant changes (ISO/IEC TR 13335-3, 1998, p 30). Any 
changes to assets, threats, vulnerabilities and security controls can have an 
effect on risks.  Preventative action should therefore be taken to ensure the 
early detection of any changes in the security situations.  Producing audit logs 
can also be regarded as a means of monitoring. 
 
◊ The fourth task to be taken care of during the continuation phase is the audit of 
the Information Security Management System for compliance to ensure that 
the correct level of security is in tact.  External or internal personnel, such as 
auditors, can be used to conduct the security compliance checks.  Not only 
does security compliance checking ensure that the appropriate security controls 
are implemented, but correctly implemented (ISO/IEC TR 13335-3, 1998, p 
29). 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, a framework for the ISM Toolbox has been defined.  Based on the 
framework a methodology has been defined, identifying a number of components and 
phases that form part of the ISM Toolbox.  In order to obtain an holistic view of the 
ISM Toolbox, each phase of the ISM Toolbox methodology has been addressed and 
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related to the relevant component(s) of the ISM Toolbox framework.  A holistic view 
of the ISM Toolbox is necessary, to indicate exactly on which area within the ISM 
Toolbox this study will focus.  
 
As explained in this chapter the most important task of the ISM Toolbox is to indicate 
the most effective set of security controls which will provide the required level of 
security for information assets.  In order to identify the most effective set of security 
controls the required level of protection must, therefore, first be determined.   
 
Traditionally a risk analysis was used to identify and assess risks and based on these 
measured risks, appropriate security controls could be identified and implemented.  
The process of identifying and implementing security controls is known as risk 
management. Risk management is one of the areas, on which this study will focus and 
will therefore, together with risk analysis, be discussed, in the next chapter.  
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Chapter  7 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Since risk management forms such an integral part of the ISM Toolbox framework 
(figure 6.1), as explained in chapter 6, it needs to be discussed in more detail, in this 
chapter.  
 
The term risk was defined in chapter 2 as the potential that a given threat has to  
exploit vulnerabilities which could cause loss or damage to an asset or group of assets.  
It was explained that when a threat manifests and exploits the vulnerability of the 
asset, it could have an adverse impact on the organization.  Such an impact is an 
unwanted incident which is caused by either deliberate or accidental action and affects 
the assets in such a way that loss or damage can occur. The ideal is, therefore, to 
attempt the prevention of such security incidents to avoid the associated impact that it 
may have on the organization.  
 
Risks should, therefore, be identified and assessed to ensure the proper management 
thereof.  Risks can be managed by introducing security controls which can take the 
form of policies, practices, procedures or mechanisms.  Security controls can aid in 
the management of risks by either avoiding the risk, transferring the risk, reducing the 
threat, reducing the vulnerability, reducing the impact, detecting unwanted incidents 
and facilitating recovery.   
 
The process of identifying, assessing and prioritizing risks is known as risk analysis, 
and the process of selecting and implementing suitable security controls to minimize 
the identified risks is known as risk management.  Both these processes, risk analysis 
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and risk management, play an important role in the management of information 
security and will be discussed in detail in this chapter, starting with the order in which 
these two processes should take place. 
 
7.2 Different views on risk analysis and risk management 
  
There are different views on exactly when the risk analysis process takes place, in 
relation to the risk management process.  A few common views on these processes 
will be given in this section. 
 
The NIST Handbook claims that a risk is the possibility that something adverse can 
happen and risk management is the process of assessing the risk, taking steps to 
reduce it to an acceptable level and maintaining that level of risk (NIST, 1995, p 59).  
 
According to ISO/IEC TR 13335-2 (1997) the process of risk management includes, 
inter alia, the risk analysis activity (figure 7.1).  In other words the risk analysis 
process is regarded as being embedded in the risk management process. The risk 
management process, as explained in ISO/IEC TR 13335-2 (1997) will, amongst 
others, also be responsible for choosing the overall risk management strategy of the 
organization in order to select appropriate security controls as a result of the risk 
analysis activity.  The risk management process of ISO/IEC TR 13335-2 will 
furthermore formulate the IT system security policy and the IT security plans for 
implementing the security controls (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 2-3). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1:   Risk analysis and risk management as viewed by ISO/IEC TR 13335 
 
ISO 17799, on the other hand, treats the processes of risk analysis and risk 
management as two separate but related processes, with the risk analysis process 
preceding the risk management process (figure 7.2) (Owens, 1998, p 8-9; BS 7799-2, 
1999, p 2; Moses, 1992, p 229-231).  In this context, the main objective of the risk 
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analysis process is to assess risks, whereas the risk management process is responsible 
for the identification and selection of appropriate security controls, based on the 
outcome of the risk assessment to reduce the risks to an acceptable level (Moses,1992, 
p 236).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2:   Risk analysis and risk management as viewed by ISO 17799 
 
Regardless of whether risk management includes the risk analysis activity or not, it is 
still important that risks should be managed properly.  In this chapter / dissertation the 
discussion of the risk analysis and risk management processes will be based on the 
views of ISO 17799, viz, the risk analysis process will precede the risk management 
process.  
 
The process for the assessment of risks involves three major steps.   First an 
organization-wide strategy for risk analysis and risk management should be selected.  
Secondly a risk analysis should be conducted to identify the risks with which the 
organization is faced.  Thirdly, the identified risks should be managed by selecting and 
implementing all necessary controls which will result in the risks being reduced to an 
acceptable level (Humphreys, Moses and Plate, 1998, p 10).  Each activity of the risk 
analysis and risk management processes, as illustrated in figure 7.3, will be discussed 
in detail in the sections that follow. 
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Figure 7.3:   The association between risk analysis and risk management 
 
7.3 The Risk Analysis Process 
 
A security risk can be defined as the potential that a given threat has to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of an asset to cause loss of or damage to an asset.  Measures of risk can 
therefore be determined from a combination of asset values, assessed level of related 
threats and the associated vulnerabilities. 
  
The assessment of risks would involve the consideration of the business harm likely to 
result from a risk that materializes as well as the consequences thereof.  The 
assessment of risks should furthermore consider the realistic likelihood of occurrence, 
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taking into account threats, vulnerabilities and currently implemented security 
controls. By definition, risk analysis is the process of identifying security risks, 
determining their magnitude and identifying areas that need information security 
controls.  Risk analysis consists of a number of aspects such as the values of the 
assets, the levels of threats and vulnerabilities and existing/planned controls, including 
impact and likelihood (Moses, 1992, p 231).  Each of these aspects, as illustrated in 
figure 7.4, will be discussed separately in more detail in the rest of this section.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4:   The process of risk analysis 
 
7.3.1 Asset identification and valuation 
 
Before any risk analysis review can be undertaken, the boundary in which the 
review will take place must be established. The boundaries are identified by taking 
into account the characteristics of the organization, its location, assets and 
technology (BS 7799-2, 1999, p 1).   By doing so it will ensure that no asset is 
unintentionally overlooked or forgotten.  It is essential that all assets within the 
review boundary are identified.   Any tangible object which has value to the 
business process under review is regarded as an asset.  Once all assets have been 
identified by listing each of them, monetary values should be assigned to each of 
them.  The monetary values which are assigned to each asset should be in line with 
the importance of the asset to the business.  The importance of the asset can be 
portrayed in terms of the potential business impacts which can result from 
disclosure, modification, non-availability and/or other loss or destruction of the 
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asset.  The monetary values being assigned should, therefore, preferably be related 
to the cost of obtaining and maintaining the asset (Humphreys, Moses and Plate, 
1998, p 22).  
 
It is often necessary to express the value of an asset, or rather its importance, in 
non-financial terms, which is referred to as qualitative valuation. Examples of this 
valuation method is to distinguish between low, medium and high, or to use a 
scale from 1(low) to 10(high) to express the importance of an asset.  Once all the 
assets in the established boundary have been identified and valued it is necessary 
to consider the threats to these assets. 
 
7.3.2 Threat assessment 
 
It is of great importance to assess all possible threats to the previously identified 
assets.  Existing threat lists as those found in C:CURE PD3002 (Humphreys, 
Moses & Plate, 1998, p 41-45) can be used to help with identifying threats to 
particular assets.  After the threats have been identified, the likelihood of 
occurrence of these threats needs to be assessed. 
 
Assessing the likelihood of threat occurrence involves the consideration of the 
threat frequency and whether they are deliberate (eg. possible attackers) or 
accidental threats (eg geographical factors such as weather conditions). 
 
As explained earlier, a threat normally exploits a weakness (vulnerability) that 
exists to have an impact on the asset.  The vulnerability of the asset to the threat 
must, therefore, also be assessed in order to determine the level of risk the 
organization is dealing with. 
 
7.3.3 Vulnerability assessment 
 
A vulnerability assessment involves the identification of all weaknesses which 
may be exploited by a threat source in order to cause harm to the asset, and 
ultimately also to the business itself.  A vulnerability on its own cannot cause 
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harm.  Harm can only come to the asset if a corresponding threat is present which 
can exploit the vulnerability  (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1998, p 16).  During the 
assessment of vulnerabilities, it is important to assess the severity of the 
vulnerability, meaning the ease with which the vulnerability may be taken 
advantage of.  Vulnerabilities could, for example, be rated with a scale which 
indicates vulnerability, such as highly probable, probable, possible, unlikely or 
impossible (Humphreys, Moses and Plate, 1998, p 24). 
 
Once asset identification, asset valuation, threat assessment and vulnerability 
assessment have been completed, all existing and planned security controls must 
be identified.  
 
7.3.4 Identifying existing and planned security controls 
 
To avoid unnecessary work and cost during the process of risk analysis it is 
important that only additional security controls to those already planned for and 
currently implemented, should be selected. Besides avoiding the duplication of 
security controls, the identification of existing and planned security controls can 
uncover security controls which are not justified by the outcome of the risk 
analysis.  With such unjustified security controls it should be considered whether 
it would be best to remove, replace or supplement the security control or to leave 
the security control as is because of cost implications.  It is sometimes more 
expensive to remove a security control than it is to leave it as is.  An alternative to 
replacing security controls could be to implement additional supporting security 
controls.  
 
The only task that remains to be done for the risk analysis process to be complete, 
is the assessment of the risk. 
 
7.3.5 Assessment of Risk  
  
 The objective of risk analysis is to identify and assess all the risks to which an 
organization and its assets are exposed. 
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 A definition of risks is that they are a combination of the assets at risk, the 
likelihood of the occurrence of threats which can cause business impact and the 
ease of exploitation of the vulnerabilities by the identified threats.  Whichever way 
risks are assessed, it should always result in a list of risks for each of the impacts 
of disclosure, modification, non-availability and destruction for each of the 
identified assets within the established boundary of the organization.    
 
At this stage the risks have been identified, assessed and prioritized, due to the 
completion of the risk analysis.  These identified risks must somehow be managed in 
order to reduce the risks to an acceptable level. The risk management process, which 
follows the risk analysis process, will be responsible for managing the identified risks 
and will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 7.4 The Risk Management Process 
 
Since the risk analysis process precedes the risk management process, it should be 
completed before the risk management process takes place. Once the risks have been 
identified and assessed as part of the risk analysis process, the risks can be managed in 
an appropriate way.  The risk management process involves the identification and 
selection of security controls to reduce risks to an acceptable level as indicated by the 
assessed measure of risk (Moses, 1992, p 230).  Each of the activities involved in risk 
management, as illustrated in figure 7.5, will be discussed individually. 
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Figure 7.5:   The process of risk management  
 
7.4.1 Identification and selection of security controls 
 
The security controls that should be identified and selected should be based on the 
result of the risk assessment.  When identifying controls it is important that the 
cost of implementing and maintaining a control does not exceed the value of the 
asset it intends to protect.  In the next sub-section it will become clear how a risk 
can be reduced by the implementation of information security controls. 
 
7.4.2 Reducing the risk 
 
By implementing the selected information security controls, risks can be reduced 
by either one or more of the following ways (Moses, 1992, p 236): 
◊ by avoiding the risk,  
◊ transferring the risk (e.g. insurance),  
◊ reducing the likelihood of threats,  
◊ reducing the vulnerabilities,  
◊ reducing the possible impacts,  
◊ detecting unwanted events early,  
◊ reacting and  
◊ recovering. 
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The way which is chosen to protect information systems depends on the specific 
business environment and circumstances in which the organization conducts its 
business.  Even after all security controls are in place, there will still be some form 
of risk remaining.  The remaining risk is called the residual risk.  More about the 
residual risk will be discussed in the next sub-section (Humphreys, Moses and 
Plate, 1998, p 27). 
 
7.4.3 Risk acceptance 
 
 The residual risk might be the result of certain assets being intentionally left 
unprotected because of either a low risk being assessed or because of the high cost 
of the suggested control.   As part of the risk acceptance phase of risk 
management, all selected controls will be reviewed to reveal all residual risks.  
These residual risks will be assessed to classify them as either being “acceptable” 
or “unacceptable”. 
 
Acceptance criteria can be used in those cases where decisions need to made, 
regarding the acceptability of risks.  Acceptance criteria, such as the pre-set 
organizational policy, time constraints, money (or budget) constraints, technical 
constraints and cultural constraints can all play a role in deciding whether a risk is 
acceptable or not (Moses, 1992, p 241).  Unacceptable risks should not be 
tolerated and decisions should be taken to apply additional controls or more 
stringent controls which will further reduce the risk.  The reduced risk should then 
either be accepted, and if not, the expense for the implementation of additional 
controls must be approved to ensure that the risk is reduced to an acceptable level 
(Humphreys, Moses and Plate, 1998, p 28). 
 
In this section the importance of security controls in securing information has once 
again been shown.  The selection of security controls should be based on the extent of 
the associated risks that it intends to reduce.  To accurately determine the risks, a good 
risk analysis technique or tool should be used. It is, therefore, important that either 
different approaches to determine risks and their size, or different techniques to 
determine the most appropriate set of security controls, are studied.   
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A number of different approaches to security control selection currently exist.  These 
approaches will be referred to as risk analysis approaches. Examples of such 
approaches are the Baseline approach, Detailed Risk Analysis approach, Informal 
approach and Combined approach, to name but a few. An organization is, however, 
faced with the decision of choosing the most suitable approach.  Based on the time, 
effort and depth of detail, to which the information system will be explored, a suitable 
risk analysis approach should be chosen to compare with the organization’s 
environment and requirements. Choosing a suitable approach also depends on factors 
such as the business environment, the nature and importance of the business, the 
amount of dependency on technology to support the business, the complexity of the 
business and the number of trading partners, including contractual relationships. 
When choosing an approach the foregoing factors as well as the advantages and 
disadvantage of each approach must be carefully considered.  A general rule that can 
be followed is that the more important and essential security is to the organization and 
for the business that it conducts, the more time and resources should be dedicated to 
security, especially if there is a lot at stake. 
 
Although other risk analysis approaches can be used to assess the risks, the following 
section will only give an explanation of what the Detailed Risk Analysis Approach 
entails (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 9).  
  
7.5 The Detailed Risk Analysis Approach  
 
This section will concentrate on the Detailed Risk Analysis approach, by giving a 
brief description of what it involves and also listing its associated advantages and 
disadvantages.   
 
Since a Detailed Risk Analysis is very resource intensive, the boundaries in which 
assets are identified must be clearly established.  Another important factor is that 
management involvement should occur throughout the process of performing a 
Detailed Risk Analysis. 
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A Detailed Risk Analysis involves the identification and valuation of all assets within 
the established boundary and then assesses the threats to these assets, while taking into 
account the associated vulnerabilities. Based on the information gathered from the 
threat and vulnerability assessment, risks are assessed and appropriate security 
controls are identified and selected.   
 
As an option, security controls can be selected from those listed in ISO 17799 in order 
to reduce the risks.   A lot of detail is required in assessing threats and vulnerabilities 
in order to select appropriate security controls.  It should however be kept in mind that 
a Detailed Risk Analysis is responsible for identifying and assessing the risks and is 
not directly responsible for selecting security controls.  As mentioned earlier, the 
selection of security controls forms part of the risk management process.  
 
The detail involved in performing a risk analysis, depends on which assessment tool 
or method will be used to relate the measures and values of assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities which will ultimately result in a measure of risk. The measures or 
values being assigned to assets will indicate their business importance, whereas those 
assigned to threats will indicate severity or seriousness, and those assigned to 
vulnerabilities will indicate a degree of weakness (Humphreys, Moses and Plate, 
1998, p 32).  A few of the assessment tools and methods that can be used as part of 
risk analysis will be examined and explained in the next section. 
 
7.6 Assessment Tools and Methods 
 
The tools and methods that exist for undertaking risk analysis range from approaches 
that make use of simple question and answer checklists to more structured analysis-
based approaches (ISO/IEC TR 13335-3, 1998, p 11; Humphreys, Moses and Plate, 
1998, p 48).   
 
Risk analysis tools and methods are used to measure the risk, based on the values 
assigned to, and assessment of, assets, threats, vulnerabilities and existing/planned 
controls.  The assessment of asset values, or the potential business impact, can be 
done by either using qualitative or quantitative measures. When quantitative measures 
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are used to assess assets, monetary values are assigned to the assets, indicating the 
asset worth in terms of procurement, replacement and maintenance cost of the asset.  
 
Qualitative measures developed because quantitative measures could not properly 
identify values of data assets, not to mention how impossible and illogical it is to 
represent the potential effects of the impacts in purely financial terms (Moses, 1992, p 
250).  Qualitative measuring is, therefore, based on the use of adjectives to describe 
the importance of the asset.  For example, a qualitative measure for describing the 
importance of an asset could range from moderate to severe.   
 
Whether tables are used in combination with either qualitative or quantitative 
measures, there is no right or wrong method to use.  The choice of a tool or method to 
use for risk analysis depends on whether the organization is comfortable with the 
chosen tool or method and whether they have confidence that the tool or method will 
produce repeatable results (Humphreys, Moses and Plate, 1998, p 49).  Four different 
analysis methods, found in GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 13335-3, 1998, p 43-47), will be 
explained.   
 
7.6.1 Matrix with Predefined Values 
 
The values defined for assets when using this type of method are represented in 
terms of replacement or reconstruction costs.  Thus costs are represented 
quantitatively, which need to be converted to a qualitative scale (eg. 1 to 4). 
 
To determine the value of assets the appropriate staff members must be 
interviewed.  Once the interviews are concluded, a questionnaire must be 
completed for each threat type and each grouping of assets that relates to a specific 
threat type.  This will enable the level of threats (likelihood of occurrence) and 
vulnerabilities (ease of exploitation by threats to cause unfavorable impact) to be 
assessed.   
 
In order to gather the necessary information to complete the questionnaire, 
technical staff will be interviewed, the physical location will be inspected and the 
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appropriate documentation will be reviewed.  Each answer from the questionnaire 
will result in the assignment of a score.  The scores will be added by means of a 
knowledge base and will be compared to ranges, in order to identify threat levels 
and vulnerability levels which range from a high to low scale.  
 
The matrix method indicates asset values, threat levels and vulnerability levels, as 
shown in figure 7.6.   These elements are all matched in the matrix based on the 
results from the questionnaire, the relevant measure of risk on a scale from 1 to 8 
is identified for each combination of elements.  The size of the matrix, including 
the number of threat and vulnerability categories can be adapted to suit the needs 
of the organization. 
 
 Levels of 
threat 
Low Medium High 
 Levels of 
Vulnerability L M H L M H 
L M H 
0 0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 4 5 6 5 6 7 
Asset 
value 
4 4 5 6 5 6 7 6 7 8 
Figure 7.6:   The Matrix method 
 
For example, if an asset has the value 3, the threat is high and the vulnerability is 
low, then according to the matrix method the measure of risk is 5.  The higher the 
measure of risk the more protection is required for assets, which can be achieved 
by selecting and implementing the appropriate control or number of controls. 
 
7.6.2 Ranking of Threats by Measures of Risk 
 
The threat ranking method makes use of a matrix to relate asset value (or impact) 
and likelihood of threat occurrence (thus considering vulnerabilities).  Firstly, the 
impact or asset value of each threatened asset (as indicated by column ‘b’ in figure 
7.7) is evaluated on a predefined scale, for example 1 to 5.  Secondly, the 
likelihood of occurrence of the threat is evaluated on a predefined scale from 1 to 
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5 (indicated by column ‘c’ in figure 7.7).  Thirdly, the measure of risk is calculated 
by multiplying the impact value and the likelihood of the threat occurring, thus 
multiplying the values in column ‘b’ and ‘c’ of figure 7.7.  Only once the measure 
of risk has been calculated, can the threats be ranked in order of priority.  It 
should, however, be noted that this method does not take vulnerabilities into 
account. 
Threat 
descriptor 
 
(a) 
Impact 
(asset 
value) 
(b) 
Likelihood of 
threat 
occurrence 
(c) 
Measure 
of risk 
 
(d) 
Threat 
ranking   
 
(e) 
Threat A 5 2 10 2 
Threat B 2 4 8 3 
Threat C 3 5 15 1 
Threat D 1 3 3 5 
Threat E 4 1 4 4 
Threat F 2 4 8 3 
Figure 7.7:   The Threat ranking method 
 
This method allows different threats with differing impacts and likelihood of 
occurrence to be compared and based on the outcome of the comparisons; the 
threats can be ranked in order of priority. 
 
7.6.3 Assessing Value for the Frequency and the Possible Damage of Risks 
 
With this risk analysis method the emphasis is placed on the impact of the 
occurrence of unwanted incidents and on the prioritization of systems.  In order to 
do so two values are assessed, one for the asset and one for the risk.  These two 
values combined will set the score of each asset.  All asset scores will be summed, 
whereby the measure of risk will be determined.  The values assigned to each asset 
relate to the potential damage that can result from the asset being threatened. 
Therefore, values should only be assigned to an asset that has an associated threat.  
At this stage a frequency value will be determined, by assessing both the 
likelihood of the threat occurring (level of threat) and the ease with which the 
vulnerability can be exploited by the threat (level of vulnerability), as described in 
figure 7.8. 
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Levels of 
Threat Low Medium High 
Levels of 
Vulnerability L M H L M H L M H 
Frequency 
Value 0 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 
Figure 7.8:   The frequency value method 
 
Figure 7.9 displays a matrix which will be used to determine the so-called 
asset/threat score. 
 
Asset 
Value 0 1 2 3 4 
Frequency 
Value 
     
0 0 1 2 3 4 
1 1 2 3 4 5 
2 2 3 4 5 6 
3 3 4 5 6 7 
4 4 5 6 7 8 
Figure 7.9:   The asset/threat score matrix 
 
The asset/threat score will be found at the intersection between the asset value and 
the frequency value (obtained from figure 7.8). The total of all asset/threat scores 
will result in an asset total score.  In turn, all asset total scores for assets of the 
information system will be added to give a system score.  The computed system 
score will prove helpful when deciding on the prioritization of the system’s 
protection. 
 
7.6.4 Distinction between Tolerable and Intolerable Risks 
 
By merely distinguishing between tolerable and non-tolerable risks can be another 
way of determining measure of risk.  This type of risk analysis method is similar 
to the method explained in section 7.6.3, although it can achieve similar results 
with much less effort.  It makes use of the measure of risk to rank risks in order to 
indicate the areas that most urgently require protection.  The matrix contains only 
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T’s and N’s to specify tolerable and non-tolerable risks.  The matrix shown in 
figure 7.9 should be used and all numbers should be replaced by T’s and N’s, as 
illustrated in figure 7.10.  
 
Asset 
Value 0 1 2 3 4 
Frequency 
Value 
     
0 T T T T N 
1 T T T N N 
2 T T N N N 
3 T N N N N 
4 N N N N N 
Figure 7.10:   Frequency value method based on tolerable and intolerable 
risks 
 
The matrix shown in figure 7.10 is merely an example.  The entering of T’s and 
N’s into the matrix should be customized according to the organization’s 
particular security situation. 
 
This section explained four assessment methods which can be used when conducting a 
risk analysis to result in a measure of risk. Although these assessment methods can be 
used as part of risk analysis to result in a measure of risk, there are, however, 
numerous benefits and limitations experienced with the use of risk analysis in general.   
In the following section these benefits and limitations will be discussed. 
 
7.7 Benefits and limitations of risk analysis in general 
 
There are numerous advantages and disadvantages associated with risk analysis in 
general.  A detailed discussion on the benefits and limitations, which can be 
experienced when using risk analysis, will be given in this section.  
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7.7.1 Advantages of risk analysis 
 
Risk analysis is regarded as a useful tool for identifying assets, threats and 
vulnerabilities, especially since many organizations are unaware of the 
vulnerabilities associated with their assets.   Risk analysis can also assist when 
decisions regarding the selection of appropriate security controls are made.  Proper 
decision making is crucial when choosing security controls, because security 
controls should be justified in relation to the protection that they provide.  If 
inappropriate security controls are implemented, it can reduce productivity by 
unnecessarily increasing overhead and causing inconvenience to the users, not to 
mention that the assets are obviously not properly protected. 
 
There are many security controls, which are too expensive compared to the 
advantages that can be obtained from having those implemented.  In such a case a 
risk analysis is extremely useful to indicate whether an expensive security control 
should be implemented.  It, however, depends on whether the expense of the 
security control justifies its worth.    In other words a risk analysis can be useful in 
the justification of expenditure towards information security, to allow the user to 
choose the most effective controls at the least cost (Pfleeger, 1997, p 463 & 471).  
 
Risk analysis provides information to various people responsible for ensuring that 
the correct level of security within an organization is maintained.  The people who 
can take advantage from this information include auditors, managers, developers 
and even system administrators.  The results obtained after a risk analysis is 
performed can enable auditors to concentrate on areas within the information 
system where the highest loss is expected.  For these expected high-loss areas the 
appropriate protection needs to be applied in the form of implementation of 
justified security controls.   Managers will gain relevant information about risks 
and the potential losses which can result from a security breach.  Developers and 
system administrators on the other hand, will be alerted to the potential problem 
areas regarding security, as identified by risk analysis (Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 
387).    
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Further advantages of risk analysis are that (ISO/IEC TR 13335-3, 1998, p 8):  
◊ it improves awareness which raises the level of interest and concern among 
employees regarding security issues, 
◊ an appropriate security level can be identified to ensure the security of each 
system, and that 
◊ additional information can be obtained from conducting a risk analysis, which 
could benefit the management of security relevant changes. 
 
Now that a few advantages, promoting risk analysis, have been voiced, the 
arguments against the use of risk analysis should also be discussed. 
 
7.7.2 Disadvantages of risk analysis 
 
 Besides its advantages, numerous problems have been documented regarding the 
utilization of risk analysis. Conducting a risk analysis takes a lot of time, effort 
and expertise to eventually provide feasible results (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 
9; ISO/IEC TR 13335-3, 1998, p 8-9). Not only is it a time-consuming and 
expensive process (Erwin, 1994, p 37-44), but as Charles P. Pfleeger states: “The 
results of a risk analysis are no more precise than the figures used in the analysis, 
which are often mere guesses” (Pfleeger, 1997, p 471). Not being precise, having a 
false sense of precision, suffering from immutability and having no scientific 
foundation are but some of the arguments raised against risk analysis.  The lack of 
precision refers to the imprecise or estimated values which are assigned to the 
likelihood of an occurring threat and the cost per occurrence.  It is said that risk 
analysis is best used as a planning tool to distinguish between the degree of risks, 
especially for choosing between controls when limited finances for security are 
available.   The argument, that risk analysis suffers from immutability, means that 
the risk analysis results are often filed and forgotten, whereas it should ideally be 
updated annually.  Figures produced in previous years should, however, not just be 
assumed and accepted as being correct but should be analyzed and reviewed 
annually.  Although it is claimed that risk analysis is not dependent on scientific 
theories and principles, it is, however, based on principles of probability theory 
and statistical analysis (Pfleeger, 1997, p 470-471).  Another opinion on the 
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limitation of risk analysis is the difficulty in including the indirect losses of the 
compromised systems and applications (Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 387). 
 
According to Robert V. Jacobson the traditional techniques of risk analysis are 
tedious, since there are many decisions to be made and a tremendous amount of 
data to be collected.  He further claims that risk analysis results are “subjective” 
and cannot be repeated, causing the results to be inconsistent.  Since each risk 
analysis starts at the beginning with the identification and assessment of assets, 
vulnerabilities and threats, it re-invents the wheel, because it is difficult to retain 
and recycle past experience.   It has also been found that risk analysis results are 
sometimes ignored by senior management (Jacobson, 1996, p 2).  This can prove 
disastrous, as it is known that management commitment towards security is crucial 
to encourage and promote a positive attitude amongst employees, toward 
maintaining security in the organization (Owens, 1998, p 7; ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 
1997, 3-10). 
 
This section gives a number of advantages in favor of risk analysis.  However, its 
disadvantages should not be overlooked. These disadvantages associated with risk 
analysis, together with modern developments, contributed to make traditional risk 
analysis not as effective anymore, especially since the proper protection of 
information depends on its results. 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
 
From this chapter it can be concluded that security controls reduce risks and thus 
provide information security.  It is, therefore, crucial that a suitable set of security 
controls is identified and implemented.  The identification and implementation of 
security controls should be based on the pre-determined measure of risk.  To ensure 
that the most appropriate set of controls is identified, a proper approach or technique 
must be followed. A number of risk analysis approaches exist, but only the Detailed 
Risk Analysis Approach was discussed in this chapter, because of its relevance to this 
study.  Various assessment tools and methods can be used as part of risk analysis, to 
result in a measure of risk. 
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Risk analysis is, therefore, not directly responsible for selecting security controls, but 
it does however aid in the security control selection process. The process whereby 
security controls are selected, however, is known as risk management.  A definition of 
risk management as given by Robin Moses is that “the purpose of risk management is 
to identify security controls to a level justified by the analyzed measure of risk, to 
reduce risks to an acceptable level” (1992, p 236). 
 
As highlighted, in this chapter, risk analysis has some shortcomings.  Besides the 
problems encountered with risk analysis, a change in focus also became apparent, in 
what risk analysis intends to protect and the kind of protection required today. This 
change in focus together with the shortcomings of risk analysis caused that an 
alternative, more modern approach to risk analysis, be considered. Such a potential 
new approach will indicate security requirements rather than measure of risk. 
 
The need for such a new approach, based on security requirements to aid in security 
control selection, as an alternative to risk analysis, as well as the change in focus that 
caused this need, will be addressed and explained in detail in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 8 
 
INFORMATION SECURITY 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Risk analysis used to be the primary process in securing computer assets.  Following a 
risk analysis exercise, security controls could be identified to reduce these risks to an 
acceptable level. Today, the emphasis has moved from computer assets to information 
assets.  In order to secure information, a different, more relevant approach is required 
(Wills, 1999, p 1). It seems as if the influence and impact of risk analysis has been 
reduced to such an extent that alternatives for identifying security controls need to be 
sought. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate (ascertain) whether the use of 
information security requirements can be considered as an alternative ‘more modern 
approach’ to traditional risk analysis in determining the required security controls.  To 
do so, this chapter will highlight the meaning, purpose and necessity of information 
security requirements by discussing the evolution of computer infrastructures in order 
to convince the reader that the requirements for protecting such environments have 
changed over time. The traditional risk analysis approach, as described in chapter 7, 
will be analyzed in an attempt to prove that it does not meet the requirements for 
identifying the required security controls in modern organizations anymore.  This 
chapter will conclude by introducing and proposing a technique called, the Security 
Requirements Analysis, suggested as an alternative, or supplement to traditional risk 
analysis in identifying the security controls required by an organization.  
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8.2 Computer evolution 
 
In a relatively short period of time computers advanced from simple stand-alone batch 
processing automates in a single-user computing environment, to encompass 
capabilities such as real-time control, multitasking and distributed processing in a 
distributed computing environment (Checkley, 1992, p 821).   
 
Throughout these evolutionary stages of computers, the computing environment 
changed from a Computer-Centric environment to an Information Technology-Centric 
environment.  Since today we live in a society which is mainly driven by information, 
it can be called - the Information-Centric environment (URN 99/704, 1999, p 2).  
Each of these environments will be discussed briefly. 
 
When comparing figure 8.1, figure 8.2 and figure 8.3 it becomes evident that the 
computer-processing department had a different, but unmistakable effect on other 
departments within the organization, during each phase of computer evolution.  All 
other departments within the organization depended on the data processing 
department to a certain extent.  In each phase an increasing degree of dependency can 
be observed.   
 
Figure 8.1, which represents the Computer-Centric environment, illustrates that up to 
the early 1980’s, computer processing operations were done in batch mode and for 
this reason the computer-processing department was seen as an important, but 
completely separate entity in the organization.  Few, if any, of the other organizational 
departments depended directly on the activities of the computer-processing 
department.  Most data was captured off-line and processed at a later stage in batch 
mode.  Most daily operations were not directly dependent on the operations of the 
computer and, therefore, any failure in computer operations normally had little effect 
on the activities of the organization.  Thus, the normal day-to-day operations of the 
business were in most cases not directly dependent on the computer system, as pointed 
out in figure 8.1. Consequently each department could work independently from one 
another in performing their daily tasks.   
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Figure 8.1:   Departmental Dependency in a Computer-Centric Environment / 
Era 
 
Considering figure 8.2, which depicts the Information Technology-Centric 
environment, it can be observed that as a result of activities such as multitasking, real-
time control and distributed processing, the organizational departments started to 
depend slightly more on the activities performed within the, now called, Information 
Technology (IT) department (Moses, 1992, p 229).  A clear overlap between the IT 
department and the organizational departments can be noticed, as a result of the online 
and real-time processing modes.  During this stage, the IT department was no longer 
regarded as a completely separate entity in the organization, since the business 
departments grew dependent on the IT department for their normal day-to-day 
operations.  Thus, if the IT facilities became unavailable, not only would it cause 
discomfort to the IT department, but business might suffer directly as a result of 
unavailability. 
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Figure 8.2:   Departmental Dependency in an Information Technology-Centric 
Environment / Era 
 
From the early nineties (the Information-Centric era) the IT department started to play 
an even more prominent role in the organization.  Up to this era, IT was mostly used 
for automating business operations, but in the Information-Centric era, the effective 
utilization of information surpassed the former.  Experts claim that having the right 
information at the right time can make the difference between profit and loss or the 
success and failure in the business environment of today (URN 96/702, 1996, p 3).   
 
Information has become such an integral part in conducting business successfully that 
without timely and accurate information, the entire business will fail to operate 
(Owens, 1998, p 1-2). Thus, although IT is still used extensively for the process of 
automating business operations, the information provided to management at all levels, 
so that they can make timely and accurate business decisions, is really what gives one 
organization the competitive edge over another.    
 
Figure 8.3 represents the Information-Centric environment.  From the illustration it 
can be observed that the IT department encompasses just about all the other 
organizational departments and business processes, which means that all 
organizational processes today are almost fully dependent on the ongoing activities of 
the IT department. 
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Figure 8.3:   Departmental Dependency in an Information-Centric Environment/ 
Era 
 
Most business processes today are almost totally dependent on information.  In fact, 
information has grown to be one of the most important assets within  organizations 
(Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 8; BS 7799-1, 1999, p 1; URN 99/704, 1999, p 
1). Business operations are still very dependent on effective IT systems, but it seems 
as if effective information systems prove to be even more important to organizations. 
 
Information can exist in many forms.  It ranges from information stored on computers, 
transmitted across networks, printed out or written on paper, sent by fax, stored on 
tapes or disk, spoken in conversation (including by telephone), sent via E-mail, stored 
in databases, presented by overhead projection, or any other way used to convey 
knowledge and ideas, to name but a few (URN 96/702, 1996, p 3; Humphreys, Moses 
& Plate, 1998, p 8). Whatever form information takes on, regardless of the means by 
which it is stored or transmitted, it needs to be adequately protected against 
unauthorized disclosure, modification, deletion or destruction (URN 99/703, 1999, p 
2). 
 
It can be concluded that IT systems have grown to become the heart of most 
organizations and proper protection has become absolutely imperative.  On the other 
hand, it can also be concluded that in the Computer-Centric era, protection of the 
computing facilities was mostly for the sake of ensuring continuous availability, 
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whereas today, the continued existence of the organization would be threatened (URN 
99/704, 1999, p 1).  Further, at first the protection was mostly infrastructure oriented, 
whereas in the Information-Centric era, it is really information that needs to be 
protected and protecting information is something totally different, as mentioned 
previously (Wills, 1999, p 1). 
 
The next section will attempt to indicate how the protection process has changed 
through these different eras. 
 
8.3 Protecting Information Resources 
 
The previous section has distinguished between three stages of computer evolution, 
namely the Computer-Centric era, the Information Technology-Centric era and the 
Information-Centric era.  As can be concluded from the previous section, business 
departments and/or business processes grew more and more dependent on the 
supporting infrastructures through the Computer-Centric, IT-Centric and Information-
Centric eras.  In the Information-Centric era, the successful existence of an 
organization became dependent on information and consequently also the effective 
protection of information.  This section will determine whether different approaches 
and techniques are required to protect the information resources of today compared to 
the computer infrastructures of yesteryear. 
 
Throughout the different computing eras, security controls were used to introduce and 
maintain the protection of resources.  Obviously, as these eras evolved, the extent and 
nature of the security controls also changed.   
 
During the Computer-Centric era the focus was on protecting the infrastructure to 
ensure continued operation.  Considering that the computer center formed the core of 
the computing infrastructure, a number of physical controls were used to protect 
entrance to and continued operation of the computing facility (Figure 8.4).  Physical 
controls involved, amongst others, the implementation of physical access control 
(locked doors) and surveillance (cameras) (Cowcher, 1992, p 311).   
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Figure 8.4   Protection mechanisms during Computer Evolution 
 
In the IT-Centric era, where multiprocessing and distributed systems developed 
rapidly, physical controls still played an important role.  However, technical controls, 
such as user identification and authentication, access controls, encryption of 
communication lines had to be introduced and properly used to ensure that access to 
information resources could be gained from remote locations (Figure 8.4). 
 
Since information became such an important asset in most organizations and more and 
more employees became information users in the Information-Centric era, a new 
generation of security controls had to be introduced.  Operational controls were thus 
introduced, due to physical and technical controls alone not being adequate to 
sufficiently protect all information resources. The introduction of operational controls 
did not mean that physical and technical controls became obsolete.  It simply caused 
operational controls to be used in addition to physical controls and technical controls 
(Figure 8.4).  Operational controls in the form of security policies, procedures, 
standards, etc. made a huge contribution to the protection of information resources. In 
other words, operational controls govern the human behavior of employees.  It is 
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essential that the actions of information users be dictated and monitored, in order to 
ensure adherence to physical, technical and operational controls.  
 
The nature of security controls has clearly changed over time, while attempting to 
address the ever increasing and changing requirements for protection.  The 
identification of the most effective set of security controls was usually done by 
performing a risk analysis, as those explained in chapter 7.  In the next section risk 
analysis will be examined to determine whether the changes that took place during the 
three phases of evolution, influenced the way in which security controls should be 
selected. 
 
8.4 Risk Analysis as a Control Identification Technique 
 
Risk analysis was the approach used during the previously explained eras to help 
identify the most suitable security controls. The main objective of the risk analysis 
approach is to identify and assess all risks to which the information system and its 
assets are exposed, and then aid in suggesting a set of appropriate and justified 
security controls that will reduce these risks to an acceptable level.   
 
A risk is made up of three components, i.e. an asset, a threat and the vulnerability 
between the asset and threat.  To assess the extent of a risk, the value of the asset, the 
likelihood of the threat manifesting and the vulnerability between the two are taken 
into account (Moses, 1992, p 229).   Identifying and valuing the assets in the 
Computer-Centric era did not prove to be a major problem.  Since all assets were 
tangible, the identification and quantification of the major costs and values associated 
with acquiring and using these tangible resources were relatively easy to do (Burch, 
Strater & Grudnitski, 1979, p 13).  Since assets were tangible and were located in the 
computer center they could easily be protected by physical controls.  Thus, risks could 
be assessed fairly accurately, using qualitative techniques in calculating the annual 
loss expectancies (ALEs) (Pfleeger, 1997, p 468).  The annual loss expectancy (also 
called the estimated yearly loss) of an asset is determined by multiplying the cost of an 
incident by the expected number of such incidents per year (Pleeger, 1997, p 468).  
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The only factor that was somewhat subjective, was determining the likelihood of a 
threat manifesting (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 22-25). 
 
As the dependence on information technology grew in the IT-Centric era, it became 
more difficult to identify all assets, as they were no longer situated centrally and assets 
were no longer predominantly tangible.   Even years ago, when protection was still 
more focused on tangibles, people came to realize the difficulty in quantifying the 
major costs of intangible resources (Burch, Strater & Grudnitski, 1979, p 13).  
Information is an example of an intangible resource and it is, therefore, extremely 
difficult to determine its precise value, if not impossible (Burch, Strater & Grudnitski, 
1979, p 16).  The protection of information during this era, became more important 
since many organizations were internally and externally connected by networks of IT 
systems (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 1) and operated in a distributed computing 
environment rather than a centralized computing environment, like earlier.  To solve 
the problem of valuing intangible resources, in such an environment, impact values 
were used (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 16 - 53).  Guessing what the impact 
would be if a threat manifests, calculating the extent of the risk, based on a guessed 
impact value and the likelihood that the threat would manifest (another guess) was 
very difficult to determine (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 22-25) and lead to 
very subjective results (Pfleeger, 1997, p 471; Jacobson, 1996, p 1). 
 
In an attempt to formalize the subjective values used and the false sense of precision 
in calculating risk values (Pfleeger, 1997, p 470; Jacobson, 1996, p 1), qualitative 
techniques were introduced (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 49). The use of 
qualitative techniques was necessary, because the use of quantitative measures was no 
longer able to properly identify the values of data assets in terms of replacement or 
reconstruction costs.  Not to mention how impossible and illogical it is to represent 
the potential effects of the impacts in purely financial terms (Moses, 1992, p 250).  As 
explained in chapter 7, qualitative techniques, which are based on the use of adjectives 
to describe the importance of assets, utilize tables to lookup impact values and 
likelihood of threats.  Although the qualitative risk assessment methodology might 
seem more acceptable to use, its results are still very subjective and few managers 
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actually take those results seriously (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 49; 
Jacobson, 1996, p 1-2). 
 
A lot of criticism against risk analysis was raised, especially during the late IT-Centric 
era, for reasons mentioned.  Some people claim that it is “tedious, inconsistent, 
painful and even useless” (Jacobson, 1996, p 1-2). Others say that with risk analysis it 
is difficult to consider and include indirect losses and that its results are no more 
precise than the figures used in the risk analysis, which are often mere guesses 
(Pfleeger, 1997, p 471; Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 387). Based on these arguments as 
well as those mentioned in chapter 7 section 7.7.2, it must be concluded that risk 
analysis is definitely not as influential as it used to be.   
 
Risk analysis, using assets, threats and vulnerabilities, focuses on the computing 
infrastructure in assessing and calculating risks.  Security controls are suggested, 
based on these calculated risk values.  It can thus be concluded that risk analysis is a 
bottom-up approach, selecting security controls primarily based on the requirements 
of the infrastructure.  It can further be concluded that, the more risk analysis moved 
away from analyzing physical assets, with tangible values, the more its results became 
subjective; a conclusion fully supported by Robert V. Jacobson (1996, p 1). 
 
In the Information-Centric era, information forms part of almost every business 
process within the organization.  The emphasis has moved from protecting the 
computing infrastructure and technology to protecting the information (Wills, 1999, p 
1).  Thus, the Information-Centric era might have outgrown traditional risk analysis, 
which focused primarily on the infrastructure. 
 
8.5 Information Protection using Security Requirements  
 
The previous section highlighted the fact that risk analysis, which can be regarded as a 
bottom-up approach, might not be the most suitable technique for the security control 
selection process in the Information-Centric era, where the focus has moved more 
towards the protection of information than the protection of the infrastructure.  This 
section will cover two issues.  The first will address the responsibility for security in 
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an organization and the second will address the requirements necessary for protecting 
information. 
 
8.5.1 The Responsibility for Securing Information Resources 
 
In the Computer-Centric era the organization was dependent, to a limited extent, on 
the continued operation of the computing systems.  Problems in the computing 
center did not necessarily threaten the operation of the business processes and the 
continued existence of the organization too much.  Protecting and securing the 
computer center, mostly by means of physical controls, was very much the 
responsibility of the operations manager. 
 
As business processes became more dependent on IT during the IT-Centric era, the 
IT manager took on this expanded responsibility.  The primary reason might be the 
fact that IT was now distributed throughout the organization.  Although the 
operations manager, database administrator, networks administrator, as well as 
other individuals within the organization, administered the effective operation of 
the physical and technical controls, the IT manager took on the overall 
responsibility for security. 
 
Today, as mentioned earlier, the successful existence of most organizations is 
dependent on the effective utilization of information. Business decisions based on 
incorrect information or unavailable information due to various reasons can 
severely damage an organization.  Highly confidential information falling into the 
wrong hands could have the same damaging effect on the organization.  If 
disclosure, destruction, modification or unavailability of information as an asset, 
could cause that much harm to the organization, the protection of information 
should certainly receive the same amount of attention from senior management as 
other assets such as human resources and finances (URN 99/704, 1999, p 1).  Thus, 
information security should be the responsibility of senior management, as the 
well-being of the organization depends on it (Owens, 1998, p 7).  The introduction 
and maintenance of the security controls are delegated to subordinate individuals 
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and/or departments, but the responsibility thereof still remains ultimately with the 
CEO. 
 
As the organization grew more dependent on its information resources, the 
responsibility moved upwards.  Now that the organization is absolutely dependent 
on information for its well-being, it is only right that senior management takes 
responsibility. 
 
8.5.2 Requirements for Protecting Information Resources 
 
It was mentioned that information needs to be protected by ensuring an acceptable 
high level of confidentiality, integrity and availability (URN 96/702, 1996, p 3-4).  
These properties must be maintained wherever information resides, whether in 
electronic, printed and/or spoken form (URN 96/702, 1996, p 3; Humphreys, 
Moses & Plate, 1998, p 8).  In organizations, whether large or small, information 
security requirements or the amount of security required, originate from three 
sources. 
 
The first and foremost factor that determines which and how much security 
controls are required, are the business requirements that dictate to what extent the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information must be preserved.  These 
include the organizational principles, procedures and standards, which are 
developed by the organization itself, to provide the necessary support to its 
business operations.  
 
Since the society we live in today is driven mainly be information, it can rightfully 
be called the Information Society.  The use of Internet made room for new 
commercial opportunities and has been a major driver of e-mail and electronic 
commerce (URN 99/704, 1999, p 1). Electronic commerce is growing fast and 
many organizations are forced onto this route to keep or increase their market share 
(Wills, 1999, p 1). Whether organizations are linking to the Internet and/or to other 
business partners, they potentially open their information systems to untrustworthy 
parties, which makes accidental security breaches more likely (URN 99/704, 1999, 
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p 1).  Information security standards, attempting to establish international security 
norms and instilling trust amongst business partners, started to develop during the 
last decade.  GMITS (ISO/IEC TR 13335, 1996) and ISO 17799 (BS 7799, 1999) 
are good examples of such international standards.  Thus, the second factor 
determining the amount of information security required by an organization is the 
statutory and contractual requirements, which include legal and regulatory 
requirements that might be enforced onto an organization by trading partners, 
contractors and service providers.  The legal requirements mentioned here, must 
furthermore comply with the data protection legislation and any copyright 
restrictions. Besides the fore mentioned, the legal and contractual requirements 
should also include the protection of all organizational records.   
 
A third factor that has an influence on the security controls required by an 
organization is obviously the unique set of security risks threatening the 
information and infrastructure.  This unique set of security risks can be defined as a 
combination of the threats and vulnerabilities to assets and the potential effect that 
the risks can have on the business. 
 
Thus, the information security requirements of an organization are not merely 
dictated by risks threatening the infrastructure, but also business requirements for 
confidentiality, integrity and availability as well as legal, regulatory and statutory 
requirements (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 9-10; Owens, 1998, p 2).   
 
“Information security is now generally recognized as having a critical part to play in 
ensuring SME’s can take full advantage of electronic commerce.  Quite clearly the 
information society of the future will just not work if the information we rely on - the 
lifeblood of a business - is not security.  Note that the word ‘IT security’ was not 
mentioned, since the issue is not just about protecting the technology, it is about 
protecting business or personal information wherever it resides” says Michael Wills, 
Minister for Small Firms, Department of Trade and Industry (Wills, 1999, p 1).  In the 
Information-Centric era the emphasis is on protecting information and of lesser 
importance, on the protection of the infrastructure.  
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter, operational controls play a major role in securing 
information.  The main purpose of operational controls is to dictate the behavior and 
actions of all information users.  Policies, procedures and standards, which dictate 
human behavior, are therefore extremely important for securing information.  Seeing 
that senior management, who is ultimately responsible for information security, 
operates on a level where standards are dictated and policies and procedures are 
underwritten, they can get actively involved in the process of security information.  It 
can clearly be seen that the majority of the requirements that determine the required 
level of protection, originates from the business management and senior management 
levels.  Thus, a more top-down oriented approach in identifying security controls 
needs to be determined.  Such an approach will be discussed in the next section and 
will be called the Security Requirements Analysis. 
 
8.6 Security Requirements Analysis 
 
The fact that information and its supporting infrastructures, which are prominent in 
most organizations today, have grown that important to the effective existence of an 
organization, has necessitated an alternative approach in protecting it.  The traditional 
bottom-up approach, such as a risk analysis, proved to be not as effective, for reasons 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. A more modern top-down approach is therefore 
required. 
 
In determining the security controls required, the information security requirements of 
the organization need to be established.  That means, the ‘amount’ of security required 
by the organization needs to be established.  As explained in section 8.5.2 of this 
chapter three factors have been identified to play a role in establishing the information 
security requirements (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 9-10; Owens, 1998, p 2; 
BS 7799-2, 1999, p 1), namely: 
 
◊ the business requirements for confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information, 
◊ the legal, regulatory and/or statutory requirements and  
◊ the risks to the infrastructure. 
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The security controls satisfying these three factors should be determined through some 
process or analysis and will be called a Security Requirements Analysis. 
 
During such an analysis, the ‘amount’ of security to provide the required level of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability should be determined.  Obviously, different 
types of businesses might require different requirements for each of these properties.  
Aspects like auditablity and authentication might also have to be considered.  Once an 
organization has decided ‘how much’ security they require (with the help of the 
Security Requirements Analysis), suitable security controls can be selected to satisfy 
those requirements. 
 
Any organization should establish accurately which legal, regulatory and/or statutory 
requirements are placed onto them from within their own organization, or by business 
partners and government, etc.  These requirements will demand certain further 
security controls. 
 
In protecting the infrastructure, it is not an absolute requirement to perform a risk 
analysis exercise and ‘re-inventing the wheel’ (Jacobson, 1996, p 1-2).  A number of 
baseline control manuals is available today that will help to streamline this process 
(BS 7799, 1999; GISA, 1995).  Baseline security, on the other hand, selects a set of 
security controls, which will provide good protection against most threats and under 
most circumstances (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 8).  It must be noted that if an 
organization feels that their situation is unique from others, it is recommended that 
they perform a detailed risk analysis to address their unique needs. 
 
A Security Requirements Analysis is a fairly novice process and certainly a lot of 
research needs to be done to firstly, exactly determine the information security 
requirements of an organization and secondly, to deduce the most suitable set of 
security controls from these information security requirements. 
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8.7 Conclusion 
 
Traditionally risk analysis was used to assist in the process of selecting security 
controls to aid in securing computer assets.  As pointed out, risk analysis was the main 
driving force behind the process of securing computer assets by indicating security 
controls based on the assessment of risks to the infrastructure.  However, today the 
emphasis has moved somewhat from computer assets to information assets, and the 
focus these days is to ensure that the appropriate protection is provided for 
successfully securing the information assets of an organization.  Through a risk 
analysis exercise the unique set of risks to the infrastructure is considered, and factors 
such as the legal and statutory requirements, as well as business requirements which 
dictate the degree to which confidentiality, integrity and availability should be 
preserved, should also be taken into account.   An alternative, more inclusive 
approach to traditional risk analysis is, therefore, required to secure information 
(Moses, 1992, p 229).  This new approach is referred to as the Security Requirements 
Analysis.   
 
The next chapter will discuss and explain in detail all the steps involved in conducting 
a Security Requirements Analysis, pointing out how information security 
requirements will be determined and how, in turn, information security requirements 
can help to identify the relevant security controls. 
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Chapter 9  
 
DETERMINING INFORMATION SECURITY 
REQUIREMENTS  
 
 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
As explained in chapter 8, the process of protecting information and information 
related assets, is different today than was the case a few years ago.  Michael Wills, 
Minister for Small Firms, Department of Trade and Industry, UK stated that the 
information society of the future will not work if information is not secured.  He 
further said that the issue is not about protecting the technology or infrastructure, but 
it is about the protection of business as well as personal information, regardless of 
where it resides.  In other words, in the information society of the future the emphasis 
will be on the protection of information and no longer merely on the protection of the 
infrastructure (Wills, 1999, p 1). 
 
Risk analysis, which can be defined as a bottom-up approach, identifies the security 
controls required to provide the necessary protection for assets, but might not be 
adequate anymore, for reasons mentioned in chapter 8.  A more modern top-down 
approach is called for today, where security requirements, driven by business needs, 
dictate the level of protection required.   
 
Even years ago people realized the difficulty in quantifying the major costs of 
intangible resources, of which information is an example (Burch, Strater & 
Grudnitski, 1979, p 13).  Although it is difficult or even impossible to determine the 
precise monetary value of information (Burch, Strater & Grudnitski, 1979, p 16), the 
level of protection thereof can, however, be determined.  The ‘amount’ of security 
required to sufficiently protect information assets against identified and unidentified 
risks, is referred to as security requirements.  Security requirements are related to, and 
are based on, the organization’s unique business needs in terms of confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity and reliability, and are driven by 
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business objectives and business goals (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 1).  It can be 
concluded that information security requirements have become the primary force to 
determine the security controls required, and that risk analysis might play a secondary 
role to that.   
 
Thus, to ensure that the correct amount of security is obtained to protect information 
assets, security requirements must play a more prominent role. In order to determine 
information security requirements accurately, a more formalized, yet easy to use 
method of determining security requirements would be helpful for practical and 
successful implementation of information security within an organization.  The 
formalized approach, based on security requirements to be used, is called the Security 
Requirements Analysis (SRA).  The purpose of the Security Requirements Analysis is 
two-fold.  Firstly, it is to determine the security requirements of an organization and 
secondly, based on these security requirements, the Security Requirements Analysis 
will further indicate the appropriate security controls to be implemented.  The security 
controls indicated by the Security Requirements Analysis should provide the required 
‘level’ of protection for information and other related assets, based on the 
organization’s unique need for security.  All steps involved in conducting a Security 
Requirements Analysis will be discussed in this chapter. 
 
9.2 The Security Requirements Analysis 
 
The primary goal of the Security Requirements Analysis is to determine the 
information security requirements of an organization. These security requirements 
should provide an easy way in which the most appropriate set of information security 
controls can be identified, based on the predetermined information security 
requirements, to meet the specific information security need which exists within an 
organization (BS 7799-1, 1999, p 2).  
 
Figure 9.1 illustrates an overview of the proposed Security Requirements Analysis 
process.  It starts out with a questionnaire to be completed by the major/key role 
players responsible for security and those responsible for information in the 
organization.  Preferably it should be conducted by the Information Security Officer in 
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combination with the Information Security Forum.  The Information Security Officer 
is responsible for managing all security related issues in an organization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1:   Overview of the Security Requirements Analysis (SRA) 
 
The Baseline approach, which ensures that the basic or baseline level of protection is 
ensured, also makes use of checklists (Humphreys, Moses and Plate, 1998, p 29-30). 
The Checklist-based method (also known as a simple questionnaire method) uses a 
series of questions to assess risks and identify other security related demands.  
Examples of sources that provide security checklists, such as manuals from computer 
system vendors and publications from security organizations, are BS 7799 part 1 & 2 
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(1999), ISO/IEC TR 13335 Part 4 (1999), IT-Baseline Protection Manual (GISA, 
1997) and the NIST Handbook (1995).  The generic questions and checklists given in 
these sources should be converted to specific questions in order to simplify the 
identification of major weaknesses.  Although the checklist method (or simple 
questionnaire method) does not provide the detailed insight found in a Detailed Risk 
Analysis, it is still a useful method to give an overview of the system’s security in a 
reasonably short time period, hence the use of a simple questionnaire method in the 
Security Requirements Analysis. Although the Security Requirements Analysis makes 
extensive use of questions, it however differs completely from the Baseline approach.  
The main purpose of the Baseline approach is to assess risks based on the answers 
from a series of questions.  The Baseline approach consists of the following steps 
(Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 29-31;  Cho & Ciechanowicz, 2001, p 279):  
  
◊ listing of assets, 
◊ listing of threats associated with each asset, 
◊ listing vulnerabilities associated with a pair of asset and threat, 
◊ identifying the existing security controls for the asset, threat and vulnerability, and 
◊ collecting all the information and assessing the measure of risk. 
 
The main purpose of the Baseline approach is, therefore, to assess risks.  The Security 
Requirements Analysis questionnaire, however, differs from the questionnaires used 
in the Baseline approach, in two ways.  Firstly, not only does the Security 
Requirements Analysis consider the unique set of risks (as is the case with the 
Baseline approach), but it also takes into account the business requirements as well as 
statutory and contractual requirements, as explained in section 8.5.2.  Secondly, since 
the Security Requirements Analysis is focused on providing protection for 
information, it needs to include questions covering confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, auditability and authenticity issues, instead of including only questions 
related to assets, threats and vulnerabilities, which would be the case when the 
protection of the infrastructure takes priority.  As Michael Wills said ‘Today it is not 
about protecting merely the infrastructure and technology, but protecting the 
information - the lifeblood of a business’ (Wills, 1999, p 1).  
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The Security Requirements Analysis questionnaire comprises of three sets of 
questions: business-related questions, impact-related questions and elimination 
questions.  Each set of questions has been included for a particular purpose, which 
will be explained in the following sections.  From the illustration (Figure 9.1) it can be 
seen that after some calculations take place, using the answers of the business-related 
and impact-related questions, the organization’s unique security requirements can be 
determined.  Using the resulting security requirements, appropriate security controls 
can directly be deduced using the Security Requirements Analysis.  Furthermore, an 
elimination process will take place, based on the answers from the elimination 
questions, to produce a final set of security controls, to satisfy the specific security 
requirements of the organization.   
 
The proposed Security Requirements Analysis is based on a two-dimensional 
approach.  Both these dimensions and all other steps involved in conducting a Security 
Requirements Analysis will be discussed and motivated in more detail. 
 
9.2.1 The First Dimension:   -Determining information security concern 
percentages- 
 
To be able to determine the security requirements of an organization, definite 
criteria need to be established to allow the security requirements to be defined 
accurately.  For this reason, five security concerns have been identified, namely: 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, auditability and authenticity.  A short 
definition of each security concern, which will form part of the Security 
Requirements Analysis, will now be given: 
 
     Confidentiality:   The property that sensitive information is not made available or 
disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, p 5; Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 5). 
 
     Integrity:   Ensuring that information is accurate and complete has not 
been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner (ISO/IEC 
TR 13335-1, p 5; Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 5). It also 
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includes reliability: the property of consistent intended 
behavior and results (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, p 5). 
 
     Availability: Ensuring that information is available, accessible and usable 
upon demand to those who are authorized to have it, when and 
where they should have it (Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 6; 
ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, p 5). 
 
     Auditability: (usually called Accountability (ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, p 5)).  An 
investigation, which ensures that the actions of an entity may be 
traced uniquely to the entity.  
 
     Authenticity:   The property that ensures that the identity of a subject or 
resource is the one claimed.  Authenticity applies to entities 
such as users, processes, systems and information (ISO/IEC TR 
13335-1, 1996, p. 5). It can therefore be referred to as the 
property that ensures the integrity of the identity. 
 
This list of security concerns differs slightly from those mentioned in GMITS 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-1, 1996, p 5). For the purpose of the Security Requirements 
Analysis, ‘Reliability’ was integrated with ‘Integrity’ as they are closely related and 
for the purpose of this study they can be seen as a single concern.    
      
One of the main tasks of the Security Requirements Analysis is to determine the 
level of protection required for each of the five security concerns. This will be 
determined through a high-level analysis. Multiple, complex weighted calculations 
and multi-dimensional lookups result in a level of intensity being assigned to each 
of the five information security concerns.  As soon as a security concern is 
associated with a specific level of intensity, it can be called a security requirement.  
 
The level of protection for each of the five security concerns can be one of three 
levels of intensity, i.e. high, medium or low.  Jointly, the security concern and the 
intensity level thereof, as determined by the Security Requirements Analysis, will 
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result in a security requirement.  A security requirement, therefore, indicates the 
required security needed in an organization. 
 
To determine which security concern has which intensity level associated with it, a 
set of business-related questions will be asked.  For each of the five security 
concerns, a set of multiple-choice questions will be asked, which will result in an 
intensity level of each security concern. In other words, each security concern will 
be indicated as being either of high, medium or low intensity and this result will be 
termed the security requirements.  
 
An example list of possible business-related questions for the information security 
concern “confidentiality” is shown in figure 9.2. 
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Confidentiality 
Protecting sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure or intelligible 
interception. 
     
4 A Extremely valuable 
3 B Considerably valuable 
2 C Valuable 
1 
Choose the word best describing the information your 
company is in possession of:   (URN 96/938, 1996, p. 
1) 
0 D Not valuable 
4 A 
Information which would cause 
very serious damage if 
disclosed. 
2 B Information which could cause significant harm, if disclosed. 
2 
Into which of the following categories would you 
classify the information within your organization? (URN 
96/938,1996, p. 3) 
1 C Information which is private, but not highly confidential 
4 A Disastrous 
3 B Extensive 3 
What would the effect be if sensitive company 
information reached a competitor, the press or the 
public? 1 C Minimal 
4 A Extreme 
2 B Moderated 
1 C Minimal 
4 
What would the level of risk, involved in providing a 
computer connection to a third party, be?  (URN 
96/702, 1996, p. 7) 
0 D Not Applicable 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
5 
What would the effect be upon customer confidence, 
public image, share price, etc., if sensitive company 
information is disclosed? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
6 What would the direct business loss be if sensitive company information is disclosed? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
7 
What would the effect be if legal, regulatory or 
contractual requirements cannot be met, because of 
the disclosure of company information? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
8 What would the effect be on the staff morale if sensitive company information is disclosed? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
9 What would the effect be if the information on a laptop computer of any staff member is disclosed? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
10 
What would the effect be if a fax message, with 
sensitive information, is faxed to a public fax machine 
and seen  by unauthorized employees? 
0 D No damage to business 
Figure 9.2:   Possible multiple-choice business-related questions for 
determining the level of intensity of “confidentiality”. 
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Figure 9.2 shows the “confidentiality” security concern, the question numbers, the 
questions and a selection of possible answers to choose from. There is a particular 
reason for making use of multiple-choice questions. As can be seen in Figure 9.2, 
each answer, which can be chosen for a particular question, is associated with a 
numeric value.  This numeric value is used merely to indicate the importance of 
the information security concern question according to the organization.   
 
An example list of all possible business-related questions for each of the five 
information security concerns is listed in Appendix A. Numeric values will be 
applied, in the same way and for the same reason, to the questions for each of the 
remaining four security concerns, as was explained with the “confidentiality” 
security concern. 
 
In order to determine the level of intensity required for each information security 
concern, the numeric value of every chosen answer is added.  The total of all the 
values of the chosen answers for each information security concern will result in a 
percentage of the total of the highest score for each information security concern. 
In order to ensure that an accurate set of security requirements is determined, a 
second dimension had to be included in the Security Requirements Analysis.   
 
9.2.2 The Second Dimension:   -The impact of events and the impact on services, 
products and processes- 
 
The business-related questions alone are not adequate to determine an accurate, 
final set of information security requirements, because the business-related 
questions only cover issues related to confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
auditability and authentication.  In order to determine a final set of information 
security requirements, the implications that an occurrence of a security incident 
may cause, must also be considered.  Since these implications were not addressed 
in the first dimension of the Security Requirements Analysis, a second dimension 
had to be implemented.  In combination, the first and second dimensions will 
deliver a better representative set of information security requirements.  
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Organizations must be aware of the effect that an unwanted security incident 
might have in store, not only for their own organization, but also for other parties 
associated with their organization, such as customers, suppliers and government.  
Besides being aware of unwanted security incidents, legal implications and safety 
of personnel should also be considered by the second dimension. In short, the 
second dimension considers the impact that events might impose on business 
processes, products and services of an organization. In combination with the first 
dimension, this information will be used in further weighted calculations to 
accurately identify the intensity level for each security concern.   
 
The questions, forming the second dimension, are called the impact-related 
questions, and as was the case with the first dimension will take the form of 
multiple-choice questions. The impact-related questions should cover questions 
that determine consequential and motivational issues related to security 
implications. The issues regarding consequence relate to the effect that an incident 
will have on the business processes.  The issues related to motivation are the 
reasons for wanting to cause harm to the business. The most popular reason is 
financial gain, although there are other reasons, which motivate criminals.  
Possible questions to determine these impact factors are listed in figure 9.3. 
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Consequence    
    
3 A Bankruptcy 
2 B Substantial losses 
1 C Minor losses 
1 
In the event of a major, disruptive IT services incident, 
what would be the worst possible impact on the 
organization? (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p. 19) 
0 D No losses 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
2 
In the event of a major, disruptive IT services incident, 
what would the effect be on the service level of the 
company and/or the products offered? 
0 D No impact 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
3 
In the event of a major, disruptive IT services incident, 
what would the impact be on business processes 
involving customers? 
0 D No impact 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
4 
In the event of a major, disruptive IT services incident, 
what would the impact be on business processes 
involving suppliers? 
0 D No impact 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
5 
In the event of a major, disruptive IT services incident, 
what would the impact be on the environment, e.g. injury, 
death, pollution, politics, public image, instability, etc.? 
0 D No impact 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
6 
What impact can outsiders (network access, dial-in 
access, hackers, trespassers, people sifting through 
trash) have on the organization?  (Pfleeger, 1997, p 465) 
0 D No impact 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
7 
What are the impact of natural or physical disasters 
(fires, storms, floods, power outages, and component 
failure) on the organization? (Pfleeger, 1997, p 465) 
0 D No impact 
 
Motivation    
     
3 A Extreme: > R1 million 
2 B Substantial: > R100 000 
1 C Minor: R50 000 
1 
What would the extent of financial benefit be for an 
attacker or a person with fraudulent motives? (URN 
96/939, 1996, p 3) 
0 D Nothing 
3 A Extreme harm 
2 B Serious harm 
1 C Some harm 
2 
To what extent would an attacker be able to cause harm 
to the government, political opposition, etc., by misusing 
the organization's information systems? 
0 D No harm 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
3 
To what extent can the actions of willfully malicious 
insiders  cause harm to the organization?  Consider 
disgruntled employees, bribery and curious browsers  
(Pfleeger, 1997, p 465) 
0 D No impact 
Figure 9.3:   Possible impact-related questions 
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Each answer, which can be chosen for a particular question in figure 9.3, is again 
associated with a numeric value.  These numeric values, associated with each 
selected answer, are simply added together and then represented as a percentage of 
the highest allowable score that can be obtained for the impact-related questions. 
 
It will be necessary to somehow combine the resulting percentages of the 
business-related questions and the impact-related questions.  This will be done by 
means of a matrix.  
 
9.2.3 The Matrix:   -Combining security concerns and impacts to determine security 
requirements-  
 
In this section, it will be necessary for the result of each of the five information 
security concerns of the business-related questions (first dimension) to be 
combined with the result from the impact-related questions (second dimension).  It 
is of utmost importance to ensure that a true reflection of the information security 
requirements is given, taking into account what effect a possible breach in security 
might have on the organization.  
 
To achieve this two-dimensional evaluation of the security requirements, a lookup 
matrix is used to combine the resultant percentage of each information security 
concern, with the percentage calculated from the impact-related questions. The 
matrix that will be used to combine the information security concern percentages 
with the impact-related percentage is presented in figure 9.4. 
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Figure 9.4:   Matrix used for combining business-related questions’ security 
concern percentages with the impact-related questions’ 
percentage 
 
Figure 9.5 indicates a typical example set of information security requirements, 
which could result from combining the outcome of the business-related questions 
with the results of the impact-related questions, using the lookup matrix of figure 
9.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.5:   Typical example set of information security requirements 
 
 
CURRENT MATRIX FOR DETERMINING REQUIRED LEVEL OF 
PROTECTION 
 
- Low, Medium or High - 
 
 
 
81 - 100 M M M H H 
Percentage (%) 
61 - 80 M M M H H 
 
(Calculated from  41 - 60 L M M M H 
Impact-Related Questions 
results ) 21 - 40 L L M M M 
 
0 - 20 L L L M M 
  0 - 20 21 - 40 41 - 60 61 - 80 81 - 100 
 
Percentage ( % )
 
 Security Concern         Intensity Level  
      (Level of protection needed) 
 
   Confidentiality         -  High 
   Integrity          -  Medium 
   Availability          -  Medium 
   Accountability          -  Low 
   Authentication         -  Medium 
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To make the security requirements that result from the Security Requirements 
Analysis even more comprehensive, the matrix of figure 9.4 has been extended to 
include more levels than merely Low, Medium and High.    The extended matrix 
(shown in figure 9.6) includes three sub-levels for each of the existing intensity levels, 
e.g. Low-1, Low-2, Low-3, Medium-1, Medium-2, Medium-3, High-1, High-2, High-
3.  
 
 
MATRIX FOR DETERMINING REQUIRED LEVEL OF 
PROTECTION  
  Low-1 , Low-2, Low-3  
   Medium-1, Medium-2, Medium-3   
  High-1, High-2, High-3  
              
  91-100 M2 M2 M2 M2 M3 M3 H1 H2 H3 H3  
  81-90 M2 M2 M2 M2 M2 M3 H1 H2 H2 H3  
Percentage (%)  71-80 M1 M2 M2 M2 M2 M3 H1 H2 H2 H2  
  61-70 M1 M1 M2 M2 M2 M3 H1 H1 H2 H2  
(Calculated from  51-60 L2 L3 M1 M2 M2 M3 M3 M3 H1 H1  
Impact-related  41-50 L2 L2 M1 M1 M2 M2 M3 M3 H1 H1  
question results)  31-40 L2 L2 L2 L3 M1 M2 M2 M3 M3 M3  
  21-30 L1 L2 L2 L2 M1 M1 M2 M2 M2 M3  
  11-20 L1 L1 L2 L2 L2 L3 M1 M2 M2 M2  
  0-10 L1 L1 L1 L2 L2 L2 M1 M1 M2 M2  
    0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90 91-100  
              
      Percentage (%)      
   (Calculated from Business-related question results)   
              
Figure 9.6:   Extended Matrix used for combining business-related question’s 
security concern percentages with the impact-related question’s 
percentage 
 
For example, if an organization’s security requirement for ‘confidentiality’ turns out 
to be of ‘HIGH’ intensity, as depicted in figure 9.5, the use of the extended matrix of 
figure 9.6 can further distinguish between three sub-levels  of ‘HIGH’. On a scale 
from ‘one’ to ‘three’,  ‘one’ obviously represents less importance and ‘three’ 
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represents the most importance.  Organizations will now not only be able to see their 
security requirements in terms of High, Medium and Low, but to what extent of High, 
Medium and Low.  By doing so, organizations can have a better idea of the degree of 
security required within their organization.  An example set of security requirements 
which resulted from the use of the extended matrix (figure 9.6) can be viewed in 
figure 9.7, followed by an example which explains in detail how the matrixes can be 
used to produce security requirements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.7:   Example set of security requirements resulting from using the 
extended matrix 
 
9.2.4 Example:   -Calculating and combining of percentages in matrix-  
 
This example illustrates how the Security Requirements Analysis can be used to 
determine the security requirements of an organization.  As explained in section 
7.2.1, a number of business-related questions will be asked for each identified 
security concern.  For the purpose of this example, ten business-related questions 
must be answered to calculate the resulting percentage for ‘confidentiality’, as 
indicated by figure 9.2.  Suppose the user selects the third answer from the four 
available choices, for the first question of ‘confidentiality’, then the numeric value, 
which has been pre-assigned to this third answer is the value ‘2’.  The user will 
select an answer for each of the remaining questions of ‘confidentiality’. Suppose 
that for the remaining questions of ‘confidentiality’ the following values were 
indicated:  ‘4’, ‘3’, ‘2’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’ and ‘2’, when the values of  the 
answers for each of the four questions are added, it amounts to the value ‘24’ 
(2+4+3+2+2+3+1+2+3+2).  The highest score, which can be obtained for these 
 
 Security Concern         Intensity Level  
    (Level of protection needed)
    
 
   Confidentiality         -  High-2 
   Integrity          -  Medium-1 
   Availability          -  Medium-2 
   Accountability          -  Low-3 
   Authentication         -  Medium-1 
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four questions, is ‘34’.  It means that for ‘confidentiality’ a total of ‘24’ out of ‘34’ 
was obtained.  When converting this total to percentage it would result to 
‘70.58%’ for ‘confidentiality’. 
 
In a similar manner to that explained for ‘confidentiality’, a percentage will be 
calculated for each of the remaining four security concerns (e.g. integrity, 
availability, auditability, authentication).  When the percentages of all five security 
concerns have been calculated, the percentage of the impact-related questions can 
be calculated.   
 
Numeric values are associated with each answer that can be chosen for a particular 
question of the impact-related questions, in the same way as was done with the 
business-related questions.  There are currently ten impact-related questions to be 
answered, as indicated in figure 9.3.  Again, the values associated with each 
chosen answer is added.  Yet again, as with calculating the security concern 
percentages, the total of all the added values of the impact-related questions are 
given as a percentage of the highest obtainable score of the impact-related 
questions. 
 
Suppose the third answer was chosen for the first impact-related question, then the 
associated value for this answer is ‘1’.  Similarly, all the chosen answers to the rest 
of the impact-related questions will indicate the specific values of the chosen 
answers.  Assume that the following values were indicated for the second and 
consequent impact-related questions: ‘2’, ‘1’, ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘3’, ‘2’, ‘2’, ‘3’ and ‘1’.  
The total of the impact-related questions is therefore ‘16’ 
(1+2+1+0+1+3+2+2+3+1).  The highest obtainable score for the impact-related 
questions is ‘30’.  The percentage of ‘16’ out of a possible ‘30’ is ‘53.3%’. 
 
This percentage which resulted from answering the impact-related questions must 
be combined with the percentages obtained for each of the security concern 
percentages, which resulted from answering the business-related questions.  When 
the extended matrix, shown in figure 9.6, is used for combining the relevant 
percentages in this particular example, it will indicate the cell where the column 
169  
representing the percentage (’70,58%’) for ‘confidentiality’, meets the row 
representing the percentage (’53,3%’) for the impact-related questions.  This cell 
contains ‘M3’, which means that the security requirement for ‘confidentiality’ 
turns out to be ‘MEDIUM-3’ (the highest level of MEDIUM). 
 
The matrix will be used in exactly the same way, for determining the level of each 
of the four remaining security concerns.   
 
The main goal of the Security Requirements Analysis is, therefore, to determine 
accurate information security requirements, based on business requirements and 
impacts associated with company information. Once the security requirements of the 
organization have been determined by the Security Requirements Analysis, security 
controls can be selected to provide the level of protection, dictated by the security 
requirements. 
 
9.3 Information Security Controls 
 
Having determined the security requirements, security controls should be selected to 
satisfy these requirements.  The security controls will typically be selected from the 
ISO 17799 baseline standard which lists approximately 127 information security 
controls to choose from (BS 7799-1, 1999, p. 2 - 41). A question that arises and needs 
to be addressed here is, “How does a particular information security requirement 
identify the correct security controls?”.  The answer to this question is simply to 
classify each information security control. This is done by means of a control 
categorization table  which links each security control in ISO 17799 to one or more of 
the security concerns and to a particular level of intensity (high, medium, low).  The 
control categorization table, responsible for linking security concerns and intensity 
levels, is shown in Appendix B.  The linking of security concerns to intensity levels 
was determined by subject experts and can be changed as dictated over time.   
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9.3.1 Information Security control selection 
 
The direct linking of security concerns and intensity levels to the selection of 
security controls, using the categorization table will contribute towards an 
integrated approach to information security.  The intensity level indicates the 
necessity or importance of the associated security controls.  For instance, in the 
case where security protection of level ‘HIGH’ is required, the implementation of 
the identified security controls is very important, for ensuring that no business 
harm is likely to come to the organization. A security concern of level ‘LOW’ 
obviously requires less security controls to be identified and implemented than a 
level ‘HIGH’ security concern.  All necessary security controls to satisfy the 
unique security requirements of an organization, as produced by the Security 
Requirements Analysis, will be indicated by using the categorization table. 
 
9.3.2 The Elimination Process  
 
Although a set of ISO 17799 security controls will be identified for the specific 
security requirements of an organization by using the categorization table of the 
Security Requirements Analysis, not all the security controls in the particular set 
of security controls might be applicable to the organization’s specific security 
needs. Certain security controls are only relevant for specific business and IT 
environments.  Although the indicated set of security controls is adequate to 
satisfy the information security requirements, some might not be relevant to the 
scope of the organization or business unit.   
 
Perhaps the organization does not make use of Internet, or does not have a 
network, or makes use of outsourcing, in which case a set of elimination questions 
needs to be answered, and based on this, certain irrelevant security controls can be 
eliminated and omitted from the initial identified set of security controls. This will 
ensure that a more complete and accurate set of information security controls will 
be indicated, to provide the level of protection necessary to suit the needs within a 
particular organizational environment. Figure 9.8 providess a list of example 
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questions that can be included to eliminate irrelevant security controls, depending 
on whether the answer to the question is ‘YES’ or ‘NO’. 
 
Elimination Questions 
1 Can the organizational IT facilities and information assets be accessed by third parties? Yes No 
2 Does your daily operations make use of a local or a wide area network? Yes No 
3 Does your company support Internet access? (URN 99/713, 1999, p 4; URN 99/704, 1999, p 1) Yes No 
4 Does your company have a mainframe in use? Yes No 
5 Does your company make use of outsourcing? Yes No 
Figure 9.8:   Example list of Elimination Questions 
 
The elimination questions are answered at the same time as the business-related and 
impact-related questions and are, therefore, not a separate questionnaire that should be 
completed at a different time as the business-related and impact-related questions.  
Since time is of essence, especially for managerial staff serving on the Security 
Forum, a single questionnaire relieves these key role players from the tedious task of 
completing separate questionnaires at different times during the Security 
Requirements Analysis. A single questionnaire is therefore completed, during which 
consensus is reached amongst the members of the Security Forum regarding the 
organization’s security situation, and based on its outcome the appropriate security 
controls, as well as an up-to-date security policy document, will be produced.  
 
All that remains to be done is to correctly implement the identified security controls.  
In addition, a set of supporting security procedures will be identified to support the 
effective operation of each control.  The definition of the policy and the security 
procedures fall outside the scope of this project and are addressed in related research 
projects. 
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9.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter explained and demonstrated the steps involved in conducting a Security 
Requirements Analysis.  The Security Requirements Analysis takes the form of a 
questionnaire which includes business-related questions, impact-related questions and 
elimination questions.   
 
As explained, the answers resulting from the business-related and impact-related 
questions will be analyzed and by performing numerous weighted calculations, and 
with the use of matrixes, the security requirements of the organization can be 
determined.  These security requirements will indicate all relevant ISO 17799 security 
controls to satisfy the previously determined security requirements of the organization.  
The identification of security controls based on the determined security requirements 
is simplified by using a pre-classified categorization table. The answers to the 
elimination questions will assist in the elimination process, which ensures that only 
the security controls, which are relevant to the particular business environment, are 
included in the final suggested set of information security controls. 
 
Worth mentioning is the fact that the final set of security controls, as produced by the 
Security Requirements Analysis, is merely a suggestion and if the organization so 
wishes, any additional security controls may be added or omitted from the suggested 
set, provided that the reasons for these additions and/or omissions be documented in 
the Statement of Applicability.  In the event of a security audit for certification, a 
Statement of Applicability can be very useful in motivating why certain security 
controls have been added and/or omitted.  Thus the Security Requirements Analysis 
process aids the user in selecting the most appropriate set of ISO 17799 security 
controls in a more objective way, to satisfy their specific information security needs. 
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Chapter 10  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
    
 
 
 
10.1 Summary 
 
Information has arguably become an organization’s most important asset.  The focus 
throughout this dissertation is on the importance of information, as an asset (BS 7799-
1, 1999, p 1), and the necessity to adequately protect it.  The protection of 
information, also referred to as information security, can best be organized and 
managed by establishing and maintaining an Information Security Management 
System (ISMS) (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p 2-14; Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 
1998, p 7).   
 
One of the processes of the Information Security Management System is Risk 
Management.  As mentioned in chapter 5, the Risk Management process is 
responsible for ensuring the proper identification and implementation of information 
security controls, in order to reduce risks to an acceptable level, as indicated by the 
assessed measure of risk (Moses, 1992, p 230).  However, before security controls can 
be implemented the appropriate security controls must first be identified.   
 
Risk analysis was traditionally used to provide guidance in identifying security 
controls to protect mostly physical assets.  The focus of risk analysis was on analyzing 
the risks to the infrastructure, by taking into account security elements such as assets, 
threats and their likelihood of occurrence, vulnerabilities and severity of the impact 
(Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 49; Moses, 1992, p 231).  
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10.2 Conclusion 
 
Protection today is no longer just concerned with the protection of physical assets, as 
was the case when only the risks to the infrastructure were analyzed (Wills, 1999, p 
1).  Since the concern is now more on the protection of information, as explained in 
chapter 6, an alternative approach is called for.  Besides considering only risks to 
infrastructure, this new approach also takes into account factors such as business 
requirements, legislative requirements, statutory requirements and contractual 
requirements (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 9-10; Owens, 1998, p 2).  
 
This new approach is referred to as the Security Requirements Analysis (SRA).  
Another reason for developing the Security Requirements Analysis is because not all 
organizations have trained information security analysts employed, which makes the 
decisions for information security even more difficult.  People responsible for 
ensuring information security in the organization have to identify and implement 
security controls, in the hope that these would provide the desired protection against 
possible disclosure, loss or destruction of information.  
 
The Security Requirements Analysis can simplify the task of security control 
identification and selection, by firstly determining the security requirements of the 
organization.  By means of a type of business analysis that is based on specific 
business goals and objectives, the Security Requirements Analysis determines the 
information security requirements of an organization in terms of confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, auditability and authentication. Once known, the security 
requirements will directly indicate all relevant security controls from the ISO 17799 
baseline standard. 
 
The Security Requirements Analysis can be seen as a top-down approach which 
depends on security requirements to indicate appropriate/relevant security controls.  
An in-depth explanation on the steps involved in conducting a Security Requirements 
Analysis is given in chapter 9. 
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The Security Requirements Analysis forms part of a larger project which is concerned 
with the development of the Information Security Management (ISM) Toolbox. The 
ISM Toolbox is an integrated software tool which serves as a guide to provide a 
structured approach for the development of an Information Security Management 
System (ISMS) for an organization.   The proposed Information Security Management 
System will be customized according to the unique business and security needs, 
requirements or objectives within the particular organization. 
  
Since the Security Requirements Analysis is part of the ISM Toolbox, security control 
identification is but one of the outputs which can be produced by ISM Toolbox.  
Besides security controls identification, the ISM Toolbox can also produce an up-to-
date information security policy, as well as other security related documentation. 
Seeing that these fall outside the scope of this study, it will not be discussed in more 
detail 
 
10.3 Further Research 
 
While research was being conducted regarding the functionality and effectiveness of 
the Security Requirements Analysis, other research possibilities came to light. If 
further research is undertaken in the field of Information Security Management, the 
Security Requirements Analysis could become a very powerful and trusted tool to 
introduce the correct amount of security within organizations.   
 
◊ Since the need for the protection of information increased, new developments in 
the way that risk analysis is done, took place in an attempt to address this issue. 
The latest developments in risk analysis methods could be examined to determine 
whether it could possibly be integrated with the current Security Requirements 
Analysis, to ensure an even more effective way of indicating security controls. 
 
◊ A security audit could be another possibility, and can serve as an extension to the 
Security Requirements Analysis.  A security audit could be useful in determining 
whether the security controls, as indicated by the Security Requirements Analysis, 
has in fact been implemented.  Even so, the importance is on whether the security 
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controls are correctly implemented, in order to provide the correct amount of 
protection for which they were intended. 
 
From the aforementioned suggestions, it can be seen that not only can further research 
improve the functionality of the Security Requirements Analysis in itself, but it can 
also assist in the development of external components.  These external components 
(e.g. security audit), in combination with the Security Requirements Analysis, increase 
the obtainable benefits when using a Security Requirements Analysis.  Making the 
Security Requirements Analysis even more feasible for organizations in implementing 
information security. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
Business-Related Questions 
 
 
Confidentiality: 
Protecting sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure or intelligible 
interception. 
 
4 A Extremely valuable 
3 B Considerably valuable 
2 C Valuable 
1 Choose the word best describing the information your company is in possession of:   (URN 96/938, 1996, p 1)
0 D Not valuable 
4 A 
Information which would cause 
very serious damage if 
disclosed. 
2 B Information which could cause significant harm, if disclosed. 
2 
Into which of the following categories would you 
classify the information within your organization? (URN 
96/938, 1996, p 3) 
1 C Information which is private, but not highly confidential 
4 A Disastrous 
3 B Extensive 3 
What would the effect be if sensitive company 
information reached a competitor, the press or the 
public? 1 C Minimal 
4 A Extreme 
2 B Moderated 
1 C Minimal 
4 
What would the level of risk, involved in providing a 
computer connection to a third party, be?  (RN 96/702, 
1996, p 7) 
0 D Not Applicable 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
5 
What would the effect be upon customer confidence, 
public image, share price, etc., if sensitive company 
information is disclosed? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
6 What would the direct business loss be if sensitive company information is disclosed? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
7 
What would the effect be if legal, regulatory or 
contractual requirements cannot be met, because of 
the disclosure of company information? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
8 What would the effect be on the staff morale if sensitive company information is disclosed? 
0 D No damage to business 
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3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
9 What would the effect be if the information on a laptop computer of any staff member is disclosed? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
10 
What would the effect be if a fax message, with 
sensitive information, is faxed to a public fax machine 
and seen  by unauthorized employees? 
0 D No damage to business 
 
 
Integrity: 
Safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of information and computer 
software 
 
4 A Extremely valuable 
3 B Considerably valuable 
2 C Valuable 
1 
To your judgement, is your company in possesion of 
very valuable or sensitive information?  (URN 
96/938, 1996, p 2) 
0 D Not valuable 
4 A Disastrous 
3 B Extensive 
2 C Moderate 
2 
What would the effect related to the organization be 
if the information residing on a personnel member's 
portable personal computer was inaccurate?  (URN 
96/702, 1996, p 7) 
1 D Minimal 
4 A Disastrous 
3 B Extensive 
2 C Moderate 
3 
What would the effect related to competitors, 
customers, suppliers or third parties, be if the 
information residing on a personnel member's 
portable personal computer were inaccurate?  (URN 
96/702, 1996, p 7) 1 D Minimal 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
4 What would the effect be if management decisions are based on inaccurate information? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
5 
If fraudulent transactions are entered on any of the 
information systems, what effect might it have on 
the business. 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
6 What effect might result from unauthorised changes to information or wrong information due to errors? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
7 
What would the effect be on customer confidence, 
public image, share price, etc., if unauthorised 
changes are made or errors occur to information? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
8 
What would the effect be if additional costs are 
incurred, due to unauthorised changes to or errors 
to information? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
9 
What would the effect be if legal, regulatory or 
contractual requirements cannot be met, because of 
incorrect information or unauthorised changes made 
to information? 
0 D No damage to business 
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3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
10 What would the effect be if the information on a laptop computer of any staff member is incorrect? 
0 D No damage to business 
 
 
Availability: 
Ensuring that information and vital services are available to users when 
required 
 
4 A Disastrous 
3 B Critical 
2 C Moderate 
1 
What would the effect related to the organization be if 
important system resources or vital business information 
was not available?  (URN 96/702, 1996, p 7) 
1 D Minimal 
4 A Disastrous 
3 B Critical 
2 C Moderate 
2 
What would the impact related to competitors be if 
important system resources or vital information was not 
available?  (URN 96/702, 1996, p 7) 
1 D Minimal 
5 A 1 Hour 
4 B 1 Day 
3 C 3 Days 
2 D Week 
3 
In the event of a power failure occurring, indicate the 
maximum allowable time frame in which the system 
must be operable. 
1 E 2 Weeks 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
4 What would the effect be on management decisions if required information are not available for one hour? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
5 What would the effect be on management decisions if required information are not available for one day? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
6 What would the effect be on management decisions if required information are not available for one week? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
7 What would the effect be on management decisions if required information are not available for one month? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
8 
What would the effect be on customer confidence, 
public image, share price, etc., if company information 
systems are unavailable for one hour? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
9 
What would the effect be on customer confidence, 
public image, share price, etc., if company information 
systems are unavailable for one day? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
10 
What would the effect be on customer confidence, 
public image, share price, etc., if company information 
systems are unavailable for one week? 
0 D No damage to business 
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3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
11 
What would the effect be on customer confidence, 
public image, share price, etc., if company information 
systems are unavailable for one month? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
12 What additional costs would be incurred if information systems are not available for one hour? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
13 What additional costs would be incurred if information systems are not available for one day? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
14 What additional costs would be incurred if information systems are not available for one week? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
15 What additional costs would be incurred if information systems are not available for one month? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
16 
What would the effect be if legal, regulatory or 
contractual requirements are breached, because of 
information systems being unavailable for one hour? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
17 
What would the effect be if legal, regulatory or 
contractual requirements are breached, because of 
information systems being unavailable for one day? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
18 
What would the effect be if legal, regulatory or 
contractual requirements are breached, because of 
information systems being unavailable for one week? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
19 
What would the effect be if legal, regulatory or 
contractual requirements are breached, because of 
information systems being unavailable for one month? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
20 
What would the effect be if the backlog of processing 
cannot be handled either manually or electronically 
when the system recovers after one hour? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
21 
What would the effect be if the backlog of processing 
cannot be handled either manually or electronically 
when the system recovers after one day? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
22 
What would the effect be if the backlog of processing 
cannot be handled either manually or electronically 
when the system recovers after one week? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 23 What would the effect be if the backlog of processing 
cannot be handled either manually or electronically 
2 B Serious damage to business 
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1 C Minor damage to business  when the system recovers after one month? 
 
 
 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
24 
What would the effect after one hour be if the 
information on the laptop of a staff member gets 
irrecoverably corrupted and no back-ups exists? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
25 
What would the effect after one day be if the information 
on the laptop of a staff member gets irrecoverably 
corrupted and no back-ups exists? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
26 
What would the effect after one week be if the 
information on the laptop of a staff member gets 
irrecoverably corrupted and no back-ups exists? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
27 
What would the effect after one month be if the 
information on the laptop of a staff member gets 
irrecoverably corrupted and no back-ups exists? 
0 D No damage to business 
 
 
Auditability; 
The property that ensures that the actions of an entity may be traced uniquely 
to the entity. 
 
4 D Extremely important 
3 C Very important 
2 B Important 
1 
Is it important for your organization to be able to know 
exactly which employee performed which actions.  
(Whether it be authorized or unauthorized activities.)  
Indicate the level of importance.  (URN 96/939, 1996, p 
1) 0 A Not important 
4 D Extremely important 
3 C Very important 
2 B Important 
2 
Given your organization's role in society, in relation to 
suppliers, partners, customers and registries and taken 
in account legal obligations, how important is it that 
your organization can account for its activities?   
0 A Not important 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
3 
What would the effect be if the actions, both authorised 
and unauthorised, of an employee cannot successfully 
be traced? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
4 What would the effect be if unauthorised transactions were made and the transgressor cannot be identified? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
5 
What might the effect be (worst case) if unauthorised 
transactions are performed over a long period of time 
and not detected? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
6 
What would the effect be on customer confidence, 
public image, share price, etc., if unauthorised 
transactions cannot be traced and the culprit be 
identified? 
0 D No damage to business 
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3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
7 
What would the effect on legal, regulatory or 
contractual requirements be if the origin of 
unauthorised transactions cannot be identified? 
0 D No damage to business 
 
Authentication: 
The property that ensures that the identity of a subject or resource is the one 
claimed 
 
Often in a business environment it, from time to time, 
becomes necessary to send information from one 
location to another.   
    
  
3 A Extremely important 
2 B Very important 
1 C Important 
 
1 
With this in mind, indicate the importance, to the 
sender, of knowing that the intended receiver actually 
received the information and the importance to the 
receiver, of knowing that the information is sent by the 
claimed sender. 0 D Not important 
3 D Extremely important 
2 C Very important 
1 B Important 
2 
How important is it that activities are being performed 
by identifiable employees within the organization for 
authorization purposes 
0 A Not important 
4 A Actions performed by any employee 3 May actions be performed by just any employee or is authorization explicitly assigned? 
1 B Authorization required 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
4 
What would the effect be if an unauthenticated  person 
performs unauthorised transactions under th account 
of a key employee? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
5 
What would the effect be on customer confidence, 
public image, share price, etc., if an unauthenicated 
person performs unauthorised transactions? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
6 
What would the effect be if additional costs are 
incurred, due to an unauthenticated person who 
performed unauthorised transactions? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
7 
What would the effect be if legal, regulatory or 
contractual requirements cannot be met, because an 
unauthenticated person performed unauthorized 
transactions? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
8 What would the effect be if the information on a laptop computer of any staff member is incorrect? 
0 D No damage to business 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Serious damage to business 
1 C Minor damage to business 
9 
What would the effect be if more than one person are 
identified and authenticated through the same user ID 
password? 
0 D No damage to business 
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Impact-Related Questions 
 
 
Consequence: 
 
3 A Bankruptcy 
2 B Substantial losses 
1 C Minor losses 
1 
In the event of a major, disruptive IT services incident, 
what would be the worst possible impact on the 
organization? (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p 19)
0 D No losses 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
2 
In the event of a major, disruptive IT services incident, 
what would the effect be on the service level of the 
company and/or the products offered? 
0 D No impact 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
3 
In the event of a major, disruptive IT services incident, 
what would the impact be on business processes 
involving customers? 
0 D No impact 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
4 
In the event of a major, disruptive IT services incident, 
what would the impact be on business processes 
involving suppliers? 
0 D No impact 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
5 
In the event of a major, disruptive IT services incident, 
what would the impact be on the environment, e.g. 
injury, death, pollution, politics, public image, 
instability, etc.? 
0 D No impact 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
6 
What impact can outsiders (network access, dial-in 
access, hackers, trespassers, people sifting through 
trash) have on the organization?  (Pfleeger, 1997,  p 
465) 
0 D No impact 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
7 
What are the impact of natural or physical disasters 
(fires, storms, floods, power outages, and component 
failure) on the organization? (Pfleeger, 1997, p 465) 
0 D No impact 
 
Motivation: 
 
3 A Extreme: > R1 million 
2 B Substantial: > R100 000 
1 C Minor: R50 000 
1 
What would the extent of financial benefit be for an 
attacker or a person with fraudulent motives? (URN 
96/939, 1996, p 3) 
0 D Nothing 
3 A Extreme harm 
2 B Serious harm 
1 C Some harm 
2 
To what extent would an attacker be able to cause 
harm to the government, political opposition, etc., by 
misusing the organization's information systems? 
0 D No harm 
3 A Business survival threatened 
2 B Substantial impact 
1 C Minor impact 
3 
To what extent can the actions of willfully malicious 
insiders  cause harm to the organization?  Consider 
disgruntled employees, bribery and curious browsers  
(Pfleeger, 1997, p 465) 
0 D No impact 
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Elimination Questions 
 
To eliminate information security controls that are not applicable to a specific 
organization's security environment 
 
1 Can the organizational IT facilities and information assets be accessed by third parties? Yes No 
2 Does your daily operations make use of a local or a wide area network? Yes No 
3 Does your company support Internet access? (URN 99/713, 1999, p 4; URN 99/704, 1999, p 1) Yes No 
4 Does your company have a mainframe in use? Yes No 
5 Does your company make use of outsourcing? Yes No 
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APPENDIX B 
 
ISO 17799 CONTROL CATEGORIZATION 
TABLE 
 
 
 
 
1.  Information security infrastructure Con
fi
de
nt
ia
lit
y 
In
te
gr
it
y 
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
A
ud
ita
bi
lit
y 
A
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n 
 1.1  Management information security forum L  L  L  L  L
 1.2  Information security coordination L  L  L  L  L
 1.3  Allocation of information security responsibilities L  L  L  L  L
 1.4  Authorization process for IT facilities L  L  L  L  L
 1.5  Specialist information security advise H H H - H
 1.6  Cooperation between organizations H H H H - 
 1.7  Independent review of information security M M M M M
 
2.  Security of third party access Con
fi
de
nt
ia
lit
y 
In
te
gr
it
y 
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
A
ud
ita
bi
lit
y 
A
ut
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 2.1  Identification of risks from third party connections M M M M M
 2.2  Security conditions in third party contracts M M M M M
 
3.  Assets Classification and Control Con
fi
de
nt
ia
lit
y 
In
te
gr
it
y 
A
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ila
bi
lit
y 
A
ud
ita
bi
lit
y 
A
ut
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at
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n 
 3.1  Accountability for assets      
  3.1.1  Inventory for Assets M M H M - 
 3.2  Information classification      
  3.2.1  Classification guidelines H H H H H
  3.2.2  Classification labeling H H H H H
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4.  Personnel Security Con
fi
de
nt
ia
lit
y 
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gr
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A
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A
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 4.1  Security in job definitions and resourcing      
  4.1.1  Security in job descriptions - - - M M
  4.1.2  Recruitment screening H H - M M
  4.1.3  Confidentiality agreement H - - H - 
 4.2  User training      
  4.2.1  Information security education and training M M M - - 
 4.3  Responding to incidents      
  4.3.1  Reporting of security incidents M M M M M
  4.3.2  Reporting of security weaknesses M M M M M
  4.3.3  Reporting of software malfunctions M M M M M
  4.3.4  Disciplinary process M M M M M
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 5.1  Secure areas      
  5.1.1  Physical security perimeter M M M M M
  5.1.2  Physical entry controls L  L  L  L  L
  5.1.3  Security of data centres and computer rooms M M M M - 
  5.1.4  Isolated delivery loading area H H H H - 
  5.1.5  Clear desk policy M - M - - 
  5.1.6  Removal of property M - M - - 
 5.2  Equipment security      
  5.2.1  Equipment siting and protection M - M - - 
  5.2.2  Power Supplies - - M - - 
  5.2.3  Cabling Security L L L L L
  5.2.4  Equipment Maintenance M M M M - 
  5.2.5  Security of equipment off-premises M - M M - 
  5.2.6  Secure disposal of equipment M - - M - 
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 6.1  Operational procedures and responsibilities      
  6.1.1  Documented operating procedures M M M M - 
  6.1.2  Incident management procedures M M M M - 
  6.1.3  Segregation of duties - M - M M
  6.1.4  Separation of development and operation facilities H M M H - 
  6.1.5  External facilities management M M M M M
 6.2  System planning and acceptance      
  6.2.1  Capacity planning - - H - - 
  6.2.2  System acceptance H M H M - 
  6.2.3  Fallback planning - - H H - 
  6.2.4  Operational change control - - M M - 
 6.3  Housekeeping      
  6.3.1  Data back-up - L L L - 
  6.3.2  Operator logs H M M M - 
  6.3.3  Fault logging - M M M - 
  6.3.4  Environmental monitoring - - H H - 
 6.4  Media handling and security       
  6.4.1  Management of removable computer media M - M M - 
  6.4.2  Data handling procedures M M M M - 
  6.4.3  Security of system documentation H H H H - 
  6.4.4  Disposal of media M - - H - 
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 7.1  Network Management      
  7.1.1  Network security controls M - M M - 
 7.2  Data and software exchange      
  7.2.1  Data and software exchange agreements M - M M - 
  7.2.2  Security of media in transit M M M M - 
  7.2.3  EDI security M M M M - 
  7.2.4  Security in electronic mail M M - M M
  7.2.5  Security in electronic office systems M M - M M
 7.3  Protection from malicious software      
  7.3.1  Virus control L L L L L
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 8.1  Business requirement for system access      
  8.1.1  Documented access control policy H H - H H
 8.2  User access management      
  8.2.1  User registration L L - - L
  8.2.2  Privilege management L L - - L
  8.2.3  User password management L L - - L
  8.2.4  Review of user access rights L L - - L
 8.3  User responsibilities      
  8.3.1  Password use L L M L L
  8.3.2  Unattended user equipment L L - L L
 8.4  Network access control      
  8.4.1  Limited services M M - M - 
  8.4.2  Enforced path H H - H - 
  8.4.3  User authentication L L - L L
  8.4.4  Node authentication H H M H - 
  8.4.5  Remote diagnostic port protection L L M L - 
  8.4.6  Segregation in networks M M H - - 
  8.4.7  Network connection control M M H - - 
  8.4.8  Network routeing control M M H - - 
  8.4.9  Security in network services L L - L L
 8.5  Computer access control      
  8.5.1  Automatic terminal identification M M - M - 
  8.5.2  Terminal logon procedures M M - M - 
  8.5.3  User identifiers L L - L L
  8.5.4  Password management system L L - L - 
  8.5.5  Duress alarm to safeguard users H H - H - 
  8.5.6  Terminal time-out M M - M - 
  8.5.7  Limitation of connection time M M - M - 
 8.6  Application access control      
  8.6.1  Information access restriction M M - M M
  8.6.2  Use of system utilities M M M M - 
  8.6.3  Access control to program source library L L L L - 
  8.6.4  Sensitive system isolation M M H - - 
 8.7  Monitoring system access and use      
  8.7.1  Event logging M M H M - 
  8.7.2  Monitoring system use M H M M - 
  8.7.3  Clock synchronization - H - H - 
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 9.1  Security requirements of systems      
  9.1.1  Security requirements analysis and specification L L L L L
 9.2  Security in application systems      
  9.2.1  Input data validation - M - - M
  9.2.2  Internal processing validation - M - - M
  9.2.3  Data encryption H H - - - 
  9.2.4  Message authentication - H - H H
 9.3  Security of application system files      
  9.3.1  Control of operational software - H M H - 
  9.3.2  Protection of system test data H H H H - 
 9.4  Security in development and support environments      
  9.4.1  Change controls procedures - M M M - 
  9.4.2  Technical review of operation system changes - - H H - 
  9.4.3  Restrictions on changes to software packages - M M M - 
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 10.1  Aspects of Business Continuity Planning      
  10.1.1  Business continuity planning process - - H - - 
  10.1.2  Business continuity planning framework - - H - - 
  10.1.3  Testing business continuity (plans) - - M - - 
  10.1.4  Updating business continuity plans - - H - - 
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 11.1  Compliance with legal requirements      
  11.1.1  Control of proprietary software copying - - - H - 
  11.1.2  Safeguarding of organizational records - - M - - 
  11.1.3  Data protection M - - H - 
  11.1.4  Prevention of misuse of IT facilities - M M M M
 11.2  Security reviews of IT systems      
  11.2.1  Compliance with security policy M M M M - 
  11.2.2  Technical compliance checking M M M M - 
 11.3  System audit considerations      
  11.3.1  System audit controls M M M M - 
  11.3.2  Protection of system audit tools L L L L - 
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Abstract 
 
Organizations depend and rely heavily on the use of information, because if the right 
information is not available at the right time, it can make the difference between profit 
and loss, or the success and failure of the organization.  Information is an asset and 
just like other important business assets within the organization, it has extreme value 
to the organization and should therefore be sufficiently protected.  To make a positive 
contribution to the overall success of an organization, information security controls 
must be well chosen and properly implemented to provide the necessary protection for 
information.  
 
Society today, is mainly driven by information and is often referred to as the 
‘information society’.  Over the last few years, the emphasis has clearly moved, from 
securing computer assets to securing information.  Therefore an alternative approach 
is required to secure the information resources of an organization.  
 
At present the needs for protection are very different, to the kind required earlier. 
Previously the onus was primarily on the protection of hardware, but nowadays it is 
more about protecting the information, than merely protecting the infrastructure. 
Information security is evaluated in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
accountability, authenticity and reliability and for this reason the traditional risk 
analysis approach is definitely not the ideal approach to determine the ‘amount’ of 
information security required. . 
 
The amount of protection required to adequately protect all information assets against 
identified and unidentified risks is referred to as the security requirements.  A Security 
Requirements Analysis will therefore be done to indicate the amount of security 
required.  This paper will provide guidelines for conducting a Security Requirements 
Analysis and how to use its results to identify and implement the appropriate set of 
security controls. 
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Introduction - The importance of information 
 
To operate effectively, all organizations rely and depend heavily on the use of 
information (Owens, 1998, p. 2)(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p. 1), because without 
information, business will fail to operate (Owens, 1998, p. 1 & 2).   Information is an 
asset and just like other important business assets within the organization, it has 
extreme value to an organization (BS 7799-1, 1999, p. 1)(Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 
1998, p. 8).  For this reason, it has become very important that business information is 
sufficiently protected. 
 
Information security is useful in the process of controlling and securing information 
from accidental or malicious changes, deletions or unauthorized disclosure (Royds, 
2000, p. 2)(URN 96/702, 1996, p. 3). By preventing and minimizing the impact of 
security incidents, information security can ensure business continuity and reduce 
business damage (Owens, 1998, p. 7). To implement information security, a suitable 
set of security controls can be implemented to protect information assets (BS 7799-1, 
1999, p. 1).   
 
The protection of assets – Then and Now  
 
The protection of assets is different today than were the case years ago.  Previously the 
focus was more on the protection of tangibles, such as hardware. All computing was 
done in a centralized computer facility and the computing assets could easily be 
protected in this central computing environment by using physical measures, such as 
the locking of doors, surveillance cameras, etc. The identification and quantification 
of the major costs and value associated with acquiring and using these tangible 
resources were relatively easy to do (Burch, Strater & Grudnitski, 1979, p 13). During 
this time, where assets where mostly physical of nature (Cowcher, 1992, p. 311), risk 
analysis was often used, since it was well suited for indicating the necessary 
protection in a centralized computing environment. 
 
Risk analysis involves monetary values to be assigned to all identified assets and 
threats, the assessment of vulnerabilities or weaknesses (Moses, 1992, p 229 & 230), 
while also considering the likelihood or probability of a security failure occurring and 
the impact or business harm which such failure might have on the organization  (BS 
7799-1, 1999, p 1).  Having done this, risks are identified and assessed and based on 
the magnitude of the various risks, a set of controls are proposed to minimize the risks 
to an acceptable level (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p. 9)(Moses, 1992, p. 236).  Risk 
analysis is therefore adequate to protect assets of which the threats and vulnerabilities 
can be estimated by means of qualitative and/or quantitative measures (Humphreys, 
Moses & Plate, 1998, p 49). 
 
In today’s society, information became a very important asset, if not the most 
important asset in the business world, where Internet and E-commerce plays an ever-
increasing role.  It is often referred to as the information society (URN 99/704, 1999, 
p. 2)(ISACF, 1998, p 2) or the information age (Hutchinson & Sawyer, 1990, p 2). In 
the information society the focus moved from merely protecting the infrastructure to 
protecting the business or personal information instead (Wills, 1999, p. 1).  The 
protection of information is therefore now even more important, because many 
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organizations are internally and externally connected by networks of IT systems 
(ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p. 1) and operates in a distributed computing 
environment rather than a centralized computing environment, like earlier. 
 
Even years ago, when protection was still more focused on tangibles, people came to 
realize the difficulty in quantifying the major costs of intangible resources (Burch, 
Strater & Grudnitski, 1979, p 13).  Information is an example of an intangible 
resource and it is therefore extremely difficult to determine its precise value, if not 
impossible (Burch, Strater & Grudnitski, 1979, p 16).  Because of the difficulty 
involved in determining the precise value of information and since the emphasis has 
moved over the last few years from computer (tangible) assets to information 
(intangible) assets, an alternative approach (Moses, 1992, p. 229) to traditional risk 
analysis is required to determine which security controls must be implemented to best 
secure the information resources of an organization.   
 
Need for Security Requirements 
 
Security requirements can be used to assist in the process of securing information 
resources. Security requirements are related to and are based on the organization’s 
unique business security needs in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
accountability, authenticity and reliability (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p. 1), and are 
driven by the organization’s specific business objectives and business goals.  It can 
therefore be said that security requirements are concerned with the ‘amount’ of 
security necessary for the effective protection of information assets against identified 
and unidentified risks, and not so much with determining the precise monetary value 
of the information. Although difficulty is experienced when attempting to assign 
monetary values to information and ultimately also to confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, auditability and authentication, the ‘amount’ of security or the level of 
protection required can however be determined. 
 
The ‘amount’ of security required by an organization (the security requirements) 
originates primarily from three sources (BS 7799-1, 1999, p. 1).  The first is derived 
from assessing the risks to the organization.  The second is the legal, statutory, 
regulatory and contractual requirements that must be satisfied by the organization, its 
trading partners, contractors and service providers.  Thirdly, the particular set of 
principles, objectives and requirements for information processing that an 
organization has developed to support its operations (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 
1998, p. 19). Once the security requirements have been determined, the most effective 
set of security controls, to provide that level of security can be identified. 
 
In order to make a positive contribution to the overall success of an organization, 
information security controls must be well chosen and properly implemented 
(Boddington & Hill, 1998, p 6).  Information security controls can provide the 
necessary protection to information assets against risks (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 
1998, p. 9 & 20).  
 
An organization should therefore first establish its security requirements in order to 
identify and select which information security controls are adequate (Humphreys, 
Moses & Plate, 1998, p. 9).  The security requirements will determine which security 
202  
controls are to be implemented to effectively counter all identified and unidentified 
risks.  A good understanding of the organization’s security needs is therefore 
necessary, to help with selecting the most suitable information security controls, 
which can ensure that risks are reduced to an acceptable level (BS 7799-1, 1999, p. 
2)(ISO/IEC TR 13335-4, 1997, p. 22).  
 
Thus, to ensure that the correct amount of security is obtained to protect information 
assets, security requirements need to be determined.  The approach for determining 
security requirements will be referred to as the Security Requirements Analysis and 
will be used to indicate the necessary protection required by an organization, by 
identifying the most appropriate set of security controls. 
 
High-level overview of conducting a Security Requirements Analysis (SRA) 
 
The SRA consists of a number of steps as illustrated in Fig. 1.  The objective of a 
SRA is not only to determine the unique security requirements of an organization, but 
also to analyze these security requirements to identify the best set of security controls.  
The selection of the security controls should be based on predetermined information 
security requirements and should meet the specific organizational information security 
need, which exists within an organization (BS 7799-1, 1999, p. 2). 
  
To be able to accurately determine the security requirements of an organization, 
definite criteria need to be established.  For this reason, five security concerns have 
been chosen to form part of the SRA, namely: confidentiality, integrity, availability, 
auditability and authenticity. 
 
The SRA, which is a type of business analysis involve a questionnaire, to be 
completed by the major/key role players responsible for security and those using 
information in the organization.  Preferably it should be done by the Information 
Security Officer in combination with the Information Security Forum.  The 
Information Security Officer is responsible for managing all security related issues in 
an organization.  Although the Information Security Officer is part of the Information 
Security Forum, the Information Security Forum should ideally also include 
representatives from various departments in the organization.   
 
This questionnaire, which forms part of the SRA consists of amongst others, business 
related questions, which will be used to determine the level of protection needed for 
each of the five security concerns.  Multiple complex weighted calculations and multi-
dimensional lookups result in a level of intensity being assigned to each of the five 
information security concerns. Since there are three levels of intensity, namely high, 
medium and low, each security concern will therefore be indicated as being either of 
high, medium or low intensity.  A security concern in combination with its associated 
level, as determined by the SRA, is referred to as a security requirement, e.g. 
Confidentiality = High, Integrity = Medium, etc. A security requirement therefore 
indicates the required security needed in an organization. 
 
These business related questions alone are not adequate to determine an accurate, final 
set of information security requirements, because the business-related questions only 
covers issues related to confidentiality, integrity, availability, auditability and 
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authentication. The implications that an occurrence of a security incident may cause, 
must also be considered by the SRA. By considering these implications, a better 
representative set of information security requirements will be produced by the SRA.  
 
Organizations must be aware of the effect that an unwanted security incident might 
have, not only on their own organization, but also on other institutions associated with 
their organization, such as customers, suppliers and government. Besides being aware 
of unwanted security incidents, legal implications and safety of personnel should also 
be considered.  It is imperative that the SRA therefore take into account the impact 
that events might impose on the business processes, products and services of an 
organization. The questions which considers all the before mentioned security 
implication issues are called the impact-related questions and are also included as part 
of the SRA.  
 
As shown in Fig. 1, the impact related questions are divided into two groups of 
questions, those that determine consequential issues and those that determine 
motivational issues related to security implications. The consequential issues are 
defined as the effect that an incident will have on the business processes, whereas the 
motivational issues are defined as the reasons for wanting to cause harm to the 
business. The most popular motivation for causing harm to an organization is 
financial gain, although there are others factors, which motivate criminals.  By 
applying further weighted calculations based on the answers to the impact-related 
questions, in combination to those done with the business-related questions, the 
intensity level for each security concern can be determined even more accurately, than 
was the case when only business-related issues were examined. 
 
The main goal of the SRA is therefore to determine accurate information security 
requirements, based on business requirements and impacts associated with company 
information. Once this has been done, security controls can be selected to provide the 
level of protection, dictated by the security requirements. 
 
The security controls to be identified by the SRA will be selected from the BS 7799 
baseline standard which list approximately 127 information security controls to 
choose from (BS 7799-1, 1999, p. 2 - 41). This is done by means of a categorization 
table which links each security control in BS 7799 to one or more security concern 
and to a particular level of intensity (high, medium, low). The direct linking of 
security concerns and intensity levels to the selection of security controls, will 
contribute towards an integrated approach to information security.  The intensity level 
indicates the necessity or importance of the associated controls.  For instance, in the 
case where security protection of level high is required, the implementation of the 
identified security controls are very important, for ensuring that no business harm is 
likely to come to the organization. A security concern of level low obviously requires 
less security controls to be identified and implemented than a level high security 
concern.  All necessary security controls to satisfy the unique security requirements of 
an organization, as produced by the SRA, will be indicated by using the categorization 
table. 
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Security Requirements Analysis 
 
Single questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: The Security Requirements Analysis (SRA) steps 
 
Although a set of BS 7799 controls will be identified for the specific security 
requirements of an organization by using the SRA, not all the security controls in the 
particular set of controls might be applicable to the organization’s specific security 
needs.  Perhaps the organization does not make use of Internet, or does not have a 
network, or makes use of outsourcing, in which case a set of elimination questions 
needs to be answered and based on this, certain irrelevant security controls can be 
eliminated and omitted from the initial identified set of security controls. 
 
The elimination questions are answered at the same time as the business-related and 
impact-related questions and are therefore not a separate questionnaire that should be 
completed at a different time as the business-related and impact-related questions.  
Since time is of essence, especially for managerial staff serving on the Security 
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Forum, a single questionnaire relieves these key role players from the tedious task of 
completing separate questionnaires at different times during the SRA. A single 
questionnaire is therefore completed, during which consensus is reached amongst the 
members of the Security Forum, regarding the organization’s security situation and 
based on its outcome the appropriate security controls as well as an up-to-date security 
policy document will be produced. As producing a security policy document does not 
form part of the objective of this paper, it will not be described in further detail. 
 
All that remains to be done is to correctly implement the identified security controls.  
In addition, a set of supporting security procedures will be identified to support the 
effective operation of each control.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Since information is regarded as an important business asset (BS 7799-1, 1999, p. 1), 
proper security measures must be taken to ensure that information is properly 
protected (Humphreys, Moses & Plate, 1998, p. 8).  The protection of assets is 
different today than was the case a few years ago.  As Michael Wills, Minister for 
Small Firms, Department of Trade and Industry, UK states that the information 
society of the future will not work if information is not secured.  He further says that 
the issue is not about protecting the technology, but it is about the protection of 
business as well as personal information, regardless of where it resides.  In other 
words, in the information society of the future the emphasis will be on the protection 
of information and no longer merely on the protection of the infrastructure (Wills, 
1999, p.1).   
 
Even years ago people realized the difficulty in quantifying the major costs of 
intangible resources, of which information is an example (Burch, Strater & 
Grudnitski, 1979, p. 13).   Although it is difficult or even impossible to determine the 
precise monetary value of information (Burch, Strater & Grudnitski, 1979, p. 16), the 
level of protection thereof can however be determined.  The ‘amount’ of security 
required to sufficiently protect information assets against identified and unidentified 
risks, is referred to as security requirements.  Security requirements are related to and 
are based on the organization’s unique business needs in terms of confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity and reliability, and are driven by 
business objectives and business goals (ISO/IEC TR 13335-2, 1997, p.1).   
 
This paper explained the need for an approach to effectively secure the information 
resources of an organization.  An approach, which has been developed specifically to 
address the issue of securing information resources, is the SRA. The purpose of a 
SRA is firstly to determine the security requirements of an organization and based on 
these security requirements, the SRA will further indicate the appropriate security 
controls to be implemented.  The security controls indicated by the SRA will provide 
the required protection for information and other organizational assets, based on the 
organization’s unique need for security.  
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